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1 
Introduction: 
Explorations of everyday African  
encounters: Research undertaken by  
students of the Research Masters in  
African Studies, Leiden University  
 
Mirjam de Bruijn & Daniela Merolla 
 
 
 
 
 
The Research Masters in African Studies at Leiden University, which is coor-
dinated by the African Studies Centre and hosted by Leiden University’s Faculty 
of Humanities, started in the academic year 2006-2007. African Studies, as it is 
formulated in this Masters programme, is a multidisciplinary field of study with 
its main focus being on the social sciences and humanities. The programme’s 
multi- and interdisciplinarity is also reflected in the various institutes, universities 
and professors, from both the Netherlands and abroad, who participate in the 
teaching programme. In its first year of operation, the main participating insti-
tutes, in addition to the African Studies Centre and Leiden University, were the 
University of Wageningen, the University of Amsterdam (UvA), the VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam, the CERES Research School for Resource Studies for Develop-
ment (Utrecht) and the University of Leuven. The Research Masters programme 
collaborates with many research institutes in Africa and offers a platform to unite 
African Studies in the Netherlands and beyond. 
African studies 
The study of Africa is as old as the first encounters between Africa and the West. 
These were in reality and in people’s imaginations, the latter being exemplified 
by early maps that were often not based on actual travel experiences and realities 
2 Mirjam de Bruijn & Daniela Merolla  
 
on the ground but on stories. More recent knowledge of Africa was laid down in 
texts, for instance in the written accounts of travellers and explorers but also by 
scholars of earlier times. Examples of African and African Arabic writers are Ibn 
Battuta and Ibn Khaldun in the 13th and 14th centuries, and in the early 19th 
century there were the texts of European travellers and explorers such as Hein-
rich Barth, Samuel Baker, Andre Gide, René Caillé, Roberto Ivens and Mungo 
Park, to name but a few. At the beginning of the 20th century, the first colonial 
administrators produced linguistic, social and political knowledge about African 
societies and some of those French administrators are today recognized as being 
early ethnographers, for example, Louis Faidherbe and Jean-Louis Triaud. But it 
was only in the course of the 20th century that knowledge production about and in 
Africa became institutionalized in research institutes and universities. The names 
given to these institutes reveal that they were often the products of the colonial 
encounter. Examples are IFAN (Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire or African 
Institute of Basic research) in Dakar, the Rhodes Livingstone Institute in the UK, 
and the Africa Museum Tervuren in Belgium. These early colonial institutes for 
social sciences were the start of the research traditions of the British, Belgians 
and French in Africa, and the Germans and Portuguese also left their footprints 
and created their own institutes. 
Nations without colonial ties in Africa, like the Netherlands, have a different 
academic tradition regarding the continent. Although they had colonies in South 
America and Asia, Dutch involvement in Africa was not one of colonialism, and 
its trade relations with Africa go back hundreds of years. However Dutch 
institutes of learning incorporated the study of Africa only after World War II 
when colonial ties with Indonesia were loosened and a renewed interest in trade 
relations and commerce led to a craving for knowledge about the African conti-
nent. African Studies in the Netherlands became a reality with the creation of a 
professorship in the Anthropology of Africa Department at Leiden University at 
the end of the 1950s. Over the decades since, Africa has developed its own 
centres of African Studies in South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, among 
others. From being a colonial discipline, it has developed into a fully fledged 
field of studies with its own debates and combinations of disciplines, and with its 
own community of researchers (Zeleza 2006, 2007).  
Although African Studies concentrates on the study of Africa, research is not 
confined to Africa alone as geographically African Studies also includes Dias-
pora Studies. And theoretically, the study of Africa reveals dynamics and pro-
cesses that are instructive for various disciplines (see Bates et al. 1993). African 
societies are societies like many others and the study of Africa should be in-
formative in allowing comparisons with other areas and seen as an important 
contribution to the development of new research fields within disciplines and 
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crossing related disciplines. It should be remembered that African Studies con-
tains not only a range of disciplines but a wide variety of geographical areas, 
societal forms, economies and politics. Despite this diversity, Africanists feel 
united in a common endeavour: The study of Africa in all its diversity. The re-
search of the Masters students in Leiden shows this diversity and commonality, 
which is sometimes so difficult to grasp, and they have become members of the 
Africanist community through the teaching programme and as a result of their 
research. 
The Research Masters in African Studies  
What do students learn in a Research Masters programme in African Studies? 
The main aim is for them to understand African societies within the context of a 
critical and reflexive approach, and the key tool for understanding is undertaking 
and experiencing research in practice. The research process can be divided into 
various phases, starting with the writing of a research proposal, which leads to 
the following phase, namely fieldwork. For some non-African students, this can 
be their first experience of Africa, while for African students it is their first 
experience of heading off on an academic mission. After their fieldwork, the 
students come back and process their research experiences into a thesis. Going 
along this route is a learning (and teaching) challenge in itself. Gaining good 
results is a test that for some students in Phase I may seem unattainable. Never-
theless, eight students in the first cohort of Research Masters in African Studies 
students reached the final phase successfully and their results are presented in 
this book. They started their Research Masters in the autumn of 2006, doing their 
fieldwork and the writing up of their results in the following (2007-2008) aca-
demic year, and defending their theses in December 2008. 
These students all succeeded in overcoming the challenges they encountered 
while doing research. This exercise was not only a learning process but also 
allowed them to attain a level that contributes to other people’s knowledge of 
Africa. The inventiveness and originality of the topics they chose and the quality 
of their work mean that they can be included in the interdisciplinarity and 
thematic directions of the field of African Studies. The diverse encounters they 
had with Africa during their research period offered an extra dimension to the 
discussions that were central in the courses they followed before they started 
their research when the main objective was to develop an understanding of 
African societies and the processes and dynamics at play. Insights are however 
created in a context of African Studies that is as much a scientific field as a field 
in which we deal with choices and selections. The field of African Studies is par-
ticularly influenced by choices and processes that are defined in politics, more 
specifically within development policies, with the epistemological foundations of 
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research in African Studies being marked by the intersection of research and 
hegemonic discourse and practice. Where in the past the concerns of the colonial 
powers were central, today the politics of development, security and poverty 
alleviation have an essential place in the debate. The study of Africa should, 
however, go beyond these concerns and delve into themes that relate to general 
continent-wide discussions in the social sciences and humanities. Orientations in 
the study of Africa are defined in relation to images that we create about and of 
Africa and Africans. These images and Africanist knowledge are not isolated in 
scientific discourse but stimulate as well as react to a wider context. Perceptions 
and ideas present in the researchers’ wider environment contribute to construct-
ing knowledge, including visual forms such as paintings, photos, documentaries 
and films, and a large range of narratives like news, travelogues and ‘fiction’ 
(Mudimbe 1988). Such a wider context becomes especially relevant if we con-
sider that African artistic reflection and reactions to external exploration and 
knowledge have interacted with political discourse and practice. The works of 
African artists have challenged fellow artists as well as policy makers and 
researchers. Works by Birago Diop, Ousmane Sembène and Tshibumba, for 
example, demonstrate how scientific images denied historical changes and mis-
represented Africa’s present as well as its past. Such a criticism again interacted 
with and stimulated the enormous number of studies on the continent’s historical 
past. Even today, the different fields of knowledge production in and of Africa 
are interconnected in reflections on technological, scientific and political devel-
opments within Africa and on long-term exchanges and transnational processes. 
While preparing their research proposals and doing fieldwork, the African 
Studies Research Masters students learn to recognize the conglomeration of 
images of Africa and the major intellectual processes that are at stake. They 
become able to analyze orientations towards and against the radicalization of the 
differences and the aesthetization of Africa in apparently diverse discourses, such 
as scientific essays, institutional reports, newspaper articles, films and creative 
writing. This also involves attaining a critical stance of one’s own work in the 
writing phase. We can indeed only contribute to a good understanding of Africa 
in relation to African issues, of Africa in relation to general debates and of Africa 
in relation to ourselves if we critically analyze these dynamics.  
The ‘we’ referred to in this section are the members of the Africanist scientific 
community, of which the Research Masters students have become a part. It is 
important to make the results of their research available to this community and 
this is the reasoning behind the decision to publish this volume.  
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The chapters 
The studies included in this volume vary in place, methodological approach and 
theme. What then makes them essentially products of African Studies? First of 
all, they share an empirical grounding, being based on fieldwork in African 
archives, daily situations and interviews and, in addition, they are strong in 
contextualizing and situating the studies both in place and theoretical debate. The 
fields of study in this volume include conflict, democracy, migration, urban and 
rural studies, language, communication and youth, but all are linked to the 
diverse thematic fields that are currently in vogue in African Studies.  
As stated above, an important debate in African Studies is about the practice 
of policy, one that is certainly present in some of the contributions in this antho-
logy. Josh Maiyo’s study relates to the issue of how political parties function in 
Eastern Africa, which is explicitly related to the problematic that goes with intro-
ducing and building democracy in Africa. This particular study received a lot of 
attention and support from the Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), which 
is based in the Netherlands. It did not stop with the provision of information but 
made a critical analysis of the functioning of political parties in Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda. The political-science approach was linked to profound ethnographic 
work within the parties themselves. Another example of a study that is closely 
related to a policy-relevant theme is that carried out by Hilde Kroes on Internally 
Displaced Peoples (IDPs) in northern Uganda. This study analyzes the various 
visions and ideas vis-à-vis these IDPs and the possibility of peace in the region, 
concluding that the international community’s expectations are based on incor-
rect assumptions leading to policies that do not necessarily deliver the intended 
results. In particular, those policies aimed at returning the IDPs do not seem to 
relate to the reality on the ground. The critical approach that both these studies 
took is demonstrated in the other studies as well. Their common approach, in the 
sense that they have tried to analyze social realities in their political and social 
consequences while being strongly embedded in the empirical, has resulted in a 
clear vision of the processes at play, while including an analysis of political re-
lations, the processes of in- and exclusion, and relations to future developments. 
They also provide good descriptions of the social, political and economic reali-
ties encountered. Reflexivity on the reality of fieldwork itself and on the way 
analyzes are made should always be part of a critical approach. 
The two socio-linguistic studies in this volume offer insight into the com-
bination of the study of language and social analysis. Pierre Aycard’s analysis of 
youth culture in South Africa, its integration in the lives of youths and its implicit 
notions of democracy and hope for the future are telling. This study was mainly 
based on participation and interviews in the townships but it has also resulted in  
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Picture 1.1 Hilde Kroes taking a boda boda in Gulu Town, Uganda 
 [© Hilde Kroes] 
 
 
the film Speak as You Want to Speak: Just Be Free! in which Pierre Aycard’s 
interviewees offer linguistic materials and interpretations of their linguistic prac-
tices. It even manages to avoid the pitfall of many documentaries that speak 
‘about’ Africans while Africans themselves remain voiceless. The analysis of the 
use of Swahili as a language of difference in Burundi, as proposed by Lianne 
Belt, goes beyond a simple analysis of the language and its use and tries to situ-
ate the development of language in the historical construction of ethnic contro-
versies in the town of Bujumbura. 
Migration and mobility have become prominent topics in African Studies in 
the past few decades. The research on IDPs in northern Uganda is an example of 
a study that enters into this realm, alongside Conflict Studies. The dynamic 
migration patterns of girls who move to N’djamena, Chad’s capital city, are 
described by Jonna Both and offer another example, showing how migration 
patterns are embedded in the cultural context of the societies to which the mi-
grants belong. The study however also illustrates how these patterns are situated 
in a political and regional context, in this case the very specific context that was 
created by Chad’s long civil war, which has led to an economy and society of 
uncertainty that makes the migrant girls not only move but also negotiate differ-
ences in a profitable way. 
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The everyday lives of Africans – be they adults, girls, youth or children – are 
at the heart of the majority of the chapters. The students looked for situations in 
which life had become problematic and where there were ‘problems’. We should 
however take care not to study only situations in the context of crisis or an 
extreme problematic setting. A study of women and how they organize them-
selves in small groups to deal with a lack of money, which was undertaken by 
Esther Kuhn, is a good example of a very ordinary situation in an African village, 
but in the ordinary lies specificity at the same time. The ROSCA saving schemes 
described are important for villages in Mali, and probably in some cases even 
crucial to the survival of women in this part of Africa. The use of mobile phones 
in a small urban centre in Anglophone Cameroon, as described by Barbara 
Gwanmesia, is another example of ordinary everyday experiences and the study’s 
conclusion that phone use should be understood in the context of the needs and 
wishes of the local people who have these phones seems obvious. The context of 
these needs and the way they are defined, however, mean that in the context of 
Buea and the normal economy of uncertainty, the phone has taken on its own role 
and its own different types of usage by those involved in the study. People are 
shaping and modelling the technology of communication to suit their needs as 
they are modelled and defined in the specific cultural, social and economic con-
texts in which they lead their everyday lives. 
All the studies refer to the uncertainties with which Africans, but also African 
institutions (although they may be part of the very uncertainties themselves), 
have to deal. These uncertainties are political, economic and/or social, shaping 
the daily context and thus the daily lives of institutes, political parties, migrants, 
inhabitants and men, women and youth in various countries and rural and urban 
spaces in Africa. The studies in this volume have taken different theoretical 
orientations regarding these uncertainties but they are all grounded in practice. 
For instance, the study of political parties is related to this problematic in terms 
of internal organizational problems, and the analysis considers the informal and 
formal workings of politics. And while the analysis of ROSCAs invites one to 
enter into a debate on economic- and social anthropology, the IDP problematic in 
Uganda in a discourse analysis with the migrant girls’ situation is best under-
stood as a form of navigation in various worlds. The socio-linguistic studies at-
tempt to understand situations through a combination of linguistic analysis and 
social-historical theories, and the analysis of phone use is related to an economic 
analysis of the situation, linking the daily practices of phone use to the economic 
changes in the area. 
These variations in approach have not resulted in big differences in the 
methodologies used. All the studies have embraced the ethnographic empirical 
approach, though with various interpretations. The ethnographic approach as it is 
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applied in the study of political parties in three different countries is certainly not 
the same as the ethnographic approach used in the study of migrant girls in town 
but what they have in common is that the reality is seen through the eyes of the 
people participating in this reality. Various methodological tools are used: Small 
surveys, observation, interviews, discourse and narrative analysis and, probably 
most importantly, an extended stay in the students’ respective places of research.  
Being in the field for a long period of time should never be an aim in itself but 
it is necessary if one is to grasp the practice and reality and to understand and 
interpret the processes and dynamics to be studied. This was perhaps the most 
challenging phase in these research projects, partly because it determined the 
ultimate outcome, i.e. the thesis. 
 
 
 
Picture 1.2 Lidewyde Berckmoes discussing developments in the field in an NGO 
vehicle 
 [© Lidewyde Berckmoes] 
 
 
The chapter by Lidewyde Berckmoes is devoted in its entirety to the process 
of gathering data in a field where insecurity reigns. In this specific case, the in-
security was physical, unlike the Cameroonian case where it was economic and 
was being experienced by the informants. The field locations chosen were ex-
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periencing different forms of insecurity, but in six of the eight studies physical 
insecurity played a role: the threat of rebel attacks in the northern Ugandan case, 
military and police violence on the streets of N’djamena, the hostility and rebel 
presence in Burundi, urban violence in South Africa, and confrontations with 
political upheaval in Kenya. These situations impacted on the researchers’ feel-
ings of security as well and certainly influenced their findings. For instance, the 
researcher analyzing political parties in Kenya after the 2007 riots found a totally 
different environment from the one that had been expected. In the study of 
migration to the city, risks were taken when going onto the streets at night and it 
was not possible to do so as extensively as would have been ideal when em-
ploying an ethnographic research method. One can imagine that doing research in 
the IDP camps was not without risk. But as mentioned in the article on youth in 
Burundi, these situations also contain extensive information in themselves. The 
unsaid and the places avoided are telling and should be used as data. The feelings 
of despair they can evoke in the researcher may be similar to those felt by 
informants. The limits on the choices for fields of study are indeed limits, but 
analysis of the ‘why’ of these limits may be helpful in understanding specific 
research questions. The methodological reflections in Lidewyde Berckmoes’s 
article are relevant for all the researches whose work is described in this volume 
and they open up a debate on methodology that belongs as much to the field of 
African Studies as do the exciting themes and approaches the researchers des-
cribe. And what is shown above all is that endurance and creativity are important 
elements in the research process. 
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Facilitating return: Notions of 
conflict and peace in ending  
internal displacement in  
Northern Uganda 
 
Hilde Kroes 
 
 
 
 
 
In current conflict theories it is suggested to see ‘war’ as socially constructed 
phenomena and that the level of violence in an area is not an effective indicator of 
the extent of a conflict. This paper challenges the conventional definitions of 
‘war’ and ‘peace’ that influence humanitarian and government interventions in 
northern Uganda. Since peace talks started in 2006 between the Lord’s Resist-
ance Army and the Ugandan government, hundreds of thousand internally dis-
placed persons (IDP) have been pushed out of the IDP camps ‘as the war is over’. 
However, IDPs do not act upon notions on war and peace, but decision making is 
based on the level of security they experience. In their views, northern Uganda is 
still a violent, uncertain and volatile place. This article argues that humanitarian 
and governmental policies do not sufficiently correspond to the life world of IDPs. 
Forcing the return process upon IDPs is not the solution to the displacement in 
the region. Instead, this approach promoted by the government and some humani-
tarian agencies, seriously undermines the displaced people’s rights and their 
authorities to make their own choices. 
Introduction 
I have grown up in the camp. I fear abductions due to what happened in the past. If I 
go back to my village, the LRA1 will roam while we are not protected. Nobody is sure 
whether this will end peacefully. The LRA might still be in our villages.2 
                                                 
1  The Lord’s Resistance Army. 
2  Focus group discussion at Anaka Camp, male aged 22, 19 December 2007. 
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Since peace talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of 
Uganda started in 2006 the displaced people in Gulu and Amuru districts in 
northern Uganda have been waiting for a conclusion to one of Africa’s most 
notorious conflicts. Over the last twenty years, 1.5 million people have been 
forced to leave their homes in northern Uganda for internal displacement camps. 
As the LRA is no longer terrorizing the region now that negotiations have 
started, the Ugandan government has claimed the war to be over and the region 
safe enough for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their villages. 
However, the IDPs in Gulu and Amuru districts did not leave the camps in 2007. 
This article highlights some of the dynamics that were explored in a research 
project3 that investigated why these IDPs were not returning home despite the 
relatively peaceful environment. It addresses the notions that the government, 
humanitarian agencies and IDPs have about conflict, peace and security.  
Different ideas about when a war is over and the development of a region 
result in interventions that do not necessarily correspond to the worlds of those 
most in need. In some cases, IDPs’ rights are even violated. This article chal-
lenges the perceptions of the Ugandan government and the humanitarian commu-
nity who speak of a ‘transition phase’ now that peace talks are being held after 
twenty years of conflict and humanitarian crisis. If northern Uganda’s situation 
were examined with the view that war is ‘socially constructed’ (Richards 2005), 
it would be clearer why people in northern Uganda are not moving. Humanitarian 
interventions could then be better adapted to the realities of those who have been 
displaced. 
Theories 
Conflict and peace  
The transition from ‘conventional wars’ to what are often referred to as the ‘new 
wars’ have been analyzed by many. Conventional wars are interstate wars that 
cross borders, for example the First and Second World Wars as well as the Gulf 
Wars. After the end of the Cold War, the so-called new wars came into the global 
arena. New wars involved new forms of violence, like the use of machetes, the 
burning down of houses and property, and mutilations. This kind of war has 
always been around but received only limited attention before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The new wars were ‘apparently provoked by poverty, population 
pressure or the bizarre hatreds of international terrorists’ (Richards 2005: 2). 
These wars tend to be inter-zonal and often within national borders. 
                                                 
3  H. Kroes (2008), ‘The journey home, multi-discursive perceptions on the movement patterns of in-
ternally displaced persons, Northern Uganda’, MPhil Thesis, Leiden: African Studies Centre & Leiden 
University. 
12 Hilde Kroes  
 
In the 1990s, the global community faced new trends in international politics; 
growing political instability, increasing numbers of migrants and wars as well as 
higher numbers of refugees and IDPs (Duffield 1994: 2-3). Conflicts in Africa 
are generally seen as obstructing and damaging economic revival but, according 
to Richards (2005: 3), there is a danger in approaching wars as tumultuous and 
seeing them as ‘bad’. War is then taken out of context: War is ‘foregrounded’ as 
a ‘thing in itself’ and not – as we shall argue – as one social project among many 
competing social projects. 
Perceiving war as a negative discourse overlooks the factors that can reduce 
violence: Social organization, culture and politics (Richards 2005: 3) Wars are 
sociological phenomena that systematically include planning, organization, train-
ing and the involvement of specific groups in society (Ibid.: 4). This means that 
wars are not mindless actions of rebels or others, although their actions may 
seem random and lacking in organization (Ibid.). 
It is claimed that war belongs to society (Richards 2005; Hilhorst 2007; 
Lambach 2007). According to Richards, wars can only be explained in different 
causes as part of a social process. There is ‘no single explanation of war’ 
(Richards 2005: 12). He focuses not on what causes wars but on how war and 
peace are ‘constructed’ (Ibid.: 13), arguing that there are many unconventional 
ways of looking at ‘war’ and ‘peace’. Economic factors have often been attri-
buted to the start of a war,4 as has ethnicity. Richards (2005: 8) refers to this new 
trend as ‘new barbarism’ and he promotes an ‘ethnographic perspective’ of war 
focusing on ‘patterns of violence already embedded within society’ (Ibid.: 11). 
These perspectives include: 
(…) pre-war peace is often more delicate and finely balanced than appreciated; and 
that the seeds of war are to be seen shooting up in peace; that the shift towards in-
tense armed conflict is a process with many twists and turns (and significant pauses, 
relevant as opportunities for peace makers); that conflict is sustained by an emergent 
sociology and economy of war; that turning back towards peace, even beyond a 
peace agreement, is a rocky path with many pitfalls; that the hidden or silent vio-
lence behind conflict has to be addressed if peace is to be sustained (justice matters); 
that sometimes peace breaks out even without formal peace making efforts; that war 
and violence echo in collective and individual memory for generations and that the 
institutional fabric to keep armed conflict within bounds over the longer term 
emerges from below as well as from above. (Richards 2005: 13-14) 
It is necessary to focus on the details of personal and societal lives. Every 
detail, like displacement, abductions and divided families are part of an armed 
conflict. And every detail matters when analyzing war and peace. To conclude, 
Richards prefers to speak of a ‘continuum’ instead of making sharp distinctions 
                                                 
4  Richards (2005: 9-10) refers to Berdal & Keen (1997), Berdal & Malone (2000), Le Billon (2000; 
2001) and, notably, Collier (2000). 
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between war and peace. This shift in thinking encompasses the irregular 
eruptions of violence in a period of perceived peace as well as cases where peace 
is even more violent than war (Richards 2005: 5). War does not ultimately result 
in peace, and peace does not always mean the end of war. ‘War’ does not always 
mean war in terms of violence and ‘peace’ is not always without violence. It is 
sometimes better to talk of ‘No war no peace’ as in the title of Richards’ (2005) 
book.  
 
Linking relief to development 
In this phase of news, wars and complex emergencies, the UN and the inter-
national aid apparatus are being challenged by new dynamics based on political 
instability, insecurity, an increasing gap between the rich and the poor, conflict 
and population movement and displacement (Duffield 1994: 3). New wars de-
mand new types of humanitarian aid and humanitarian aid should be linked to 
development.  
New dynamics require new kinds of interventions. Emergency relief no longer 
means the provision of food packages in times of hunger or tents for shelter. 
Donors now want more sustainable ways of addressing people’s needs even 
when they are hungry and have no shelter (Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell 1994: 1). 
Organizations have noted a gap between relief and development operations, with 
the theory being to link relief and development to ensure sustainability and cost 
effectiveness. ‘Better “development” can reduce the need for emergency relief; 
better “relief” can contribute to development and better “rehabilitation” can ease 
the transition between the two’ (Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell 1994: 1). 
It was thought that effective development could contribute to conflict pre-
vention (Macrae et al. 1997: 223). Development tackles poverty and poverty, as 
was the general line of thinking, enhances the risk of war. 
A new paradigm in the aid industry was born, a paradigm dominated by terms 
like ‘relief’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘recovery’. As Duffield (2002) 
observed, the focus on sustainability has resulted in interventions and strategies 
based on ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘development’. The distribution of food to the 
starving was no longer seen as an ethical or long-lasting solution. Relief has been 
used to take ‘anti-impoverishment measures’5 (Duffield 2002: 89). He calls this 
‘liberal self-management’; to design programmes for people to ensure their own 
economic and social well-being. In cases where circumstances are more difficult 
(gender, discrimination, etc), NGOs can offer a helping hand (Ibid.). 
 
                                                 
5  An example would be that people no longer ‘just’ receive food during relief operations. The World 
Food Programme has expanded its programme to include a more developmental focus. In their Food 
for Education programme for example, schools prepare breakfast and lunch for pupils to prevent them 
from dropping out of schools. Another example would be attracting labourers by paying them in food. 
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Picture 2.1 Koro Camp, October 2007 
 [© Josh Maiyo] 
 
 
The academic debate of linking relief to development is strongly connected to 
the debate concerning the definition of conflict/emergency and peace. As Hil-
horst (2007: 2) explains, ‘emergency’ and ‘reconstruction’ are socially con-
structed labels linked to different political debates. She argues, in line with 
Richards, that the distinction between emergency and post-emergency is not clear 
(Ibid.: 3) and that peace agreements often illustrate peace and motion recon-
struction. Instead she suggests that a crisis occurs over a longer period of time: 
There will be a long `no war no peace´ phase. When war is officially over, vio-
lence and predatory behaviour may still occur (Hilhorst 2007: 3; Lambach 2007: 
10). 
If peace suggests ‘reconstruction’ in the aid discourse, notions of peace should 
be critically examined. In the developmental discourse, emergencies are seen ‘as 
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temporary interruptions to the process of linear development’ (Duffield 1994: 5). 
He argues that these complex emergencies and their challenges affect social 
networks and systems as they are embedded in historical and societal dynamics 
(Ibid.: 4): 
So-called complex emergencies are essentially political in nature: They are pro-
tracted political crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to 
socioeconomic stress and marginalisation.  
In the context of Sudan in the 1990s, Macrae et al. see two major questions to 
consider when shifting to developmental aid in a complex emergency situation. 
The first is whether the emergency is over and the second is the space for 
development aid (Macrae et al. 1997: 229). Establishing when an emergency is 
over is not easy. The different interests of stakeholders claim different expla-
nations about how to define a situation. Often it is the local government that 
declares an emergency to be over. Interests should then be critically examined 
before declaring an emergency to have definitively ended. ‘The space for 
development aid’ is related to this. The shift to development depends on an 
invitation by local authorities to start with development interventions. A space 
for development can be created, even if an emergency is not yet over or the time 
is not yet ripe. Macrae et al. (1997: 231) also suggest that the shift to develop-
ment can be a wrong signal in the relationship between donors and governments. 
Government can then claim that the situation is normalizing and that the popu-
lation is no longer in danger or need. Duffield (1994) and Macrae et al. (1997) 
argue that complex emergencies are always political, which means that every 
national, international and local actor is involved in politics in emergencies.  
 
Linear thinking 
Terms like ‘development’, ‘relief’ and ‘rehabilitation’ deny the wider political 
context in which aid agencies determine their instruments and channels (Macrae 
et al. 1997: 224). In Sudan it was determined that different organizations did not 
have a common understanding of the definitions of these popular terms and none 
of them provided a decent policy framework. Those involved in the aid discourse 
however think linearly and that one situation follows another (see Figure 2.1). 
Every stage demands a different aid response from humanitarian aid to develop-
ment. The linkage between the two extremes is defined by terminology. But how 
one can respond to the different stages in practice is not clearly defined. If war is 
thought to result in transition, peace conflicts with the academic debate on the 
social processes of violence. The following chart represents the thinking in the 
humanitarian world. 
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Stages in security 
 
Stages in situations 
 
Stages in aid response 
 
Figure 2.1 Linear thinking of the humanitarian world in security situations  
and aid responses 
 
 
Macrae et al. (1997: 225), Richards (2005) and others are sceptical about these 
linear approaches. Hilhorst (2007: 12) summarizes it as follows: 
Let us not forget that the transition from relief to development is an optimistic slogan 
that does not apply to most people in emergency situations. [citing Christoplos 1998] 
Their normality is not one of development but of bare survival, with few services to 
fall back on. Their return to normality is not a transition from relief to development 
but a transition from relief to muddling through. Safeguarding the meagre livelihood, 
safety net and service options of these people should be a major driving force of hu-
manitarian aid. 
To conclude, humanitarian aid and the development discourse offer a linear 
thinking in terms of how to explain security situations and responses. It is 
thought that conflict means an emergency, one that demands a humanitarian 
response. Conflict is then followed by peace, which means a phase moving 
towards normality and reconstruction. Development programmes support this 
phase. However, there is no consensus on what to do between conflict and peace 
and how to respond. The humanitarian and development community invented a 
new model, the ‘linking relief to development’ approach. However, as academics 
have argued, the linear approaches to conflict, situation and responses will not 
help to understand local dynamics and the genuine needs of people. All the terms 
in Figure 1 have been invented in the aid organizations’ paradigm. What might 
be better would be to approach peace and conflict as part of society and nuanced 
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processes as Richards (2005) and Hilhorst (2007) propose, also in the case of 
northern Uganda. 
The Ugandan context 
Conflict and displacement 
It is hard for people to speak of one Uganda (RLP 2004: 10). Linguistically, 
culturally, economically and ecologically, southern Uganda is very different from 
northern Uganda, and the north/south divide was emphasized even during British 
colonial rule (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999; RLP 2004; Gingyera-Pinycwa 1992). 
The Baganda in the south were rewarded for collaborating with the British with 
roads, infrastructure, hospitals and a university during colonial rule. Northerners 
were considered disorganized and tribal (RLP 2004: 10) and in this less-
developed part of the country the British were able to find many people prepared 
to join the British army. Northerners were more occupied with fighting someone 
else’s war instead of investing economically in their own region (Doom & 
Vlassenroot 1999). 
Democracy became rooted in Africa when the indigenous people had to deal 
with the colonial powers (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 445). In the north, ethnic groups 
were struggling within themselves and with others but generally joined efforts to 
oppose the southern dominance created during colonialism. There was a wide-
spread belief that a northerner as president of Uganda could make up for these 
imbalances (Glentworth & Hancock 1973: 240). 
However, the two presidents from the north did not bring about national unity 
and stability. On the contrary: The gap between the north and the south widened 
and the situation deteriorated dramatically. Murder, imprisonment and exile 
marked Uganda’s history between 1962 and 1986 (Mugaju 2000: 8): Obote was a 
brutal dictator and Idi Amin’s regime represented eight years of oppression, 
killings and human rights abuse. His motto was: ‘I can fight therefore I must 
rule’ (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 445). When the Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA) captured Kampala in 1979, Idi Amin fled the country. After the 
elections in 1980, Obote started his second term as president although guerrillas 
accused him of sabotaging the elections. One of these rebel groups was the New 
Resistance Army (NRA) headed by Yoweri Museveni. Obote was overthrown by 
his own commanders in a coup in 1985 and Tito Okello assumed the presidency 
for a short period until he was overruled by Yoweri Museveni, who was not 
happy that Okello had assumed power while it was the NRA that had contributed 
to Obote’s departure. Museveni and his National Resistance Army feared south-
ern influence and revenge. 
NRA troops destroyed villages in the northern part of Uganda and civilians 
were incarcerated in concentration camps soon after they had captured the north 
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(Omara-Otunnu 1992: 454). Both the NRA and the rebel groups committed 
murder, looted properties and burnt down houses. Museveni even admitted that 
his troops set fire to food stores in northern Uganda, his explanation being that 
everything should be done to weaken the rebels (Ibid.: 455). As a result, many 
people from the north fled to Sudan or formed rebel movements in the north 
(Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 14). An opposition party emerged in northern 
Uganda under the name of the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM). 
Alice Lakwena, a young Acholi woman founded a movement known as the Holy 
Spirit Mobile Force (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 455) which posed a serious threat to 
the NRA but it could not overcome the NRA’s superiority (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 
457). Museveni took this opportunity to claim that northerners were backward 
and wild but, in the meantime, Lakwena’s followers formed a new rebel group 
under the notorious Joseph Kony: The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).  
The year the NRM took power and the LRA was formed marks the beginning 
of northern Uganda’s conflict, but numerous factors and incidents could have 
triggered the violence that followed. Or as Dolan (2005: 67) puts it: 
(…) what defines a particular period of violence as a war in its own right rather than 
simply one more in a succession of phases of violence? The so-called LRA war, 
after all, follows on from the violence of the Obote and Amin periods, violence 
during the establishment of colonial rule, and the depredations of the ivory and slave 
trade in the nineteenth century, to mention only the most obvious. 
During the conflict between the LRA and the government army, thousands of 
people were forcibly displaced by the NRA, which was infamously known for 
the looting and killing of the Acholi’s cattle. The LRA committed horrific 
atrocities: The cutting off of noses, lips and ears for example. In 1993 the first 
attempt at peace negotiations were initiated but a year later the talks failed, 
triggering a tremendous increase in violence (Dolan 2005: 75-76). The level of 
insecurity made people feel that they were no longer safe in their homes and 
thousands of young children ‘commuted’ between their villages and what they 
perceived as safer areas like the streets of Gulu town, hospitals, NGOs and 
churches where they spent the night. Fearing abduction from their villages, they 
sometimes walked several kilometres every evening and then returned in the 
morning. Others left their villages for the so-called ‘protected villages’ declared 
by Museveni’s government. Most of them were already trading centres or small 
towns: The majority however were controlled by the government army, now 
called the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). 
People were ordered to leave their villages and go to the closest trading 
centres or newly established camps but this displacement of the local population 
was only a temporary solution. The displaced were not allowed to leave the 
camps as they could be mistaken for rebels and would be shot. The conflict 
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started to attract more international diplomatic attention and the Ugandan govern-
ment was urged to take initiatives to end the conflict. It kept emphasizing that the 
conflict with ‘bandits’ demanded a military solution but when the LRA finally 
seemed to become tired of fighting, international efforts were made to get both 
the LRA and Museveni around the table for peace talks in 1998. However, the 
UPDF continued to fight the rebels in the eastern part of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC). Under international pressure, the Ugandan govern-
ment signed a peace agreement with Sudan in 1999. Furious about the lack of 
LRA involvement, Joseph Kony and his soldiers returned en masse to the north-
ern part of Uganda. The conflict continued and the Acholi who had sought to 
return to their own homes found themselves back in congested camps (Dolan 
2005: 76-85). By the end of 2004, 80% to 90% of the Acholi people were living 
in displacement and the UN World Food Programme was distributing food to 
about 1.5 million people in northern Uganda (Ibid.: 89-92). 
The violence continued in the following years. In 2004, the LRA attacked 
Barlonyo camp in Lira district, killing over 330 people. This was followed by a 
big demonstration in which 10,000 people urged the government to offer better 
protection for the IDP camps (HRW 2004). In early 2005 another attempt was 
made to organize peace talks but these again failed. The LRA extended their 
attacks to include Sudanese civilians and aid workers in northern Uganda, for-
cing relief organizations to temporarily leave the region. The ICC issued arrest 
warrants for five LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony and his second-in-com-
mand Vincent Otti. Civic and religious leaders expressed their concern that the 
warrants would obstruct possible future attempts at peace talks (HRW 2005). In 
July 2006 and financed by bilateral and multilateral donors, the regional govern-
ment of Southern Sudan initiated peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan 
government. A ceasefire was signed and the agenda was agreed. Under pressure 
from critics, the government of Uganda proposed withdrawing ICC warrants for 
the LRA leaders but this was not possible because the ICC was in charge and the 
Ugandan government was no longer in a position to influence the ICC process.6 
These peace talks raised expectations among those who had been displaced 
(HRW 2006) and, at the time of writing, peace talks between the LRA and 
Museveni’s government are still taking place with only Kony’s signature still re-
maining. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  Many scholars and professionals have written about the justice and reconciliation process in northern 
Uganda and the tensions between justice (ICC warrants) and peace (withdrawing the warrants to 
encourage Kony to sign the deal). 
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The national policy for internally displaced persons and the PRDP 
Jan Egeland, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, said the 
situation in northern Uganda was ‘one of the worst humanitarian crises in the 
world’ (The Lancet 2003: 1818). The displacement of 90% of the northern popu-
lation resulted in congested camps where disease, death and extreme levels of 
poverty were prevalent and people were living in appalling circumstances. To 
address the rights of the internally displaced, the government of Uganda was 
encouraged to prepare a policy to ensure their rights. The National Policy for 
Internally Displaced Persons was thus drawn up in 2001 and resembles the 
Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement and the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights. The policy describes the rights of the internally displaced and focuses on 
their return and resettlement and the assistance that should be offered by various 
institutions in this process. The policy states that: 
Reintegration is the re-entry of formerly internally displaced people back into the so-
cial, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community; 
Returnee refers to any Internally Displaced Person who returns to his or her home or 
place of habitual residence; 
Resettled persons are Internally Displaced Persons who resettle voluntarily in an-
other part of the country of habitual residence  
Integration is the process by which formerly displaced persons get absorbed into the 
social, economic, cultural and political fabric of a new community, or the community 
where they first found temporary settlement. (OPM 2004: xi) 
Although the policy does not describe how displaced people should be guided 
in these three processes, their rights are emphasized in the chapter on ‘General 
Provisions’. Two are of major importance: ‘freedom of movement’ and ‘freedom 
of choice’. The first is described as follows: 
Free movement ensures that the internally displaced can take part in various subsis-
tence activities and should, therefore, not be curtailed. (OPM 2004: 21) 
Strategies to ensure this right include the provision of security and a person’s 
free choice as to where to reside (Ibid.). Related to freedom of movement is the 
freedom of choice: 
In order for IDPs to be able to make the decision to return with full knowledge of the 
facts and freedom of choice, the Government shall use appropriate means to provide 
Internally Displaced Persons with objective and accurate information relevant to 
their return and reintegration to their homes or areas of habitual residence, or resettle 
voluntarily in another part of the country. (OPM 2004: 23) 
Since the peace talks started, the government, UNHCR and various NGOs 
have been actively working towards a northern Uganda without displacement, 
camps or the need for aid. Northern Uganda should develop because it is ‘the 
major impediment to increasing GDP growth in Uganda’ (PRDP 2007: vi). The 
Uganda government initiated a huge policy plan to recover and develop the north 
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called the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP). 
It is a framework for all the operations in the north for a period of three years at a 
cost of US$ 606,519,297. The policy has four objectives: (i) the consolidation of 
state authority; (ii) the rebuilding and empowering of communities; (iii) the re-
vitalization of the economy; and (iv) peace building and reconciliation. Gulu 
district has been told to replace the IDP policy and adopt the PRDP as their focus 
even though northern Uganda is still in the displacement phase. However it is 
promoted that displacement now belongs to the past.  
Humanitarian and government discourse 
Perceptions of conflict and peace 
On 10 November 2006 the UPDF and the northern district leaders declared on 
the radio that people could ‘voluntarily return’.7 As a district government official 
said: ‘The government assured that Kony will never cause displacement any-
more’.8 In their view, people should leave the dirty and crowded camps for their 
own villages where the government could protect them. The Ugandan govern-
ment is aware of all the critique they have received by forcing people into camps 
where life became worse for so many. Home is now considered to be the best 
place for them. No one would challenge them on that but the questions remains: 
Now, at this time? According to the same government official, this is a good time 
to return. As his colleagues confirm, the government has been very positive 
about the outcome of the peace talks. The level of insecurity has decreased 
dramatically and the region has been declared safe and ready for returnees. 
Government officials at the district and central level claim to have the ‘Kony 
issue’ under control and at the Office of the Prime Minister in Kampala, it was 
even said that the conflict ‘was a temporary problem’.9  
Calling the conflict a temporary problem is one way of looking at a conflict 
that has lasted for decades. It indicates the indifference of the central government 
towards this conflict and a lack of sympathy for its victims. The government does 
not speak about the threat of the LRA as a group but focuses on one man: Joseph 
Kony. Government officials claim Kony is no longer a threat to northern Uganda, 
that the region is safe enough for IDPs to return and that peace talks will cer-
tainly succeed. Others have adopted the view that there is no longer a war going 
on. Especially in the media, phrases like ‘When the war is over (…)’ have reso-
lutely turned into ‘Now the war is over (…)’ (AllAfrica 2008; Daily Monitor 
2008). 
                                                 
7  Interview with a district government official, Gulu town, 21 September 2007. 
8  Interview with a district government official, Gulu town, 12 November 2007. 
9  Interview with the Commissioner of Disaster Management and Refugees & the Principal Disaster 
Management Officer, Kampala, 18 October 2007. 
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Notions on the conflict in northern Uganda have implications for the humani-
tarian operational field. Northern Uganda is just one of the many programmes 
that humanitarian organizations are running. A lot of international staff have 
worked in other (conflict) areas and most of their programmes are based on a 
blueprint with little room for contextual adjustment. However, it is interesting to 
see that for many, the war in northern Uganda is considered to be different from 
other wars. 
This [situation in Northern Uganda] is not a difficult programme. You don’t get shot 
at in northern Uganda, there is democracy, structure, money, donors. We are making 
it so difficult for ourselves. Let’s pack and leave and concentrate on where the need 
is higher, Chad, Sudan, Iraq.10 
This UN official pleads for leaving the region because the situation is not 
serious enough to warrant their presence and he feels that the different structures 
that are in place make the situation there ‘better’ than that in other parts of the 
world. This was acknowledged by another humanitarian aid worker who said that 
‘In Darfur people do not have anything. There it is war.’11 This implies that there 
is no war in northern Uganda and comparison with other regions in the world 
makes northern Uganda a ‘second-degree’ war zone for some humanitarian 
workers. That hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people still live in 
crowded and underdeveloped camps with an uncertain future ahead of them is 
not considered a sufficiently difficult situation. There might be a degree of peace 
prevailing in the region but there is not yet total peace. For these aid workers, the 
improvement in security is not seen as a welcome but temporary relief for those 
who have suffered twenty years of conflict but as an end to the conflict. 
Why is this humanitarian situation considered to be so different from others? 
Many would suggest the presence of a government structure as one of the 
reasons, as the UN official mentioned. Gulu’s district government is indeed 
functioning and its roles and responsibilities are clear on paper: The government 
of Uganda is the main authority and humanitarian actors are there to help them. It 
is thought that this is different in other countries. 
Some international actors, not all, fail to appreciate the humanitarian structures that 
are there. The structures here are functional. This is not Darfur or a country where 
there is no government.12 
Return interventions 
When talking to IDPs six months after the peace talks, President Yoweri Muse-
veni stated:  
                                                 
10  Interview with a UN official, Gulu town, 13 December 2007. 
11  Interview with a humanitarian aid worker, Gulu town, 6 November 2007. 
12  Interview with a representative of Gulu NGO Forum, Gulu town, 22 December 2007. 
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There is kuc (peace) and security. Kony has run away. We are dealing with the cattle 
rustlers from Karamoja. This is not accidental. It is a result of years of deliberate 
work especially building our military capacity to contain peki acon (old problems) 
like Kony and cattle rustling. So kuc is here to stay. (…) The time has come. Take 
advantage of this kuc, go home and reorganize yourselves. (AllAfrica 2008) 
The Ugandan government and the humanitarian agencies in northern Uganda 
are working together to respond to IDP issues. Until October 2007, the National 
Policy on Internal Displacement in Uganda was used as a framework for ope-
rations. On returning to their homes, the policy claims: 
The government recognizes the right of IDPs against forcible return and resettlement 
in any place where their life, safety, liberty and health would be at risk. (OPM 2004: 
23) 
However, it depends on how one defines ‘risk’. The government claims the 
lives of IDPs are no longer at risk because in their view the war is over. Such an 
attitude enables the government to operate within the policy’s framework, but 
risk may be felt differently by others. For many, there is a realistic risk that the 
security situation will worsen. For them, the government’s promotion of return 
could be a violation of their rights. It is open to debate why the UN and hu-
manitarian agencies are barely challenging the government’s return campaign 
although it is clear that the government has its own agenda and wants to distract 
all eyes from the unpopular concept of encampment.  
The PRDP is one of these distractions. It has been allocated a budget of US$ 
38,973,120 out of a total budget of US$ 600 million for a three-year period to 
‘facilitate the voluntary return of IDPs from camps to their places of origin 
and/or any other location of their preference as peace returns’ (PRDP 2007: 63). 
Apart from the provision of ‘return kits’, there are no suggestions as to how to 
facilitate the return process. Almost US$ 39 million have been allocated to the 
return process in northern Uganda, all of which has to be spent by October 2010. 
As the government is obviously aware, there is no formal peace in place yet but 
by claiming that the war is over, the PRDP plan can be implemented anyway. 
This means that the government has started to channel the first of the US$ 39 
million through government bodies. 
The PRDP is influencing everyone working in the humanitarian community in 
northern Uganda and the government is closely monitoring the agencies’ activi-
ties. Many humanitarian workers admitted they had not read the 157-page plan 
but there is no way of opposing the plan or the timing of its launch. The PRDP 
was a UN and World Bank initiative and several agencies were involved in its 
development. The different stakeholders are all committed to the plan at a central 
level and obviously want to make a success of it. In the meantime, it is generally 
accepted that the war is over and that people should return to their homes as soon 
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as possible. Northern Uganda is ready to develop as a region and this is in the 
hands of the government. Half a billion dollars have been set aside to help the 
process. 
If you look at the situation critically, it does not make sense. Encampment started in 
1997. Before that people also lived at home during war. The situation in northern 
Uganda is very safe. In places like Nairobi and Johannesburg, death is everywhere. 
The level of insecurity cannot prevent people from going home. This Kony war is no 
longer a security threat.13 
The donors want early recovery. In theory, our agency is not involved but in practice 
we have to do it because early recovery is done here. We have a vital role to play. 
We are most proactive in encouraging people to move and to close camps.14 
Internally displaced persons 
Notions on security and fear 
Government and humanitarian actors wonder why people are not returning to 
their homes. They believe that the fear and doubts of the people surrounding the 
peace talks are irrelevant and consider other reasons, such as the availability of 
hut-building materials or the lack of services in return areas, to be more pertinent. 
It is true that these reasons are mentioned by the IDPs as factors influencing their 
decision-making about whether or not to move. Nevertheless, the displaced 
people first mention another reason for not moving out of the camps or going 
straight to their villages. The reason is first and foremost fear, fear of the rebels 
who could still kill someone or abduct children. This was mentioned in an 
interview with a man in his village near Gulu town: 
‘During the day I am here in the village for cultivation, but at night I am sleeping in 
the (trading) centre. I take my children with me.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Why don’t you spend the night here?’ 
‘The situation is very bad ad night. Abductions and killings.’ 
Interviewer: ‘By the rebels?’ 
‘By the rebels and even by the government. Because if you are alone you are an easy 
target. You have to stay with others.’15 
Fear of the rebels is obstructing the return process. ‘The young people still fear 
the LRA. When they go back to their villages anything can happen and they can 
still be arrested.’16,17 
 
 
                                                 
13  Interview with a senior humanitarian aid worker, Gulu town, 12 December 2007. 
14  Interview with a senior UN official, Gulu town, 13 December 2007. 
15  Interview in a village in Gulu district, male aged 55, 12 January 2008.  
16  ‘Arrested’ was used to say ‘abducted’.  
17  Interview in a village in Gulu district, male aged 20, 10 November 2007. 
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Picture 2.2 Food distribution World Food Programme, Palenga Camp 
 [© Hilde Kroes] 
 
 
Despite the fact that the LRA has not committed any recorded crimes since the 
beginning of the peace talks, northern Uganda is far from a safe environment. 
Several incidents have taken place in which rebels have attacked and looted small 
villages at night and killed people too. These ‘robbers’ are called boo-kec in the 
local language, meaning ‘bitter vegetables’. People fear them because of the 
large number of guns available in their communities. Several people in the camps 
had heard about or experienced incidents with the boo-kec. 
This is the real life situation. Two months ago my uncle went back to the village. He 
was slaughtered. People first have to protect their own lives.18 
It is fear of the boo-kec that is keeping people in the camps waiting for the 
security situation to improve. But the boo-kec and the peace talks are not the 
Acholi’s only concern. The conflict has affected and involved everyone. People 
have been members of the LRA or the UPDF and both parties are responsible for 
many deaths and serious atrocities. Years in IDP camps have resulted in a perfect 
understanding of who knows who, and feelings of revenge and clan disputes are 
likely to increase when people go to isolated places where there is less social and 
                                                 
18  Focus group discussion in Anaka’s main camp, male aged 28, 19 December 2007. 
26 Hilde Kroes  
 
military control. The fear of revenge is a major concern among those who were 
previously abducted (JRP & QPSW 2008: 10).  
People fear revenge. They fear atrocities in their own village. For example with two 
clans, one plans revenge if the other resettles in the village.19 
Some people were in the LRA and some in the UPDF. This will be a problem in the 
village unless there is a programme. For example, when a retired UPDF soldier came 
back, he wanted to slaughter the people sleeping in his house but could not because 
there were so many of them in the hut.20 
Having witnessed several failed attempts in the past, there are doubts about the 
success of the current peace talks. Why move out of the camps while there is still 
a risk that the peace talks might fail? For some people it would be a worst case 
scenario: If they left the camps now as they might be forced to go back to them if 
the security situation deteriorated again. 
Two years of relative peace is nothing compared to twenty years of conflict 
and a decade of living in camps. People are waiting for something tangible to 
come out of the peace talks, either the actual signing of a peace deal or the mo-
ment that ‘Kony comes out of the bush’.21 For some it feels like the war is still 
going on and that the rebels could attack at any moment. Others see improve-
ments in the security situation but are sceptical about whether they will hold in 
the long run. 
Apart from living in hardship for twenty years, people have not had any future 
prospects: It has been impossible to plan or have dreams. The improvement in 
the security situation does not mean people can easily take up where they left off 
twenty years ago, plan ahead and have faith and belief in the future. The govern-
ment and the humanitarian agencies are denying them this by demanding people 
return home because northern Uganda is, in their eyes at least, no longer an 
emergency situation. 
Perceptions of home are often mixed. On the one hand there is a general desire 
among IDPs to go home, but on the other hand thoughts of home bring back 
memories of the time when they lived in fear because of the atrocities committed 
by the LRA. In principle, the Acholi people never resisted being taken to the 
camps as it would be a temporary solution and offer protection. However, this 
temporary solution has turned into a long-term problem. The years in the camps 
have negatively affected people’s lives. The obvious tendency among IDPs is to 
idealize and romanticize home as being a better place than where they are now. 
However, perceptions of home seem not to impede or enhance return. The ma-
                                                 
19  Focus group discussion in Anaka’s main camp, male aged 29, 19 December 2007. 
20  Focus group discussion in Anaka’s main camp, male aged 25, 19 December 2007. 
21  ‘Kony coming out of the bush’ is the equivalent to Kony being caught or killed in the place where he is 
now hiding, namely in ‘the bush’. 
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jority still remain in camps or at new sites. Acholi patterns of mobility show that 
home is not necessarily linked to place and time.  
Conclusion 
The Ugandan government and the humanitarian aid agencies consider August 
2006 as a moment of breakthrough in northern Uganda’s history. The ceasefire 
that resulted from the first talks was considered a serious attempt to end twenty 
years of conflict and the level of security drastically improved after this. No rebel 
attacks have been recorded in Gulu and Amuru district since then but despite the 
peace talks’ failure to conclude the conflict, the war in northern Uganda is now 
considered to be over.  
However, as Lambach (2007) explains, the level of violence in an area is not 
an effective indicator of the extent of a conflict. People’s security regularly 
deteriorates and death and injury rates can remain high in a former conflict zone 
(Lambach 2007: 10). In northern Uganda there has been almost no violence 
recently but that does not mean that the conflict has ended nor does it mean the 
beginning of a post-conflict situation. People fear the rebels, the boo-kec, revenge 
and clan rivalries. People in the camps are still dying of disease and hunger even 
though there is now ‘relative peace’. The level of violence has dropped but the 
situation should not be mistaken for a post-conflict situation: The situation in 
northern Uganda is still violent, uncertain and volatile. 
Claiming that the war is over implies that the war ‘started’ one day, that there 
was a life before the conflict and that there will be a life after the conflict. 
Interestingly, it has proven to be hard to attribute a certain event or a certain year 
to the beginning of the conflict in northern Uganda and it is hard to define the 
war-torn situation in the north. It is not important to attempt to unravel the 
features, causes and results of the war. What is important here is how the 
definition of war and peace relates to humanitarian interventions and how the 
IDPs themselves perceive their security situation and how this influences their 
decision to leave or stay in the camps. 
If we look at the conflict in northern Uganda as a ‘socially constructed pro-
cess’ (Richards 2005), then the conflict here is not an event in itself. It is part of a 
structural problem between northern and southern Uganda – as well as between 
the Ugandan government and the Acholi people. In that sense, the situation in 
northern Uganda can indeed be identified as a ‘no war no peace’ situation. The 
current peace talks and even peace itself will not solve the structural problems in 
northern Uganda. The tensions between north and south, the government and the 
Acholi will remain. They started many decades ago and there is no indication 
that they will disappear in the near future. IDPs are, of course, aware of these 
tensions and the structural political problem in the north and their perceptions of 
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the future in political and social domains are influenced by this knowledge. The 
peace talks and peace are just (important) fragments of a long historical and 
political struggle between northern and southern Uganda. The government would 
deny the structural complexity of the region and the humanitarian agencies 
working there lack the historical knowledge and the feeling for specific political 
nuances. 
There will always be an element of insecurity that particular groups may find 
difficult to live with. IDPs have already voiced their fears about the return of the 
rebels and of the boo-kec who loot and rob people in the villages. People who 
have committed crimes during the war – for instance as a rebel – also fear 
revenge from community members. In their daily lives, the ceasefire has not 
offered a breakthrough. Violence has continued, others have entered the stage. 
People do not tend to think in rigid time distinctions, in terms of the end of the 
conflict and the start of the post-conflict period. The IDPs have not changed their 
perception of the security situation: Rebel activity may have decreased but as 
long as people think it is still a potential threat in their lives, it is difficult to talk 
about a major change in their situation.  
The Ugandan government and the humanitarian aid community have an un-
realistic image of how northern Uganda will be in the near future. The fact that 
the peace agreement has not yet been signed is of huge significance to the north. 
The war is not over, and it will not even be over when a deal is signed. Twenty 
years of conflict have changed people and their societies.  
The internally displaced of northern Uganda have dealt with violence for 
centuries, more intensely in some periods than in others. Volatility is part of 
these people’s lives and they have adjusted their strategies based on their 
experiences. In line with Hilhorst (2007: 12), their normality is based upon 
survival. Their patterns of mobility indicate these strategies and their perceptions 
of their own security, which are very different from the linear thinking of the 
government and the humanitarian agencies in Uganda. The planned return 
approach promoted by the government and some of the humanitarian agencies 
seriously undermines the displaced people’s rights and their authority to make 
their own choices. No conditions have been established to facilitate the IDPs’ 
return nor are they participating in the planning and management of their own 
return. The internally displaced should be protected at all stages, security threats 
should be tackled and, above all, every effort should be made to produce a posi-
tive conclusion to the peace talks so that the internally displaced of northern 
Uganda can plan their voluntary return home in safety and with dignity. 
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Political parties and intra-party 
democracy in East Africa:  
Considerations for democratic 
consolidation 
 
Josh Maiyo 
 
 
 
 
 
Political parties are essential institutions for the proper functioning of a demo-
cratic society and perform important functions for the promotion of democracy by 
mobilizing citizens and linking them to government. To effectively carry out these 
functions, political parties are expected to incorporate democratic ideals in their 
internal processes and functioning. Intra-party democracy, as an element of parti-
cipatory democracy, is widely perceived as necessary for the development of a 
democratic culture in the wider society. The attainment of these democratic ideals 
depends on the extent to which processes of effective membership participation 
are formally stipulated in the organizational rules and practically implemented in 
political party processes. This chapter1 examines the state of internal party demo-
cracy among political parties in East Africa. It seeks to expand existing know-
ledge on intra-party democracy in Africa with specific reference to how processes 
of institutionalization, inclusiveness and (de)centralization influence levels of par-
ticipatory democracy among political parties in the region. While debate conti-
nues on exactly how much democracy is good for political party effectiveness, the 
consensus is that intra-party democracy is desirable for its role in increasing 
levels of participatory democracy in the wider society. The discussion draws on 
democratic theory and normative approaches to intra-party democracy developed 
largely from studies of political parties in western democracies while juxtaposing 
this on empirical research in Africa. International democracy assistance pro-
grammes use these models to propose that political party reform processes in-
                                                 
1  An earlier version was presented as paper at a seminar on Intra-Party Democracy at the Africa Studies 
Centre, Leiden University on 9 September 2008. The arguments presented here are based on results of 
empirical research conducted with political parties in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania from September 
2007 to January 2008. 
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clude aspects related to the internal organization such as intra-party democracy 
(NIMD 2004). This chapter seeks to determine if and to what extent these models 
are adequate for the study and analysis of African political parties and party sys-
tems. It concludes that whereas intra-party democracy is a desirable ideal, Afri-
can political parties are products of distinct socio-economic and historical cir-
cumstances to which existing models do not fit wholly and need to be reviewed. 
Introduction 
Political parties perform certain crucial democratic functions in the wider society 
such as augmenting citizen participation in the political processes, widening the 
aggregation of diverse political interests, facilitating orderly and democratic 
transfer of political power, promoting government accountability, and imparting 
legitimacy to the political system (Matlosa 2005). In Africa, political parties also 
serve as channels of resource distribution, patronage, upward mobility and ex-
pressions of indigenous and ethnic aspirations.  
It is generally accepted that political parties cannot fulfil their democratic 
functions if they themselves are not democratic in the conduct of their internal 
affairs and how they present themselves to the electorate. These assumptions 
depict intra-party democracy as essential for the creation and growth of well-
functioning and sustainable democratic institutions: Firstly, it encourages a cul-
ture of democratic debate and deliberation of critical issues and therefore collec-
tive ownership of decisions. Secondly, it promotes party unity through reduced 
factionalism and/or fragmentation. Thirdly, it creates legitimate internal conflict 
management systems and fourthly, it reduces the opportunistic and arbitrary use 
of delegated authority.  
Correlations are also made between increased intra-party democracy and 
greater party effectiveness and subsequent electoral success on the one hand, and 
the strengthening of democratic culture in the wider society on the other (Scar-
row 2005). Internal democracy is indispensable if political parties are to fulfil 
their role as legitimate and credible agents of democratization. The extent to 
which political parties can attain intra-party democracy depends on the extent to 
which processes of effective membership participation are formally stipulated 
and implemented in practice in the party’s organizational rules and procedures. If 
there is ineffective enforcement, or complete absence of such rules, the party may 
be faced with significant institutional and operational challenges.  
The enormity of the challenge facing African political parties is compounded 
by the fact that, unlike the majority of their western counterparts, few African 
nation-states display a distinctive cultural or ethno-linguistic homogeneity. They 
are heterogeneous along ethnic, regional, religious and/or clan cleavages, and are 
therefore highly fractious. Political competition and organization tends to follow 
these pre-existing fault lines, which in turn determine the structure of political 
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parties. Compared to their European counterparts, African political parties are 
products of distinct historical, socio-economic and political conditions that in-
fluence their identity, organizational structure and functioning. 
Manning (2005: 718) characterizes African parties as ‘not (being) organically 
linked to any particular organized social group, and so have often resorted to 
mobilizing people along the issues that are ready to hand – ethnicity, opposition 
to structural economic reform – without regard for the long-term consequences’. 
The majority of African political parties are characterized by weak organizational 
strength and a lack of institutional capacity, their decision-making processes are 
unstructured and power tends to be personalized in the party leader and a few of 
his cronies who are usually wealthy enough to bankroll the party (NIMD 2004; 
Wanjohi 2003). The role of the party membership is reduced to a bare minimum, 
usually to endorse decisions already made by the elite. Political mobilization as-
sumes the form of personality cults and loyalty is to the party leader as opposed 
to the party as an institution. 
Political parties in East Africa, as elsewhere across the globe, continue to 
grapple with these ideological, institutional and structural challenges with the 
potential to compromise their survival, legitimacy and effective functioning. The 
challenges often result in undesired outcomes such declining membership, elec-
toral losses, lack of cohesion, factionalism and instability, weak coalitions and a 
poor state of internal democracy (Meinhardt & Patel 2003: 33). These factors 
ultimately undermine political parties’ effectiveness as agents of democracy in 
the wider society.  
Contemporary democracy assistance programmes developed in the west fre-
quently approach the study of and interventions in political party development in 
Africa with a set of indicators and criteria by which political parties can be 
analysed and measured with regard to their institutionalization, organizational 
strength, as well as internal democracy (NIMD 2004). These tools often come 
with a list of ‘Dos and Don’ts’ that sets minimum standards for party behaviour 
and organization (NDI 2008). The question however remains as to whether these 
models based on western theoretical analyses and assumptions on the role and 
functions of political parties are practical, useful and acceptable to political prac-
titioners in African party political environments. The following section delves 
into the contemporary conceptualization of intra-party democracy and its appli-
cability to African settings. This is followed by an empirical examination of the 
state of intra-party democracy in East Africa that examines whether or not poli-
tical parties in the region conform to these models. The chapter then concludes 
with an analysis of the practical and theoretical applicability of existing models 
and proposes ways in which these could be improved.  
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Conceptualizing intra-party democracy 
The primary democratic function of a political party is to link the citizenry with 
the government (Sartori 1987: 11). To play this role effectively, political parties 
have to provide opportunities for effective participation by party members, acti-
vists and leaders in the party’s decision-making processes. Intra-party democracy 
(IPD) thus refers to the extent to which political parties’ decision-making 
structures and processes provide opportunities for individual citizens to influence 
the choices that parties offer voters. Discourse on intra-party democracy is an-
chored in theories of participatory democracy which can be described as pro-
cesses that emphasize the broad participation (in decision-making) of citizens in 
the direction and operation of political systems. Membership participation is a 
central feature and variable of research into IPD.  
Intra-party democracy is not a universally popular notion however and debate 
continues among policy makers and comparative political theorists regarding the 
desirability and feasibility of intra-party democracy. Various arguments have 
been advanced for and against IPD based on differing views on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of democratic decision-making processes. This is certainly the 
case in East Africa where a combination of increased internal democracy coupled 
with low institutionalization, a lack of effective and independent conflict reso-
lution mechanisms as well as a chaotic political culture in a highly heterogeneous 
society threaten social cohesion and could be a recipe for open conflict. In this 
section, both sides of the argument are explored with a view to establishing a 
workable context-specific compromise. 
 
Too much democracy? Intra-party democracy and party effectiveness 
The iron law of oligarchy (Michels 1962) argues that political parties are in-
herently undemocratic and have a tendency towards oligarchy. According to this 
argument, intra-party democracy is cumbersome and leads to inefficient decision-
making processes that are at variance with the ultimate desire for well-organized, 
structured and institutionalized party systems. This view is further supported by 
arguments that intra-party democracy weakens political parties and compromises 
their ability to compete against their opponents and is therefore undesirable (Du-
verger 1965: 134). Proponents of this view argue that ‘in order to serve demo-
cratic ends, political parties themselves must be ruled by oligarchic principles’ 
(Teorell 1999: 364).  
 Intra-party democracy, it is claimed, impedes decision-making, precludes par-
ties from choosing candidates they regard as most appealing to the electorate and 
transfers key political decisions to a small group of activists at the expense of the 
broader party membership (Gauja 2006). Intra-party democracy is also seen to 
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reduce party cohesion while increasing the risk of internal dissention. This im-
pinges on party efficiency as more time and energy are spent on internal compe-
tition and conflict resolution than on the core priorities of electoral and govern-
mental success.  
These arguments underline the position that intra-party democracy does not 
necessarily lead to better political party effectiveness and electoral victory, and 
neither does it contribute to increased democracy in the wider society. On the 
contrary, oligarchy seems to be a more appealing option for political parties in 
presenting a united front, both to the electorate and the opposition (Wright 1971: 
446), especially in highly fractious and heterogeneous societies in Africa. Many 
African leaders have used this argument in compelling ways to defend autocratic 
single-party rule or the total proscription of political parties in the name of 
national cohesion, development and state-building (Okuku 2002). 
Oligarchic political party structures are characterized by elite and leadership 
control of the party at the expense of the party membership, more often than not 
leading to undemocratic and authoritarian government. This reflects the prevail-
ing situation in the majority of political parties in both authoritarian African 
states as well as those undergoing political liberalization. This would suggest that 
while institutions may change, political culture is yet to follow suit and political 
parties in such societies tend to have highly centralized and non-inclusive 
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decision-making processes and are not, therefore, internally democratic. Political 
parties then fail to fulfil their function as agents of democratization contributing 
to increased democracy. 
Proponents of the competitive model of democracy (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 
1956; Downs 1957; Sartori 1987) argue that a system of competitive political 
parties is necessary for effective interest aggregation and their channelling in 
competition for government. A balance therefore needs to be struck that ensures 
the growth of effective and competitive political party systems as well safe-
guarding and strengthening participatory democracy in the wider society. Only 
then can intra-party democracy promote the efficiency and competitiveness of 
political parties while at the same time increasing democracy.  
 
The case for intra-party democracy 
The choice between direct (participatory) democracy and representative demo-
cracy is normative and ideological. Proponents of direct democracy who favour 
direct citizen participation in governance processes decry the failure of repre-
sentative democracy through the political party system as an ineffective alter-
native. How then can this gap be bridged and what institutional safeguards can be 
built into representative democracy to guarantee acceptable levels of citizen 
participation in the absence of direct democracy? How can intra-party democracy 
fill this gap without compromising the effectiveness and efficiency of political 
parties?  
The appeal of intra-party democracy lies in the fact that it may ‘facilitate 
citizen-self rule, permit the broadest deliberation in determining public policy 
and constitutionally guaranteeing all the freedoms necessary for open political 
competition’ (Joseph 1997: 365). This approach combines perspectives of parti-
cipatory and deliberative democracy that emphasize the central features of par-
ticipation and contestation. Participatory democrats place a high premium on 
citizen participation in the political process and a sense of civic responsibility. 
According to Van Biezen (2004), only then can a political system warrant the 
label of ‘democracy’. McPherson (in Teorell 1999: 368) proposed a pyramidal 
system of intra-party democracy ‘with direct democracy at the base and a dele-
gate democracy at every level above that’ supplemented by a system of compe-
titive political parties. Since a truly participatory model of democracy in the form 
of direct Athenian democracy is not feasible due to the complexity of societies, 
political parties bridge the gap between citizens and government by providing 
avenues for citizen participation through effective intra-party democracy. 
The deliberative theory of democracy has gained ground of late by empha-
sizing that democracy is a product of deliberation among free, equal and rational 
citizens (Elster 1998). This approach sees democracy as a process rather than an 
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outcome. Dryzek (2000) concurs that democracy is thus a process of ‘delibera-
tion as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights or even self 
government’. This emphasizes the process by which opinions are formed, poli-
cies formulated and programmes developed. All these models present normative 
approaches to the concept of intra-party democracy. They are by no means 
conclusive or incontestable but chart the broad parameters within which more 
refined and context specific structures and processes can be advanced in favour 
of intra-party democracy. 
 
Functions of intra-party democracy 
Normative theorizing aside, research on intra-party democracy tends to focus on 
a utilitarian perspective that seeks to establish empirical causal relationships as-
sociated with processes of intra-party democracy. Research remains inconclusive 
on whether and to what extent parties need to be internally democratic to pro-
mote democracy within the wider society. According to Scarrow (2005: 3), poli-
tical parties that practise intra-party democracy ‘are likely to select more capable 
and appealing leaders, to have more responsive policies, and, as a result, to enjoy 
greater electoral success (…) [and] strengthen democratic culture generally’. 
Other arguments in favour of intra-party democracy suggest that it encourages 
political equality by creating a level playing field in candidate selection and poli-
cy development within the party; and ensures popular control of government by 
extending democratic norms to party organizations such as transparency and 
accountability. It also improves the quality of public debate by fostering in-
clusive and deliberative practices within parties (Gauja 2006: 6).  
In East Africa, political parties are largely characterized by a top-down organi-
zational structure where power and decision-making are highly centralized. This 
leaves little room for deliberative decision-making processes involving the party 
membership. This organizational structure has been inherited from the colonial 
legacy where colonial administrators and the political elite dictated to and made 
decisions on behalf of the native population without consultation (Malyamkono 
& Kanyongolo 2003: 273). Political parties thus tend to be autocratic or oli-
garchic in their organizational structures where conformity is preferable to the 
critical debate of issues and is enforced through covert and overt pressure, and 
illegal sanctions including suspension and even expulsion from the party. These 
practices lead to severe limitations of inclusiveness and transparency while 
breeding patrimonialism that compromises intra-party democracy. 
Political parties are perceived more as vehicles to contest and attain public 
office and less as institutions for democratic consolidation. The desirability of 
intra-party democracy is more likely to be viewed in terms of its use in im-
proving the overall political party effectiveness against competitors. This denotes 
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an outcome-oriented approach but, as the discussion above suggests, this liberal 
view of democracy is incompatible with the participatory perspective of intra-
party democracy (Wanjohi 2003; Salih 2003; Oloo 2007). 
The success of intra-party democracy in Africa lies in understanding the 
motivations of individual agency as well as the functional aspects of political 
parties. While contemporary democracy assistance programmes that prescribe 
attitude change away from a result directed towards a process-oriented approach 
may be desirable, this could prove difficult to achieve. A fine and pragmatic 
balance must be struck between an emphasis on party processes that entrench 
democratic culture by increasing citizen participation with result-oriented ap-
proaches that strengthen political party effectiveness. Political parties should not 
be seen just as ‘incubators that nurture citizens’ political competence’ (Scarrow 
2005) but also as channels of political contestation, resource allocation and 
interest aggregation. In polities characterized by low levels of civic awareness, 
intra-party democracy provides opportunities to expand civic education and 
awareness through participation, while at the same time devolving power and 
decision-making processes to a broader section of society. 
Political party systems in East Africa 
Political party systems determine the form and substance of political competition 
among parties, which in turn determines the way in which parties organize 
internally and present themselves to their opponents and the public. A party 
system refers to the classifications of internal and external networks and rela-
tionships of political parties. They comprise ‘the alliances, coalitions, negotia-
tions and debates’ that political parties engage in and that form the ‘crucial 
aspects of political life, the structure of the governing polity and the nature of 
political stability’ (Salih & Nordlund 2007: 43).  
Uganda and Tanzania are one-dominant-party systems where both the CCM 
and the NRM enjoy electoral success and uninterrupted periods in power. Kenya 
has had a two-dominant-party system since the 2002 elections. Uganda has six 
political parties in parliament, Tanzania has five and Kenya has no fewer than 
twenty-three, almost all under either the PNU or ODM umbrella parties. While 
Kenya has had competitive multiparty elections since 1992 and Tanzania since 
1995, Uganda has only had one (in 2006). Pluralist politics are therefore still in 
their infancy there and Uganda can be described as having a dominant autho-
ritarian party system. 
 While political parties form the mainstay of political organization and repre-
sentation, their level of institutionalization is still relatively weak. In such cir-
cumstances, dominant party systems have a negative effect on competitive poli- 
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Table 3.1 Party systems in East Africa, January 2008 
 
Parties at 
indepen- 
dence 
Single- 
party 
rule 
Multi- 
party 
elections 
Registered
parties 
Parties in 
Parlia- 
ment 
Party 
system 
Uganda 3 1969-2005 2006 35 6 
One-
dominant 
party 
Tanzania 6 1964-77-1992 
1995/2000/ 
2005 19 5 
One-
dominant 
party 
Kenya 2 1964-66, 1969-1991 
1992/1997/ 
2002/2007 156 23 
Two-
dominant 
party 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union 
 
 
tics. In Uganda for instance, opposition parties operate under severe constraints 
imposed by the authoritarian NRM government (Chege 2007). A lack of insti-
tutionalized structures within political parties leads to the development of per-
sonality cult politics. President Museveni, for instance, does not seem even to 
respect his own NRM party. During the 2006 elections, he set up parallel 
structures for his campaigns that were ran by close associates from the military. 
It is these parallel structures rather than the civilian party taskforce that are 
credited with ensuring his victory in the elections.2 
Similarly, President Kibaki in Kenya abandoned his sponsoring party (NARC) 
and set up a new political party, the PNU, just three months before the general 
election in December 2007. His campaign secretariat was run by professionals 
drawn from the private sector while politicians associated with his coalition part-
ner parties were shunned, leading to numerous complaints, disorganization and 
dissent.3 This portrays a system where political elites have scant respect for poli-
tical parties as institutions and only see their value as convenient tools for con-
testing elections and which can be discarded once they have served their purpose. 
Political parties tend to be dormant after elections and only revive during the 
following election cycle (Chege 2007: 25). 
Dominant party systems pose a challenge to democracy in general and may 
lead to less intra-party democracy since they dominate the legislature and mono-
polize the law-making process. In most cases, parliament loses its sovereignty as 
an independent arm of government; it simply exists to rubberstamp and legi-
timize decisions by the executive organ of the ruling party. This scenario is made 
worse in simple majority or first-past-the-post electoral systems that prevail in all 
three East African countries. In a situation where the vote is divided among 
                                                 
2  Dr Ssali Simba, Interview 13 September 2007. 
3  Daily Nation, 1 December 2007. 
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numerous parties, it is possible for a party without a majority to form the 
government. This was the case in Kenya after the 1997 elections in which KANU 
formed the government with less than 36% of the total votes cast (Wanjohi 2005: 
75). Governments in dominant party systems can be less accountable to the 
legislature and the wider electorate but the opposition may well be too weak to 
hold it to account. Such party systems are therefore resistant to structural change 
and reforms that are likely to weaken their stronghold on power. 
This not withstanding, legislation governing political parties has been intro-
duced in all three countries under various political party acts. Legal regulation of 
political parties is becoming a norm in the region and is widely seen as a positive 
development, especially where public funding of political parties in concerned. 
This strengthens the competitive capacity of opposition parties against the ruling 
party which often relies on state resources that offer undue advantage. Reforms 
in party laws however contain significant shortcomings regarding enforcement, 
oversight, the independence of regulatory bodies, and the possibility of state 
interference. Additionally, provisions in existing party laws in Tanzania and 
Uganda prohibit the formation of coalitions, thus denying party members and 
political parties the freedom to decide what form of political organization best 
suits their own interests. 
In light of the weak institutional and organizational capacity of political par-
ties in the region, legal regulation is likely to encourage intra-party democracy by 
fostering processes of accountability and transparency and ensuring regular 
elections, financial accountability and the institutionalization of inclusiveness. 
Party law also serves to encourage institutionalization and organizational capa-
city of political parties in order to improve their competitiveness in elections. 
Regulation encourages parties to offer better policy options and ensure that 
capable candidates emerge from competitive and credible selection processes. It 
also increases party responsiveness and accountability to its membership and 
raises levels of membership participation in party activities and programmes, 
thus reducing oligarchic tendencies and the overwhelming powers of party 
leaders. 
Party law is by no means a panacea for low intra-party democracy or weak 
organizational and institutional structures or for extending democracy to the 
wider society. Political parties are a reflection of the societies from which they 
emerge and their effectiveness depends largely on the political culture and other 
context-specific variables. Any programmes that promote democracy through 
political party assistance should be cognisant of these factors. In weak demo-
cracies with hegemonic parties for instance, the state machinery can still be em-
ployed to thwart the interests of democracy. In countries undergoing democratic 
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transition, party law can be useful in the consolidation of democratic gain and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions.  
Intra-party democracy: An empirical perspective 
Institutionalization: Organizational rules and regulatory framework 
Political parties are, by definition, organizations whose procedures for the con-
duct of their affairs are stipulated in articles of association that are usually 
deposited with the registering authority. Almost all political parties in East Africa 
have developed party rules and regulations governing their party affairs and these 
are usually contained in documents such as the party’s constitution, its rule book 
or manifestos and strategic plans. The conduct of internal party affairs is legally 
regulated by national legislation either in the country’s constitution or in various 
political party acts. 
Party law provides general guidelines regarding internal democracy within 
political parties. These include requirements for periodic and democratic internal 
leadership elections, evidence of a national outlook, the sanctioning of discrimi-
natory practices and a guarantee of membership participation. Political parties are 
expected to comply with these regulations by adopting them in their own party 
documents.  
Virtually all the registered political parties in the region have, at least on 
paper, party documents that espouse and guarantee processes of internal demo-
cracy through leadership elections, membership participation, the selection of 
candidates, policy formulation and finances. In practice though, there are still 
wide gaps in degrees of implementation. African political parties are generally 
characterized by low levels of institutionalization and East Africa is no ex-
ception. Party law does not, for instance, define what it means by ‘periodic and 
democratic’ elections, leaving room for interpretation. Additionally, there are 
hardly any provisions for monitoring and verification. Political parties are left to 
define how and to what extent they adhere to these regulations.  
Most political parties, especially the new ones, do not have broad-based 
structures or offices across the country as they are confined to the main urban 
centres. Where rural support does exist, it is usually based on ethnic, regional or 
other parochial cleavages (Oloo 2007). The lack of countrywide appeal and re-
presentation gives incumbent parties, such as the CCM and the NRM, ammu-
nition against opposition parties which they brand as tribal and divisive elements. 
Political fragmentation means that in countries like Kenya, no single party can 
muster the requisite support to win an election and form a government on its 
own. This has led to a culture of coalition arrangements that are structured along 
ethnic and regional lines. More often than not, these coalitions are fragile power-
sharing pacts and are not negotiated on principles of sound party ideology in the 
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interest of the party membership and/or the electorate. The result is further 
political and social polarization which may ultimately result in open conflict. 
In terms of ensuring ethical conduct, party documents have elaborate disci-
plinary mechanisms and procedures but parties are more concerned with recruit-
ing and retaining members than seeking to discipline errant ones. Most parties do 
not have the capacity, manpower or resources to engage in such exercises. And 
due to the elite’s control of party organs, there are hardly any structural pro-
visions for the party membership to hold the leadership to account. All parties 
prioritize membership recruitment drives, mobilization and sensitization, and 
policy propagation as the key elements in their strategic plans. 
The challenge of institutionalization lies less in legislation and more in the 
implementation of the existing provisions within party documents. While all the 
parties have institutional and organizational structures to promote intra-party 
democracy, these are often not effectively implemented in practice. Informal in-
stitutional arrangements, such as cronyism, ethnicity and patronage, tend to take 
precedence over formal institutional structures. Party ideologies and policies that 
emerge through such structures are usually unrepresentative and non-inclusive of 
the wider party membership, thus compromising the effectiveness of a party as a 
potential mobilizing force and a focus for aggregation of wider social concerns 
and aspirations. These failures subsequently impede the degree of intra-party 
democracy. 
 
Founding principles and policy formulation 
The majority of the independence parties in East Africa were founded upon a 
liberation ideology of African nationalism. Structurally, they were organized as 
mass movements embodying the aspirations of Africans for self-government and 
liberation from colonial rule (Wanjohi 2003). The ideological foundations of the 
independence parties have not changed much in spite of the passage of time and 
societal changes. Parties like the CCM still exhibit organizational characteristics 
of strong centralization associated with autocratic tendencies designed for the 
consolidation of power. This is often characterized by the deliberate stifling of 
internal and external criticism, dissent and opposition.  
Parties formed in the early 1990s were essentially anti-establishment, pro-
democracy movements created in response to and as a means of resistance to the 
excesses of the authoritarian one-party state (Oloo 2007). These were formed 
largely out of civil society and pressure groups that fought for political pluralism 
during the single-party regimes and later coalesced into political parties. In this 
category fall parties such as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
(FORD) in Kenya, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) in Uganda as well 
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            Picture 3.2 Demonstration of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), 
Uganda 
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as the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) and 
the CUF in Tanzania. A relatively new category of ‘coalition’ political parties is 
also emerging in Kenya. These are umbrella parties usually formed out of pre-
election pacts by parties that agree to field a single presidential candidate. The 
run-up to the 2002 general elections saw the establishment of NARC and in 2007 
the ODM and the PNU as the main coalition parties going into the elections.  
While most new parties espouse principles of human rights, fundamental free-
doms and genuine democracy, they have in practice largely been motivated by a 
single issue, namely the removal of the incumbent ruler and his/her party from 
power (Wanjohi 2003). These parties generally do not espouse any distinct or 
identifiable ideologies or programmes different from the independence parties. 
They are easily recognizable by their ethnic, regional or religious affiliations and 
the social cleavages they represent as opposed to any distinct policy or ideolo-
gical position (Oloo 2007).  
Their internal organization and institutional structures do not therefore reflect 
principles of intra-party democracy. Uganda’s DP is perceived as historically 
representing the interests of the Buganda in the central region and Catholics, 
while the UPC has Protestant leanings and draws the bulk of its support from the 
north and eastern parts of the country (Ogutu 2007). The outcome of general 
elections in Kenya since the introduction of multipartyism shows a clear trend in 
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which parties and candidates draw support and win elections based on regional 
and ethnic support bases or strongholds. Party alliances have also been forged 
along ethnic lines (Oloo 2007). Not all parties however conform to this model. In 
Tanzania, opposition party members and leaders argue that, over time, they have 
broadened their support bases. This may be the case for parties such as the FDC 
in Uganda which, although drawing the bulk of its support from urban areas, 
seems to cut across ethnic and regional cleavages.  
 
Policy formulation 
Policy development under such circumstances is mostly a centralized and top-
down process. Policy documents are drafted by departmental heads, national 
executive committee members or consultants at the national level and are then 
presented at party secretariats for discussion and improvement before being rati-
fied at a delegates’ conference. This is the general trend across all parties in all 
three countries. Interviews with KANU, CHADEMA and FDC officials indicate 
that members play a minor to insignificant role in policy formulation. This is 
contrary to party documents such as manifestos and constitutions that talk of 
membership consultation through workshops and conferences to initiate policy 
development. For the CCM for instance, the process is initiated by the central 
committee then approved by the National Executive Committee and eventually 
adopted by the national delegates’ conference. Most parties follow the same pat-
tern, which lacks inclusivity of members’ views in the development of such 
crucial party documents as strategic plans, campaign manifestos and party plat-
forms. Participatory democracy, a central component of intra-party democracy, is 
thus compromised.  
In general, the use of opinion polls is a relatively new phenomenon. Some 
parties claim to use this tool in policy formulation but polling is not restricted to 
party members. They instead use public opinion polls, the results of which give a 
general reading but do not necessarily reflect the wishes of party members. There 
is no evidence therefore of intra-party democracy in ideology and the policy-
formulation processes within political parties in the region. 
The national party leadership is, in principle, answerable to its membership 
through its national delegates’ conference, which serves as the party’s highest 
decision-making organ. In practice however, there is hardly any accountability to 
the party’s membership since they do not participate in the policy-formulation 
processes in the first place. Lower party leadership levels are expected to be 
accountable at their respective levels to the higher organs but lack of account-
ability at the national level often deters commitment to accountability in the party 
branches.  
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Membership 
One of the significant challenges for the institutionalization and democratization 
of political parties in Africa in general is the lack of a distinct and disciplined 
party membership (Oloo 2007). Political parties are characterized more by sup-
porters as opposed to registered card-holding members. Party affiliation is fluid 
and membership participation in multiple parties is not uncommon. While the 
recruitment of members is delegated to the branch or district level, most parties 
do not have structures beyond the major urban centres and, in some cases, only 
have supporters in their regional strongholds. Card-carrying membership mostly 
ended with the demise of autocratic single-party rule when having a party card 
was proof of political loyalty and patriotism. Membership was in most cases 
through coercion, hence the negative attitudes seen towards registered card-
carrying members. When political parties become dormant after an election and 
there is a lack of political activity for members, parties’ external credibility and 
internal democracy are adversely affected. Decision-making processes then move 
to the parliamentary caucuses or other central party organs. 
Intense competition for electoral support among the multitude of new political 
parties places a low premium on restricting participation in party activities to 
registered members. Party elites fear alienating potential voters should they res-
trict participation, for instance in party primaries, to registered members (Muite 
2007). Party law across the region does not make any stipulations regarding party 
membership and although almost all parties have regulations regarding party 
membership, these guidelines are often ignored. Instruments such as party con-
stitutions set out members’ rights, responsibilities and obligations. All the parties 
studied refer to the existence of a membership register organized at three levels; 
branch, district and national level (or headquarters). Interestingly though, none of 
the parties could actually produce documentation to support the existence of a 
membership list or give exact figures. 
Declining or low party membership in old and new parties respectively can be 
attributed in part to not carrying out effective membership recruitment drives. 
The parties are limited by their lack of institutional structures and resources to 
allow mobilization and penetration countrywide. With the exception of the domi-
nant ruling parties (the NRM and the CCM), most parties charge a minimum fee 
for basic membership (either annually or a one-off subscription). It is worth 
noting, however, that due to massive rural poverty, many cannot afford to pay the 
membership fee and the practice in Kenya for instance is for prospective can-
didates to buy cards for distribution to intended supporters at grassroots level.  
The role of party membership in the formulation of party policies and the 
selection of candidates is negligible. The delegates’ conference or congress is 
generally described as the party’s highest decision-making organ and its deci-
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sions are binding. In practice, however, these delegates are usually carefully 
handpicked by party operatives according to their loyalty to particular party elites 
from their own regions and calculated to give as much support as possible to the 
regional party stalwarts. In many cases, parties do not have any real structures at 
the grassroots level, from where delegates should be democratically elected. The 
delegate selection process is yet another demonstration of the politics of the 
personality cult, sycophancy and patronage as opposed to genuine processes of 
intra-party democracy. Although there are stipulations regarding members’ roles, 
rights and responsibilities, these are not implemented in practice. In most cases, 
party conferences simply serve to endorse and legitimize party platforms, elec-
tion manifestos and elected office holders.  
Effective communication between the party and its members is a key com-
ponent in ensuring a constant exchange and inclusion of members’ views in party 
planning. This is another significant challenge facing African political parties due 
to the lack of infrastructural capacity. Public rallies, party meetings and indivi-
dual correspondence seem to be the most frequent forms of communication be-
tween parties and members. Some parties are slowly embracing new technology 
such as mobile telephony and the Internet for communication; about half of the 
parties studied have websites with basic party information though most are not 
regularly updated. Advertisements in the media, billboards and leaflets are used 
during election campaigns but do not form part of regular party communication 
strategies. Intra-party communication is more often than not one way as members 
rarely take the initiative to communicate with the party or party officials.  
With limited resources to hold public rallies and conferences, the physical 
communication afforded through such forums is sporadic. Party caucuses for 
special interest groups, such as women’s and youth wings, are crucial to 
achieving inclusiveness and greater intra-party democracy but these are not fully 
developed or operational in most political parties. Except for the DP’s Uganda 
Young Democrats (UYD), the CCM’s Umoja wa Vijana (Youth Wing) and 
Umoja wa Wanawake (Women’s Wing), there is not much evidence of a re-
vamping or strengthening of these institutions which are only mobilized during 
election campaigns.  
 
Leadership and candidate selection 
One of the key processes for expanding inclusiveness in party procedures and 
decision-making is the recruitment and selection of party leaders and candidates. 
 
 Political parties and intra-party democracy in East Africa 47 
 
 
 Picture 3.3 Interviewing Uganda Young Democrats 
 [© Josh Maiyo] 
 
 
These processes allow parties excellent opportunities to demonstrate their inclu-
siveness by providing opportunities for participation by members and supporters. 
It is therefore important that parties make choices that ensure such processes are 
not only inclusive but also free and fair, and are seen to be so.  
 
Leadership selection 
Electoral systems in East Africa, as in many African countries, are single-mem-
ber parliamentary (constituency) and presidential systems. This means that the 
selection of a party leader is the equivalent to selecting the party’s presidential 
candidate, should the party choose to field one at elections. Whatever the case, 
the choice of party leader determines the image as well as the course the party 
will take. This is more so in African party systems characterized by oligarchy. In 
most cases, overwhelming power and influence are concentrated in the party 
leader or a few of his cronies who hold significant sway over party policies, 
programmes and the selection of other leaders and candidates. Technically, 
almost all the political parties surveyed select their national leadership through 
the delegates’ conference, a form of party caucus in which representatives from 
the lower branch or district levels of the party meet at the national level. Ac-
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cording to most party rule-books, these delegates are supposed to be elected by 
party members at the branch, district or constituency levels and are supposed to 
be representative of women, youth and other marginalized groups.  
Convening a national delegates’ conference is a huge logistic undertaking for 
parties with limited financial means. Coupled with the acrimony, confrontation 
and friction that the exercise raises, many parties shy away from or totally avoid 
holding such events unless they absolutely have to, usually in order to meet legal 
obligations. In less institutionalized political parties, party positions are divided 
up in boardroom deals between the party’s elite, usually among its founders, 
chief financiers or regional and ethnic chieftains. Delegates’ congresses are sub-
sequently mere pomp and ceremony and are meant to legitimize already agreed 
upon leadership positions (Oloo 2007; Wanjohi 2003). 
Highly centralized political parties, such as the CCM, equally have less inclu-
sive leadership selection processes. The Central Committee is the most powerful 
organ of the party with overwhelming power over the nomination and recom-
mendations of party members for the positions of chairperson and deputy chair-
person of the party; the President of the Republic of Tanzania; MPs and members 
of the House of Representatives. Not only does the organ nominate members to 
contest leadership positions, it also has a supervisory role in monitoring the 
implementation of party elections as well as the appointment of district party 
leaders. Such a highly centralized system is characteristic of ruling parties in one-
dominant-party systems that have often retained power since the era of single-
party rule. This is the case with the NRM in Uganda where the influential 
National Executive Council nominates candidates for top party positions such as 
president, (deputy) chairperson and secretary general as well as treasurer. Those 
nominated are more often than not simply endorsed by the national conference. 
The lack of inclusive and democratic leadership selection processes with no 
clear mechanisms for neutral and independent dispute arbitration can have nega-
tive consequences for party unity and cohesiveness. Consequently, intra-party 
rivalry frequently spills over into open conflict and possible party splits. Kenya 
has perhaps been the theatre of the most divisive party wrangles arising from 
undemocratic and non-inclusive leadership selection processes. In Kenya in 2002 
for example, the then ruling party, KANU, disintegrated after incumbent Presi-
dent Daniel Arap Moi unilaterally appointed the relatively untested Uhuru Ken-
yatta, the son of his predecessor and first president Jomo Kenyatta as party 
leader. The senior party elite who had been waiting in the wings and looking for 
a democratic and inclusive succession process broke away to become the Liberal 
Democratic Party and teamed up with the opposition to form the Rainbow 
Coalition, which removed the KANU from power.  
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KANU lost extremely badly in the ensuing election and has not yet recovered. 
Subsequent wrangles over leadership elections in 2006 saw Uhuru’s leadership 
of KANU annulled in court, only to be reinstated later. This was followed by a 
split within KANU with the creation of a new faction, the New KANU. In 2007, 
similar leadership wrangles brought about splits in no less that four leading 
parties in the run-up to that year’s general election. Some of the parties affected 
were the ODM, FORD-Kenya, KANU and NARC.  
Undemocratic and unrepresentative leadership selection processes have signi-
ficant and often negative consequences for party cohesion, unity and effective-
ness in contesting elections. Internal wrangles often lead to a weakening of 
parties, splits, defections and the formation of new parties or the revival of ones 
that have become moribund. Impartial and independent conflict resolution me-
chanisms as well as institutional respect for electoral results are necessary for the 
success of intra-party democracy and safeguard against oligarchy. In societies 
where regionalism and ethnicity are the organizing principles, wider consider-
ations of national security and stability are at stake. Democracy assistance pro-
grammes should, therefore, carefully counterbalance the promotion of intra-party 
democracy with a view to political stability. 
 
Candidate selection 
Candidate selection is a fundamental process in a political party’s engagement 
with its membership and the wider electorate. The process by which candidates 
for elected positions are chosen is perhaps as important as the type of candidates 
selected. The result determines the party’s profile against its competitors during 
elections as well as determining the loyalty of its members and supporters. The 
degree to which party members and supporters are included in this process is 
significant in determining the party’s electoral success.  
The most open and inclusive form of candidate selection is the direct ballot or 
party primaries where eligible party members or supporters pre-select party can-
didates through direct elections. There are variations to this model depending on 
who is eligible to vote in the primaries. In most western democracies, partici-
pation is restricted to registered party members but this is not the case in African 
parties as most do not have a registered membership. The process is usually open 
to citizens eligible to vote in the general election. 
All the political parties studied have clear party rules and guidelines on can-
didate selection. In most cases, an election board is set up to vet interested 
candidates who must be approved by a party organ before they can be given the 
green light. The more centralized the party structure, the tighter the control on 
vetting and clearing candidates. On the other hand, a party needs to ensure that 
potential candidates are selected on specific criteria that will strengthen the party 
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going into an election. Some considerations include a candidate’s ability to fi-
nance their own campaigns, party loyalty, electability, adherence to the party’s 
ideology and platform, and the ability to work with fellow party members. 
Eligibility criteria for both parliamentary and presidential candidates closely 
mirror provisions contained in the country’s constitutions. In most cases, inter-
ested candidates collect application forms from the party’s national secretariat 
and pay an application or nomination fee. This is a convenient fundraising 
strategy for the party. Conversely, the high fees charged can be prohibitive and 
may deter capable but less wealthy candidates and render politics a preserve of 
the rich. The high costs of campaigns funded by individual candidates only serve 
to exacerbate the situation and may breed a culture of political corruption in 
campaign financing. 
Not all parties follow this pre-selection procedure. Due to the immense logis-
tical and financial requirements for such a national exercise, some parties prefer 
to have a centralized candidate selection process in which applicants are vetted 
by the appropriate national party organs and nominated directly. This is usually 
the practice with smaller parties with less capacity to mobilize and organize 
nationwide party primaries. Though less acrimonious, such a process denies 
party members any role in the selection of its candidates. The need for inclusivity 
in party primaries by opening the process up to all potential voters regardless of 
party membership has potential costs for the party. This can be the case in situ-
ations where parties have no clear membership records or where parties fear 
alienating potential voters in the actual election by restricting candidate selection 
to registered members.  
Logistical difficulties, limited financial resources and the fear of ensuing 
wrangles and divisions are but some of the factors that make party elites fail to 
carry out open, transparent and inclusive leadership and candidate selection pro-
cesses. Poor institutional and organizational capacity, inherent structural weak-
nesses and pre-existing tensions between different camps and loyalties impede 
the free and fair selection of leaders and candidates. Consequently, these crucial 
party activities are often carried out by central party organs and are characterized 
by careful regional, ethnic and personal power balancing and horse-trading that 
ensure the loyalty and satisfaction of leading and influential party figures. Party 
leaders usually prefer to keep such powerful kingpins in their camps as opposed 
to having them defect and either pose serious competition to their parties or take 
with them a huge number of much-needed votes come a general election. 
All these processes add up to the emasculation of intra-party democracy by 
alienating party members and reducing then to mere pawns in a high-stake game 
between party elites. It is not surprising that membership loyalty and allegiances 
are not to particular parties but to individual party leaders with regional or ethnic 
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bases. Interventions in favour of increased intra-party democracy in leadership 
and candidate selection should therefore take into consideration their social, 
economic and political implications, the country’s unique political culture and 
the expectations of the different social groups and the stakes involved. 
Conclusions 
Political parties are essential institutions for the proper functioning of a demo-
cratic society. As social organizations designed for contesting and attaining po-
litical power, they play an even more significant role in societies undergoing 
democratic transition. Political parties serve several functions including deter-
mining the content of the political order, selecting authoritative leaders, resolving 
disputes, maintaining order and promoting the various interests of the community 
among diverse and contending social forces. In young democracies characterized 
by weak institutions, fragile social cohesion, heterogeneity, corruption, rampant 
poverty and the possible threat of conflict, the role of political parties cannot be 
under estimated. 
In East Africa, political parties face higher expectations than in established 
western democracies and to achieve these objectives, political parties have to 
offer genuine avenues for effective membership participation not only to form 
credible and well-functioning governments but also to enhance social order and 
security. Intra-party democracy is, therefore, essential for the creation and growth 
of sustainable democratic institutions and will help foster and deepen a demo-
cratic culture within the wider society. 
An adequate institutionalization of party structures and processes is necessary 
to secure and enforce the principle-agent relationship between party members 
and elected party representatives. The deliberative model of democracy involving 
wider social representation is necessary to ensure that party decision-making and 
operational procedures are debated freely and collectively agreed upon among all 
members as equals. This necessitates active support for institutionalized decen-
tralization in which lower party organs and members are empowered and in-
cluded in the party’s decision-making processes. This means that the repre-
sentational capacity of political parties should be institutionalized in such a way 
that they are geared towards the articulation, realization and protection of the 
interests of the membership, as opposed to the prevailing situation where elite 
interests supersede or ignore the interests of the wider society.  
To address some of the systemic, institutional and structural weaknesses of the 
party-political environment, all three East African countries have enacted poli-
tical party laws. However these are not aimed at reforming the entire party 
political and electoral systems but only target the regulation of political parties, 
laying down guidelines for their registration, funding and conduct. The legal 
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regulation of political parties is widely seen as a positive development, especially 
where the public funding of political parties in concerned. With regard to intra-
party democracy, party laws have significant shortcomings as they do not set out 
clear guidelines and specific requirements for membership participation, account-
ability and oversight that ensure higher standards of adherence, especially on 
issues of corruption and party finance. More effort should thus be made to 
entrench proper procedures in party documents to create a culture of respect for 
institutionalization, accountability and transparency. 
Intra-party democracy appears to be significantly influenced by unwritten 
informal arrangements in the conduct of party affairs. Not all informal insti-
tutional arrangements are necessarily negative or detrimental to intra-party demo-
cracy. On the contrary, they can be complimentary and serve to solve conflicts 
arising from competing interests among party members and the leadership. This 
may, in turn, serve to promote the efficient performance of formal institutional 
arrangements although some informal arrangements may indeed enhance partici-
patory democracy by promoting a culture of debate and consultation within the 
party. It is, therefore, necessary to identify and encourage such arrangements that 
may be critical to the enhancement of intra-party democracy while guarding 
against those that might impede its promotion. 
The lack of inclusiveness in ideology and policy formulation processes is 
glaring amongst all the political parties in the region. This is one of the most 
centralized and non-inclusive aspects both institutionally and structurally. Party 
formation and ideological orientation are usually the preserve of a few indivi-
duals who characteristically become party ‘owners’. These founders tend to cen-
tralize power and decision-making prerogatives among themselves. More often 
than not, the process of policy formulation is outsourced to expert consultants or 
associates of the party leadership. The process thus severely compromises intra-
party democracy by disenfranchising party members, diminishing the sense of 
ownership and compromising party loyalty. Such practices only serve to entrench 
personality politics, and loyalty to the party is substituted by personal loyalty, 
which further diminishes prospects for party institutionalization.  
It needs to be determined whether and to what extent party leaders and 
members of African societies value the role of party ideology, and whether this 
has any significant place in contemporary African political party organization. 
What is the place of ideology in young democracies grappling with high levels of 
poverty, unemployment, insecurity and other development challenges? Is there a 
preference perhaps for pragmatic party programmes and platforms as opposed to 
ideology? What is the role of party leaders’ individual agency and do these 
leaders hold the same values as those in western democracies? These and other 
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issues need to be considered to better understand the underlying mechanisms 
behind the nature and character of political parties in East Africa. 
Regarding participation in leadership and candidate selection processes, most 
parties fail to hold internal leadership elections. A large number of parties es-
pecially in Kenya are yet to hold credible internal leadership elections following 
their formation and are perpetually being led by interim officials. When elections 
are held, there are critical deficits such as significant delays and they are often 
marred by corruption, bribery, threats, intimidation and, in some cases, open 
violence. Conflicts arising may be so intense as to result in party splits. Newly 
enacted party law in Kenya and Uganda and a review of enforcement mecha-
nisms in Tanzania are intended to rectify these anomalies. The issue of party law 
and political-party regulation however remains contestable. It is debatable 
whether indeed aspects of intra-party democracy can and should be externally 
legislated by the state or be left to self-regulation within party structures and 
institutions. Nevertheless, efforts can be made to strengthen a culture of respect 
and the acceptance of electoral results. Where conflict arises, independent, cre-
dible and mutually respected conflict-resolution mechanisms should be strength-
ened. This may include formal and informal mechanisms that combine possibi-
lities for arbitration as well as legal redress. 
In terms of candidate selection, there are strong tendencies towards centrali-
zation, the imposition of unpopular candidates, the granting of automatic nomi-
nation, vote rigging and manipulation of the rules. Although most parties have 
clearly stipulated internal rules regulating the selection of party candidates, they 
are not fully adhered to. The scenario is also compounded by a lack of clear, 
impartial and credible conflict-resolution mechanisms. Where conflicts arise, 
national courts are hesitant to arbitrate, preferring to leave such disputes to be 
resolved through internal party machinery. Only recently have arbitration powers 
been granted to the registrar of political parties, but external regulators are either 
hesitant to interfere or lack the independence or capacity to intervene. So while 
institutional arrangements theoretically enhance intra-party democracy, in prac-
tice, both the absence and, where they exist, weak internal and external enforce-
ment undermine free and popular participation in candidate selection processes.  
The effectiveness of intra-party democracy should be seen not in isolation but 
as part of a whole set of context-specific variables that determine the character 
and functions that political parties serve in different democratic settings. As an 
element of participatory democracy, its appeal should be viewed not only in its 
ability to encourage a culture of democratic engagement and collective owner-
ship of decisions but also in promoting party unity through the incorporation of 
processes that reduce factionalism and fragmentation. The attainment of these 
democratic ideals will only be realized if processes of effective membership 
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participation are formally stipulated and implemented in practice in the party’s 
organizational rules and procedures. While the debate continues on how much 
internal democracy is good for party effectiveness, consensus may be found in 
developing mechanisms and approaches by which intra-party democracy serves 
to increase and deepen levels of participatory democracy in the wider society. 
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4 
How the youth of Soweto  
have turned language into  
a transformable object in the  
context of a changing society  
 
Pierre Aycard 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter1 presents an up-to-date analysis of the Soweto mixed-language, Is-
camtho and demonstrates how the youth, who often have Iscamtho as their native 
language, have taken it and language-transforming behaviours in general to a 
point where it has become the usual way of expressing oneself. Iscamtho, multi-
lingual behaviour and language-transforming behaviours are now not only the 
first way of speaking that the youth learn but also the one which they master best 
and promote in more and more private and public settings. It has now moved be-
yond the borders of Soweto and has become a symbol and feature of the demo-
cratic South African society. 
Introduction 
South Africa has always been a multilingual society but it is only since 1994 that 
eleven languages have officially been acknowledged. In a context of multilin-
gualism and language contact, there have been several mixed languages in South 
African history. The most famous was Tsotsitaal but the language that has been 
most active for the past four decades has been the street language of Soweto: 
Iscamtho. This chapter demonstrates how, through the political and social history 
of Soweto and South Africa, Iscamtho has become a symbol of youth culture and 
                                                 
1  It presents the results of five months of field research in the township of White City-Jabavu in Soweto, 
South Africa, which was conducted between August 2007 and December 2008. The article follows an 
MPhil thesis entitled “Speak as you want to speak” (Aycard 2008) achieved at the African Studies 
Centre & Leiden University, 2008. 
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how, through the development of this youth culture and the recent political and 
cultural freedom, it is now a major linguistic feature of South Africa. The youth 
are depicted as the agents of this evolution, and their responses to social and 
political developments are the vector of Iscamtho’s change of status. 
Iscamtho has many names and the word Iscamtho itself means ‘to talk’ or ‘to 
chat’. The present generation of speakers commonly calls it Ringas – from the 
English ‘ring’, as several people who speak or chat can form a ring. However 
many other names such as tsotsitaal (the ‘gangster language’), scamthotaal or 
sekasi (the ‘language of the township’) could be used. The language was born 
from a criminal slang but its main characteristic is that it has been, from the start, 
a multilingual and ever-changing code. It works through the grammar of another 
language, which serves as a matrix language. In it are included lexical items 
from diverse languages, included items proper to Iscamtho, usually derived from 
previously existing Zulu items. Its speakers value the incorporation of new and 
unexpected items from any language, as well as new items. As a South African 
multilingual code, it has been a symbol of diversity and equality among the 
speakers of all the languages of Soweto. Recently, the promotion by the new 
regime of these same values of diversity and equality, together with the new 
recognition offered to youth culture from African townships, has turned the 
multilingual Iscamtho into an accepted language in many spheres of Sowetan and 
South African society. 
The first part of the chapter analyzes the socio-historical processes through 
which Iscamtho appeared and reached the status of lingua franca in Soweto. The 
following section then focuses on the political and social developments that 
South Africa experienced during democratization and during which Iscamtho 
appeared as the very symbol of the new multicultural South African society. And 
the third and final section details Iscamtho’s new position in the different spheres 
of society and the complex status it has achieved. 
Multilingualism, mixed codes and the development of Iscamtho 
Soweto was officially established in 1963, its name being an acronym of South 
Western Townships. About 15 km southwest of Johannesburg, it consists of a 
complex of townships for African people that the Johannesburg City Council and 
later the apartheid government developed from the 1930s onwards in response to 
a lack of accommodation for the thousands of black families who had come to 
Johannesburg seeking employment. It also helped to enforce the racial segre-
gation of residence areas following the 1923 Urban Areas Act and the 1950 
Group Areas Act (Beavon 2004; Carr 1990). After several townships had been 
built in the 1940s and 1950s, the government, through the Minister of Native 
Affairs – the designer of Great Apartheid and the future Prime Minister Dr 
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Hendrik Verwoerd – decided in 1955 to divide the African townships into ethnic 
zones. Officially, the purpose was to preserve the cultural specificities of each 
ethnic group but tactically it was nothing but the implementation of a divide-and-
rule strategy within African townships by the racist regime. From 1955 and when 
Soweto was formally established in 1963, the townships of Naledi, Mapetla, 
Tladi, Moletsane and Phiri were reserved for Sotho- and Tswana-speaking peo-
ple; the township of Chiawelo was for Tsonga- and Venda-speaking people; and 
the townships of Dlamini, Senaoane, Zola, Zondi, Jabulani, Emdeni and White 
City-Jabavu were for Nguni-speakers, mainly Zulus and Xhosas, but also Swazis 
or Ndebeles. As a result of the township planning policies, Soweto was divided 
into homogeneous linguistic zones, with Zulu and Sotho dominating the public 
sphere and achieving the status of linguae francae. 
However, the linguistic division had a limited impact on the diversity of 
languages in the life of every Sowetan: a family was considered to speak Zulu, 
Sotho or another language depending on the language of the head of the family. 
However, in the multi-ethnic context in Johannesburg, it was common to have 
inter-ethnic marriages, which resulted in several languages being spoken in any 
one household. In addition, houses were usually overcrowded because of the 
presence of extended family members, who might well have a different language, 
or tenants who would rent a room in the house or a shack in the backyard. Thus, 
it was usual for Sowetans to grow up with several languages in their homes, 
although there would be a general family language – normally from the father’s 
side unless there was no father at home to dominate exchanges in the house. 
Within the ethnic classification into Xhosas, Zulus, Sothos and others, there was 
also a great diversity in terms of languages, as many dialects of the officially 
recognized standards always coexisted in South Africa (Makoni 2003). Those 
dialects, rural standards and urban variants could even coexist under one appel-
lation and so there was much more linguistic diversity than was officially ac-
knowledged in the ethnically divided townships.  
When the formal construction of several townships on the area which was not 
then yet known as Soweto began, the most significant African locations in 
Johannesburg where the so-called Western Areas, especially the township of 
Sophiatown. As a freehold township where African people had long-term leases 
on housing, Sophiatown attracted many Africans who had been forced to leave 
their areas of residence around Johannesburg with the enforcement of the 1923 
Urban Areas Act in the 1930s and 1940s (Beavon 2004). In addition, numerous 
impoverished rural migrants – Blacks, Coloureds and Whites – had settled in 
Sophiatown when South Africa was hit by an economic recession in the 1940s 
and they often could not afford accommodation in their own designated areas of 
residence. In this context of racial mix, local gangs developed a slang known at 
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first as Flaaitaal and later as Tsotsitaal, from tsotsi (a criminal) and taal (lan-
guage), and which was based on Afrikaans grammar but included many words 
from African languages, mainly Tswana and later Zulu (Ntshangase 1995, 2002).  
Tsotsitaal became an iconic feature of the culture of Sophiatown, which today 
still remains as a Golden Age in the history of South Africa for African urban 
populations: Sophiatown was a place of jazz music, intellectuals and writers, 
black journalism, political activism and the mythical gangsters who epitomized 
the anti-system culture of Tsotsitaal. However, the concern of White residents 
about the increasing Black population around the White-designated areas led to 
the decision, in March 1951, to demolish the Western Areas. In 1955, people 
were forcefully relocated to the newly established townships of Diepkloof and 
Meadowlands, east and west of the already existing Orlando East and West, and 
to Rockville in the centre of present-day Soweto.  
Tsotsitaal would thus spread in Soweto where it came into competition with 
the local urban language, itself originating from a criminal slang: Iscamtho. 
Iscamtho was born from Shalambombo, a slang created in the Nguni-populated 
slums of Nancefield and Orlando in the 1920s by the Amalaita gang, under its 
leader Nongoloza (Ntshangase 1995, 2002). It was renamed Iscamtho as it 
changed from being a criminal language to a youth language in the 1960s. Tsotsi-
taal and Iscamtho are similar in the way they work: One language operates as the 
matrix of the code, providing the grammar in which lexicon from other languages 
or lexicon typical of the code is integrated. In the case of Tsotsitaal, the matrix 
language is Afrikaans; in the case of Iscamtho, it is mainly Zulu or Sotho, as the 
Amalaita gang was composed of Nguni speakers in Nancefield and Orlando, and 
was allied with the AmaRussian gang, composed of Sotho speakers from the 
Moroka squatter camp (Ntshangase 1995, 2002). But quickly any language of 
Soweto would serve as a matrix. The similarity between Iscamtho and Tsotsitaal 
lies in their status as criminal languages, and in the mechanisms of construction 
of the code. But the languages chosen to build it are different. 
Iscamtho had a low status: It was spoken almost only by men, as female 
speakers would be categorized as prostitutes, shebeen2 girls or any other socially 
unacceptable category; it was spoken among the youth but not with the older 
generations, who would consider this insulting; and it was not to be spoken at 
home where the home language(s) were always spoken. However, the social and 
political situation in Soweto was marked from the 1960s and increasingly from 
the mid-1970s by violence in all parts of the township. Gangs had been around on 
the Witwatersrand from the 1890s, and their prestige over urban youth grew 
 
                                                 
2  A shebeen was an illegal bar, run at home and usually by women. Today, many still exist but they are 
now legal. 
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continuously. Indeed, gangsters were seen by many youth as prestigious actors of 
urban life. First of all, they were enemies of the apartheid police; they were 
against the system and could fight its agents with firearms; and finally, they 
could rapidly access economic gain through their illegal activities. The criminals, 
dressed in expensive clothes and driving nice cars, were a source of interest for 
the youth (Van Onselen 1982; Glaser 2000; Ntshangase 1995, 2002). The gang-
sters’ prestige explains the interest of the youth in their language. Iscamtho 
epitomized urbanity, street-wisdom and city-slickness, and it was an inevitable 
style accessory for street boys. The youths therefore appropriated the criminal 
language and made it their own. Taking some of the gangster’s attributes, or even 
becoming a gangster themselves, were also means of obtaining some of the social 
recognition and self-respect that the regime and the police denied Africans in 
general, and African youths in particular. 
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From the 1950s onwards, Soweto experienced all the African languages in 
South Africa and many of their dialects, and two mixed codes.3 Afrikaans was 
also spoken by residents, as it was the regime’s first language, especially among 
the police. English was also present as an official language but Afrikaans had an 
advantage in this domain. English remained strong as a language of the media 
and politics. To reach to all Africans, whatever their language, political organi-
zations, newspapers and magazines had been using English since the first half of 
the twentieth century. The multicultural and multilingual character of the African 
communities around Johannesburg, and especially in Soweto, as well as the 
social and political conditions under the apartheid regime created a specific 
African urban culture marked by a certain disregard for ethnic divisions and 
multilingualism. The everyday experience in Soweto was that everyone was mul-
tilingual, and although urban variants of Zulu and Sotho quickly fulfilled the role 
of linguae francae, all languages were considered equal, despite some discri-
mination against the less-represented Venda and Tsonga languages that were 
considered as being rural and a sign of backwardness.  
In a context of resistance to the apartheid regime, African communities were 
marked by solidarity, which was necessary to sustain the poor economic condi-
tions, the equally poor standards of accommodation and permanent harassment 
by the police. Moreover, in a system based on the division of the population on 
racist grounds, solidarity between all Africans whatever their ethnic background 
was the political expression of opposition to the system. And so was multilin-
gualism, which has always had a very positive social value in Soweto, where it is 
considered an individual’s duty to be able to communicate with everyone. Mul-
tilingual skills are expected of all members of the community, who are entitled to 
speak their own language but at the same time should understand other people’s 
languages too. 
Multilingualism has a social function too: When there are many languages 
being spoken, it is essential to be multilingual if one does not want to be ‘fooled’ 
in social exchanges or to sometimes miss crucial information, especially in ex-
changes with the Whites. Multilingualism developed both socially and individu-
ally in Soweto with a wide-scale switching and mixing of languages. Quickly, 
the most emblematic vector of the language mix was the mixed codes, Tsotsitaal 
and Iscamtho. However, if these two were in competition to be the youth’s 
favoured language, Iscamtho took the lead in the 1970s (Ntshangase 1995, 2002) 
at the time of new political opposition by school students to the regime when the 
                                                 
3  There are other mixed slang languages used by criminals that are based either on Shalambombo or 
Tsotsitaal, and which are known by the names of the gangs: for instance, the ‘26 language’ is spoken 
by the 26 gang, the ‘28 language’ by the 28 gang. These languages, however, are only spoken in 
prisons or between members of the same gang. Thus they cannot be considered as a common feature of 
life in Soweto. 
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government wanted to impose Afrikaans as the medium of education in all 
scientific subjects. The students’ opposition reached a climax in June 1976 with 
the Soweto uprising, which left thousands dead in a three-month period. As a 
result of the opposition to the implementation of teaching in Afrikaans, as much 
as to the brutal repression during and after the uprising, youth in Soweto could 
not bear to speak Afrikaans any longer: Tsotsitaal was abandoned by the younger 
generations and Iscamtho became the only youth language in Soweto. 
The constantly high levels of crime and violence in Soweto in the 1970s and 
1980s took Iscamtho to another level: It became the first language of the youth 
and in many cases it became their native language too. Especially in the heart of 
Soweto, which comprises the townships of White City-Jabavu, Jabulani, Zola, 
Zondi, Emdeni and Mofolo, permanent gang warfare raged from the mid-1960s 
until the late 1980s with murder, robbery and rape being daily events. The new 
political opposition to the regime in the 1970s had to address the reasons for 
crime and violence, but no decrease in crime levels was seen. Many of the lea-
ders of the 1976 uprising left the country, but the younger generations developed 
organized political resistance, and were often supported by their parents who had 
initially abandoned the struggle after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. With the 
rise of the United Democratic Front and the loss of government control over 
Soweto during the 1980s, local leaders and civics began to organize Soweto’s 
social life. This involved self-justice, and the people’s court easily sentenced 
those who were ‘convicted’ of crimes or were ‘proven’ to be agents of the regime 
to death. The exercising of this so-called people’s justice often involved ex-
tremely violent measures, such as the so-called ‘necklace’ whereby a tire filled 
with petrol was placed over the person’s shoulders and neck and set alight. 
This kind of violence was often committed by the younger generation of 
activists who felt entitled to fight using any of the means at their disposal. The 
United Democratic Front’s slogan ‘Liberation Now, Education Later’ in a way 
legitimized the involvement of the youths in violent actions. One of the targets of 
youth violence was the gangsters themselves, as school students and their parents 
were often the victims of gang violence. The students would organize defence 
groups and track down gangsters who were then shot, burnt or beaten to death by 
teenage commandos wearing school uniform. However, gang violence never 
diminished: South Africa’s bad economic situation in the 1970s forced many to 
turn to crime as a means of survival for themselves and their families. Muggings 
and rapes could happen to anyone at any time. Especially commuters on trains 
were at risk of being shot or stabbed on their journey to or from work. In 
addition, many youth pretended to be involved in political movements and joined 
the ‘comrades’ for the sole purpose of committing crimes: Those were the ‘com-
tsotsis’, who were not gang members but in fact were nothing more than crimi-
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nals. The extraordinary violence in Soweto in the 1980s culminated in an in-
crease in jackrolling at the end of the decade: This was recreational gang rape 
and abduction for the purpose of (gang) rape, which became a constant risk for 
all women in Soweto (Mokwena 1991). As political repression by the state be-
came increasingly violent towards the end of the 1980s, especially after the 
second state of emergency in 1986, the number of youth involved in gangs did 
not decrease, and many new gangs appeared in the 1990s. Crime was seen as a 
solution when the economic situation for township youth was desperate and 
offered no future prospects. When committed against Whites, crime could be 
legitimized by the township residents. If the White regime killed the African 
population and reduced it to misery, why would it be shocking to steal from 
Whites, even if this involved killings in the process? 
The permanent violence in Soweto led many youth to be involved in criminal 
and/or clandestine activities. In this context, Iscamtho spread as it was seen as a 
criminal language with useful functions. It was a language of secrecy, and used 
words in different situations with new meanings or introduced new words that 
allowed a person to speak without being understood by those outside the criminal 
sphere. It was a strong identity marker and a sign that the speaker knew the 
township and its dangers. As more and more youth became involved in violence 
in one form or another, and went to prison for criminal or political reasons, 
Iscamtho became their everyday language and also started to develop within 
households. The youth, who were less and less under their parents’ control, 
started to use Iscamtho between themselves at home and even in exchanges with 
their parents. In some parts of Soweto, such as Zola or White City-Jabavu, the 
majority of households had at least one member involved in violent activities 
which would turn Iscamtho into one of the household’s usual languages. It finally 
became a normal feature in the lives of many families, and as the youth started 
having families themselves, they would teach their children Iscamtho from an 
early age. The first generation of native speakers was born around 1980 and 
Iscamtho became a native language, although it was very rare for Iscamtho to be 
a child’s only native language. The political and social upheavals experienced by 
South Africa in the 1990s changed the status and place in everyday social life of 
Iscamtho, and gave it a more positive meaning. 
Iscamtho as the multilingual embodiment of youth culture 
in the ‘new’ South Africa 
After four decades as the most extreme totalitarian racist regime in the world, 
South Africa became a multicultural, multilingual, liberal democracy in 1994. Its 
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Picture 4.2 Backyard in White City-Jabavu 
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1994 and 1996 constitutions laid the foundations for a new society promoting 
equality and diversity. The country’s linguistic policy is a good example, as it 
recognizes eleven official languages and also protects a number of languages of 
indigenous and migrant minorities and religions. More generally, the democratic 
regime has promoted diversity and respect for each and every individual and 
encouraged cultural exchange among all groups in South Africa. 
The coming of a democratic regime did not really change the living conditions 
in Soweto, and poverty and crime in the township have remained a problem. 
However, the events of 1994 and the preceding negotiations represented a 
psychological liberation for the youth, and an opportunity to express themselves 
freely and voice their aspirations for the future. In this respect, Iscamtho and 
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Soweto’s multilingualism represented a materialization of the new regime’s 
ideology of equality. Iscamtho reflects this equality because it can be constructed 
on any matrix-language – except Afrikaans which remains excluded, even though 
more Soweto youth are now showing an interest in it. Anyone can turn his/her 
own language into Iscamtho by introducing an Iscamtho lexicon into its grammar 
– or a lexicon from another language, especially English or Afrikaans. They will 
then produce a unique Iscamtho understandable to others, provided they know 
the matrix language well enough to follow it. Virtually every youth in Soweto 
speaks more than three languages and it is not unusual to find individuals who 
master the local variants of up to ten languages. In addition, Iscamtho speakers 
see it as a challenge to introduce as many unexpected features into their language 
from as many languages as they can find. Iscamtho can therefore be seen as a 
patchwork containing a piece of every language in South Africa and, in this 
perspective, it epitomizes South African multiculturalism. 
The multilingual diversity of Iscamtho, which makes it representative of South 
Africa in all its diversity, is fully understood by the time the youth grow up as 
they have been speaking it since they were born. Even if this is not the case as 
some families remain attached to using one of the more ‘proper’ languages at 
home, they would still have learnt mixed urban versions of the official African 
languages. In fact, there are very few families who will have kept using strictly 
standard versions of Iscamtho after living in Soweto for a long time. The urban 
variants of languages result from decades of language contact and contain 
elements of English, Afrikaans or other languages heard in Soweto. Thus, even a 
child growing up in a family where Zulu is the language spoken at home would 
acquire, through what his/her parents consider as Zulu, some elements of the 
other languages which are partly contained in Soweto Zulu. In fact, the Sowetan 
variants of each language are so hybridized and influenced by Iscamtho that the 
present youth has difficulties explaining the difference between Iscamtho and 
Soweto Zulu or Soweto Sotho. If there is still a distinction, especially for those 
who know the standard languages well, it is unclear for most youth what this 
distinction is. The difference lies in the acceptability of speech in a setting where 
a respectable attitude and level of formability are expected, and which would 
lead to a number of typical Iscamtho terms being dropped. The distinction is not 
however fundamental and urban Zulu and Sotho are becoming closer to Iscam-
tho. In the future, the distinction may well disappear. 
As a result of the hybridization of the languages, one can speak of a multi-
lingual native acquisition of language or multiple native competences (Canaga-
rajah 2007). While being spoken to only in Zulu, a child would in fact learn 
elements of Sotho, Tswana, English, or Afrikaans, and these would form part of 
his/her native speech. And as the child would be exposed early on to urban vari-
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ants of several languages (from relatives, neighbours, on the street or at school), 
s/he would develop a natural ability to speak each of these languages and would, 
with a native competence, increasingly mix languages, and understand mixed 
speech. Multilingual speech is what really defines the Iscamtho-speaker. More 
than a rigid model of mixed-code, Iscamtho is an attitude of code-mixing which 
consists in permanently playing with languages, transforming them and (re)in-
venting them. 
When the regime change occurred, it was for Black South Africans more than 
a political reversal: It was also the opportunity to be politically, socially and 
culturally acknowledged as being equal to the Whites who had dominated the 
country for centuries. Thus, the nine African cultures of South Africa were to 
receive more attention, for instance with the ‘officialization’ of their languages. 
But, the urban township culture also became more acknowledged and valued. In 
this respect, Iscamtho became the expression of the pride of being a youth in 
Soweto: Soweto is a mythical place to Black South Africans, as it was a centre of 
the struggle and the largest of all the townships where most charismatic leaders 
once lived, and also because it is seen as the place where new trends are born. 
While Soweto was considered a violent, dangerous and uncontrollable place by 
the old regime, coming from Soweto under the new regime now means being 
part of the Sowetan myth. The use of Iscamtho outside Soweto is a source of 
prestige: Iscamtho is typically Sowetan and its speaker is recognized as coming 
from Soweto. As such s/he becomes interesting to outsiders. Youth who have the 
opportunity to move out of Soweto appreciate being able to demonstrate their 
linguistic skills. There are other mixed codes in South Africa but Iscamtho is the 
most diverse and complex, since no place other than Soweto is the melting pot 
for as many languages. Iscamtho is immediately recognizable by non-speakers as 
the language of Soweto, and it provokes reactions of curiosity: People want to 
hear the Iscamtho-speaker and to try to understand and learn his/her language. 
Iscamtho is not only an expression of Sowetan pride, it is in itself a source of 
additional pride. There has actually been a reversal in the reactions of outsiders 
towards Iscamtho. In the past, it might have been recognized as a tsotsitaal, the 
language of a ‘bad’ person; but today it is appreciated and admired, and outsiders 
want to learn it. 
Many consider Iscamtho as the ideal South African language because it is the 
permanent expression of the new South African pride at being diverse and com-
plex. The concept of ‘new South Africanness’ is not only a nice subject for poli-
tical speeches, it is actually promoted in South African society through commer-
cial campaigns advertising ‘proudly South African’ products and behaviour, or 
on television where diversity and multilingualism have been voluntarily pictured 
in many programmes. There are a lot of dramas – or ‘soapies’ as they are called 
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in South Africa – in which language switch and language mix are represented, 
and in which South African people from all racial and linguistic backgrounds 
meet harmoniously. Those constructs of an ideal, mixed society are artificial, and 
reflect neither the reality of the interracial mix or true life in a township. But, 
they find a resonance in the everyday experience of Iscamtho speakers and their 
attitude towards language. 
However, Iscamtho does not only reflect diversity: It is also a means of ex-
pressing creativity and imagination, two values which for Soweto youth are an 
integral and essential part of the dream of a new South Africa. Iscamtho speakers 
are not only free to transform and enrich their language: It is socially rewarding 
to show the ability to invent the language as it is being spoken, and there is often 
competition between speakers to use an item which the interlocutor does not 
know or does not expect. This attitude has been inherited from the early days of 
Iscamtho but it is also closely tied to a cultural movement that has been the most 
emblematic post-apartheid trend since the early 1990s, namely kwaito (Stephens 
2000; Peterson 2003; Satyo 2001). The term kwaito was coined from Iscamtho 
amakwaitosi (gangsters), which is said to originate from the Afrikaans term 
kwaai, meaning ‘angry’. In a certain dimension, kwaito appears to be an ex-
tension of the South African gangster culture, which was already supported by 
musical trends such as jazz, reggae, or pantsula music, although in that case, 
kwaito rose as gangsterism went down. Kwaito is also an entire cultural move-
ment, which integrates music, clothing and dance styles aimed at fun and party-
ing, rather than politics and the demonstration of opinions. The new musical style 
was born in the townships of Johannesburg and Cape-Town where the youth 
started mixing local music, hip-hop and house music. The first nationwide kwaito 
hit was the song ‘Kaffir’ by Arthur Mafokate, which was released in 1995. The 
word kaffir is Afrikaans for ‘nigger’ and the song was an example of the new-
found freedom of expression that the township youth could enjoy, as it was 
critical of the Whites’ racist attitude towards Africans. However, kwaito is more 
directed at fun and enjoyment, and the main quality in kwaito songs is their 
ability to make people dance. 
Kwaito also promotes creativity and freedom within speech: Iscamtho and 
other urban mixed codes are the natural vector of kwaito song, and kwaito artists 
look for linguistic creativity in their lyrics. Kwaito values the permanent creation 
of language and unexpected features are used by the artists and appreciated by 
their fans. It is common for new forms created by a popular artist to be spread in 
Iscamtho and become typical Iscamtho features. An important agent in the spread 
of Iscamtho is a radio station specializing in kwaito music and created in 1997: 
YFM, for Youth FM. Based in Soweto, this station only plays kwaito and other 
styles appreciated by the youth, such as hip-hop. Its presenters are from Soweto 
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and some of them are renowned kwaito artists. On air they use their own 
language, namely Iscamtho. Debates and discussion programmes in which the 
listeners can phone in and participate are mainly conducted in English, but Is-
camtho is also largely used. 
The creative linguistic attitude of Iscamtho was spread through the develop-
ment of kwaito: A number of kwaito artists performed during the official cere-
monies marking the election of Nelson Mandela as the new president in 1994 and 
television programmes for the youth appeared around the same time in which 
kwaito was played and the youth language was used. As mentioned earlier, lan-
guage mix developed in television dramas. Iscamtho found itself well represented 
on television since the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), with its 
three channels, is based in Johannesburg and many actors and presenters ori-
ginate from Johannesburg and know the Soweto language. Since the use of a 
mixed code in a television programme depends on the ability of the actors or the 
presenters to speak it, Iscamtho is naturally more represented than any other 
South African youth language since it has had more air time. The status of 
superstars reached by some kwaito singers also played an essential role, espe-
cially concerning the most prominent South African star of the last decade: 
Zola7. This singer and actor, whose real name is Bonginkosi Thuthukani Dla-
mini, grew up in the township of Zola in the heart of Soweto. Iscamtho is his first 
(and native) language. He became famous as an actor in the controversial series 
Yiso-Yiso, which in a realistic and violent way pictured the life of Soweto youth, 
and in which he played the role of a gangster. After participating in the sound-
track of the series, Zola7 released his album Mdlwembe, which was one of the 
biggest hits ever in kwaito music. Since then he has released three more albums 
and became the presenter of a weekly show on SABC1 that is very popular 
among the youth. He also played the role of a gangster in the 2005 internationally 
recognized film Tsotsi. The popularity of Zola7 and his regular appearances on 
television definitely played a role in spreading Iscamtho throughout South 
Africa. He speaks Iscamtho in his shows, sings in Iscamtho, and a number of 
adverts bearing his image use a motto in Iscamtho. 
Through YFM and the efforts of Zola7, Iscamtho has come to be used by 
youth all over the country and not just in Soweto. Kwaito fans strive to speak the 
same language as their idol and often adopt typical Iscamtho features. Today, 
Iscamtho seems to be influencing other mixed codes in different parts of the 
country, whereas these codes would previously only reflect on a local distri-
bution of languages. In addition to YFM and Zola7, a more recent agent of the 
spread of Iscamtho must be mentioned, although its influence is not yet mea-
surable. In July 2007 SowetoTV, a new television channel, took to the airwaves 
in Gauteng (which includes the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas) and it benefits 
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from a slot on the national DsTV, the South African satellite television provider. 
SowetoTV was set up and is run by Sowetan people in their twenties and thirties 
for whom Iscamtho is (one of) their first language(s). The channel aims at 
representing Soweto and its culture. Thus, even though Iscamtho is not the only 
language it uses, it is heard on most programmes, especially on a youth pro-
gramme entitled Dlalangeringas (Let’s speak Iscamtho) and a cultural program-
me on life in Soweto entitled Ziwamporoma (It’s happening). SowetoTV also 
broadcasts retransmissions at night of local parties where kwaito music is per-
formed, thus increasing the airtime of the Iscamtho language. The many SMSs 
received by the channel from viewers from all over the country confirm the 
interest of South African youth in the Soweto language. Some of these messages 
are even written in Iscamtho even though they originate from places such as 
Durban or Port-Elisabeth where the local mixed language is quite different from 
that in Soweto. The democratization of South Africa opened the door for the 
social recognition of township youth and their culture, and Iscamtho as an 
embodiment of the imagined new society quickly took advantage of it. Soweto is 
the largest and most emblematic township of South Africa and its youth language 
has benefited from the cultural liberation and promotion of Black culture in the 
different media. But, Iscamtho and its Sowetan character have also been agents 
of the development of youth culture in the post-apartheid era. The former cri-
minal language is today so much part of the everyday life of the youth in the 
institutionalized media and in the cultural vector that it has obtained a new social 
meaning and is now gaining a new respectability that benefits its speakers and 
allows them to use Iscamtho in many more settings than previously. 
New meanings and new status of Iscamtho 
Iscamtho has been a native language for about thirty years, and the first gene-
ration of native speakers is now starting to have children who are native speakers 
themselves. Iscamtho has been a language used in many households from ‘Deep 
Soweto’ for two or three decades. In the rest of Soweto, it is rarer to find 
Iscamtho as a language intensively used at home, but in the parts of the township 
which were overwhelmingly hit by gangsters it is common. The youth use Is-
camtho when addressing their parents, although this is more the case in ex-
changes with the father than with the mother, since it is customary to address 
one’s mother in her own language and Iscamtho still keeps some of its character 
as a male language. But in White City-Jabavu for instance, about half the youth 
regularly use Iscamtho to address their mothers and the others use the Iscamtho 
lexicon when using another language as a mark of respect. 
Respect is an important issue when using Iscamtho: traditionally, a younger 
person should show respect when addressing older persons by using their lan-
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guage(s), by modulating his/her tone and by avoiding slang. The present youth 
still strongly believe in the importance of showing respect when addressing older 
people. However, in the parts of Soweto where Iscamtho has been a common 
language at home and in the everyday lives of people for two or three decades, 
there are very few elders who would strictly refuse to be addressed in Iscamtho, 
especially if they know the youth who are talking to them. In townships such as 
White City-Jabavu, Zola or Jabulani, many youth were raised by their grand-
mothers and mothers, as many fathers were involved in violent activities and died 
at a young age or were in prison. The children are rarely under tight supervision 
after the age of nine or ten, and as they talk with their friends in Iscamtho many 
are used to sometimes addressing their mothers and grandmothers in Iscamtho 
too rather than in another language. Older people have got used to Iscamtho 
because many of them used either Iscamtho or Tsotsitaal when they were 
younger, although not as intensively as the youth of today. In addition, the youth 
do not consider their language as improper per se. If what is said is insulting, if 
the tone is not adapted or if the attitude of the young speaker is disdainful for 
instance, there will be a lack of respect but to an increasing number of youth, the 
simple fact of using their language is not sufficient to be considered as dis-
respectful. Not all youth would naturally address an unknown elder in Iscamtho, 
and those who would do so are the youth who have been used to speaking 
Iscamtho to others for a long time. Many are former criminals and may have 
been in prison.  
There is often a certain pride and pleasure in teaching the tsotsi language to 
children: It establishes a more intimate relationship with one’s child, niece or 
nephew than the use of a standard language would and, as standards are not 
usually favoured to the benefit of the urban variant anyway, their would be many 
Iscamtho features even when speaking to the child in a language more ‘proper’ 
than Iscamtho. Iscamtho is more often used by a father or an uncle than a mother 
or an aunt. However, this is changing and many girls who are reaching their 
twenties are native speakers and feel no stigma in addressing their children in 
Iscamtho. Teenage pregnancy is common in Soweto and it is usual to see young 
single mothers. These teenagers, if they are themselves Iscamtho speakers, 
naturally speak to their child in Iscamtho, even if they still live at their parents’ 
house. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS is resulting in a number of children 
being brought up by an aunt or uncle, and in such cases there may be more 
tolerance towards the child’s linguistic choice. Those social factors are not di-
rectly responsible for the transmission of Iscamtho but create a climate in which 
Iscamtho is more easily a permanent feature than in ‘traditional’ models of fami-
lies, in which the respect of the family language might be more tightly protected. 
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 Picture 4.3 Township of Chiawelo 
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There is still a certain gender division in the use of Iscamtho, a reminiscence 
of the time when it was socially unacceptable for a female speaker to use the 
language. But this tendency to a gender division is less today, and even when 
they do not speak it all Sowetan girls and young women now understand Is-
camtho, which therefore really is a lingua franca. Many teenagers and young 
adults have it as a first language and the use of Iscamtho by females in the media 
has also become usual. The stigma cast on women who speak Iscamtho has not 
yet completely disappeared, and there are still conservative reactions to what is 
proper or improper for women in social relations. But one category of women 
now use Iscamtho as their main language in most situations, regardless of who 
they may be talking to, and especially with men: young lesbian women in So-
weto use Iscamtho as an identity marker. Between them, it is usually the lan-
guage they prefer to use and it is a means of affirmation in society. The former 
male-only character of Iscamtho seems to be used as a reaction by lesbian 
women to impose their identity and status and mark their equality with men. 
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Iscamtho, after developing in exchanges of all kinds in private settings, has 
reached one of the most intimate spheres of life: The relationship to the sacred. 
Native speakers pray in Iscamtho even though it may be difficult to do it 
publicly. In church, for instance, it is not a problem to use Iscamtho in one’s 
relationship with God but a person might try to avoid negative remarks by older 
people in church, and not speak Iscamtho. It might be used in prayers, which are 
not spoken, when one addresses God in one’s thoughts. The second important 
sacred relationship that Soweto youth maintain is directed at the ancestors: In 
African cultures where speaking to the ancestors who live around people in spirit, 
to protect their descendants and guide them in their lives, is still a very important 
cultural element even in communities that have been urbanized for a long time. 
Traditionally, the rule is to address the ancestors in their own language, to be 
understood by them and to show them respect. But in fact, many youths tend not 
to respect this rule, advancing different explanations to their behaviour: Firstly, 
the youth often do not master the standard language, which is considered to be 
the ancestors’ language, and when using it with the ancestors there will be a point 
at which a youth will have to use his/her own language, Iscamtho. It is often 
involuntary but unavoidable. Secondly, some consider that speaking to the an-
cestors is a matter for one’s soul, not a question of language. Whatever the lan-
guage they use, the ancestors will understand them and will respond positively to 
their demands. Finally, a minority of the youth argue that they inherited Iscamtho 
from their predecessors and, as a consequence, the ancestors must know Is-
camtho too and will not be offended if they are addressed in this language. 
The second domain in which Iscamtho developed in the past fifteen years is 
the public sphere. Iscamtho has long been a lingua franca on the street between 
the youth, and now also with older generations, as the youth from the past have 
grown older and have not lost their knowledge of Iscamtho or the pleasure of 
speaking it. It is, therefore, natural to address younger people on the streets in 
Iscamtho, and often older people too, especially for youth who consider Iscamtho 
as their native language. If everyone is allowed to use his/her own language, why 
should native Iscamtho speakers be discriminated against? As it has become 
more common and more widely accepted, Iscamtho is now used in shops and in 
contact with the township administration. There is still a risk that a customer or 
shop-tenant will not appreciate the use of Iscamtho but there are usually too 
many customers waiting in the queue for a shopkeeper or a civil servant to dis-
cuss it. The youth who have had encounters with the police (former gangsters or 
prisoners), also have no problem using it with police in the township: This is not 
always advised, as one might appear suspicious but it is not considered improper 
and it is not unusual.  
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One domain does not officially accept Iscamtho but does so in practice: 
school. In the school yard, the students speak Iscamtho with each other and this 
has been the case for a long time. But in the classroom, teachers are supposed to 
use the official school language, which will be one of the recognized languages 
spoken in the township, since the Constitution and the Bill of Rights guarantee 
the right to access education in one’s native language. This has resulted in 
schools using all the different languages heard in Soweto. From the age of ten, 
education is supposed to be given in English, but many teachers speak Iscamtho 
and probably use it themselves in their everyday lives. So although it is not a 
common vector of education, teachers regularly use Iscamtho to make their point 
clearer and to ensure that their pupils follow lessons without any problems. 
Iscamtho is thus used here and there when the children have difficulties with 
comprehension. The issue of greater recognition of Iscamtho in the education 
system, is an important one considering its growing number of native speakers: 
Many youngsters are officially considered to speak Zulu, Sotho or another lan-
guage but do not actually understand the standard versions of these languages, 
which are the ones used at school. If school is their main means of learning the 
standard language, the difficulties they encounter with it is a source of the failure 
in their curricula. It seems likely that in the future the growing number of youth 
who know only urban variants or Iscamtho will force the authorities to acknow-
ledge that standard languages are not adequate for Soweto’s educational system. 
Finally, and as mentioned earlier, the use of Iscamtho is spreading in the 
media. This not only concerns television dramas or radio programmes but also 
commercial slogans which are now using Iscamtho. The main slogan of SABC1, 
the public Nguni-speaking channel, is Mzansi fo sho, a Iscamtho sentence mean-
ing ‘South Africa for sure’, in which Mzansi is derived from the Xhosa word for 
‘south’ (umzansi). In Iscamtho, sho is also the usual way to say ‘yes’. Another 
famous slogan which can be quoted is Hola 7, used in advertisements for a cell-
phone company, CellC, in which the kwaito star Zola7 appears. Hola 7 is a 
greeting in Iscamtho but it comes from the criminal slang of the 28 gang that is 
famous as a gang of killers. It originally constitutes a threat of death, as the 
number 7 symbolizes blood. Finally, the Tastic brand of rice uses the slogan 
Dankie Mama, in which Dankie is originally Afrikaans for ‘thank you’. These 
examples illustrate the new social status of Iscamtho, which is now more res-
pectable and acceptable in business dealings. Its importance among the young 
generation is being recognized, and even businesses acknowledge the need to 
communicate in it to improve their commercial results. More than half of South 
Africa’s population live in African urban townships and the majority are under 
the age of 30. Businesses can no longer avoid using the most representative and 
fastest-developing language. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the social processes through which Iscamtho has 
developed from being seen as a criminal language to being the language of the 
youth, and then adopted the status of native language. It is the lingua franca in 
the township of Soweto among all generations, and has also become the language 
of the media, culture and advertising. The example of Iscamtho shows how the 
growing influence of a generation (the youth) and a place (Soweto) in a society 
which has experienced tremendous changes in the past fifteen years, has turned 
an ever-changing code and language-transforming attitudes from which it results 
into a common, native, socially acceptable and widespread way of speaking. The 
growing influence of kwaito, as well as the regular improvement of the social 
position of some first-language Iscamtho speakers, should continue to improve 
the social meaning of Iscamtho and to reduce the negative stigma still associated 
with it, mainly by older and rural people. According to optimistic estimates by 
NGOs, there might be up to four million speakers in Soweto, although the 
government acknowledges only two million. Between 5% and 10% of South 
Africans today can speak or at least understand Iscamtho. This number will 
continue to grow in parallel to the number of young people in South Africa, who 
are fascinated by Soweto, learn Iscamtho through television, radio and kwaito 
music. Iscamtho is emerging as a reference for speakers of all local mixed codes 
in South Africa, and its symbolism of ‘unity in diversity’, to use the official 
device of the Republic of South Africa, makes it a tool of integration for African 
youth across the country. There are two questions for the future: Will Iscamtho 
benefit from official acknowledgement, especially in the field of education? And 
will it be able to help integrate other South African communities, White, Indian 
and Coloured, and really become a language for all South Africans and not just 
one for all Black South Africans? 
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5 
How linguistic features  
and social arrangements  
can interrelate: The position  
of Swahili and its speakers  
in Bujumbura 
 
Lianne Belt 
 
 
 
 
 
Within the sociology of language, interdisciplinarity combines the study of social 
structure and language use, focusing on the interplay of language and society. 
Using the example of Swahili speakers in Bujumbura, Burundi, this chapter shows 
how linguistic features and social arrangements can interrelate. Changes in 
sociolinguistic patterns reflect social and political changes and pressures, and the 
Swahili language and its speakers in Bujumbura have experienced simultaneous 
changing appreciations. 
Introduction 
Swahili is considered unique among the African languages of the modern world 
for the dynamism of its development. The language goes back at least to the tenth 
century when it was used along the East African Coast but it spread to Eastern 
and Central Africa only about two hundred years ago with the arrival of 
foreigners. Arab traders, merchants, missionaries, administrators, politicians and 
educators all played a part in this spread and today Swahili is widely used as the 
lingua franca in Eastern and Central Africa. In Burundi and Rwanda however, 
appreciation for the language changed several times over the years: Initially it 
used to be the language that united people from different backgrounds but it later 
changed into the language of strangers, Muslims and ‘uncivilized’ people. It has 
 The position of Swahili and its speakers in Bujumbura 77 
 
recently changed again and is increasingly now being seen as a language of the 
region.  
This study of Swahili and Swahili speakers in Bujumbura is based on research 
carried out between June 2007 and January 2008 and the work of Dickerman 
(1984), and covers the history of Swahili and its speakers in Bujumbura from the 
end of the nineteenth century to the present. Focusing on different time periods, 
the chapter deals with the interplay of language and society and demonstrates the 
changing status of Swahili and the social status of its speakers since the language 
was adopted in Bujumbura. It highlights the underlying factors that caused these 
changes and shows their relationship with political decisions. In conclusion and 
to illustrate how linguistic features and social arrangements interrelate, and how 
changes in sociolinguistic patterns reflect social and political changes and pres-
sures, the history of Swahili and its speakers in Bujumbura is discussed. 
 
 
 
Picture 5.1 Children proudly showing their first Swahili  
study book 
 [© Lianne Belt] 
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The introduction of Swahili to Bujumbura 
Trading contacts in the Lake Tanganyika region with the Swahili traders of the 
Indian Ocean intensified after the 1830s and Ujiji, at the western end of one of 
the main overland caravan routes, rapidly grew in importance. Through simple 
day-to-day contact between merchants and the local population, Lake Tangan-
yika slowly became a ‘second Swahili coast’, with many of the defining Swahili 
characteristics being adopted, including the Swahili language, Islamic architect-
ure and clothing, and Islam itself.  
A large market, situated in present-day Bujumbura, attracted many people, 
including the Germans. They had created a base in Bujumbura in 1897 but their 
activities were more of a military nature, although from 1907 onwards they 
changed their position to one of a more administrative nature and it was desig-
nated the Residentur (Residency) of Urundi. They decided that Bujumbura would 
be the only entrance to the interior. Employees came from almost every different 
ethnic group in East and Central Africa, were often Muslim and frequently spoke 
Swahili. In 1909 the Germans founded their first government-run school in 
Bujumbura and as Swahili was the only official language in Ruanda-Urundi, it 
was decided that it would be used as the language of instruction. The German 
schools served to educate the chiefs, sub-chiefs, assistants of the colonial admi-
nistration, supervisors and anyone else who enjoyed studying. ‘Those who suc-
ceeded at school could hope for employment as secretaries with the government 
or traders’ (Dickerman 1984: 55). The Swahili language, supplemented by the 
defining characteristics of the Swahili culture, was instituted in Bujumbura and 
all its inhabitants spoke the language as a lingua franca. 
The downward spiral 
After Germany’s defeat at the end of the First World War, Belgium was given 
the mandate over Ruanda-Urundi. Initially they preserved the linguistic policy of 
the Germans, mainly because Swahili was also used along Lake Tanganyika’s 
coastal line in the Belgian Congo. Not being able to speak Swahili was incon-
ceivable but in the long term many new rules were enforced which resulted in the 
social, economic and linguistic situation of Bujumbura’s inhabitants changing 
considerably. 
Bujumbura became more stratified as the Belgians sought to establish separate 
economic and geographic spheres for the different racial groups and just as lines 
were being drawn between rural and urban areas, so too were boundaries laid 
within the town (Dickerman 1984: 102). 
To ‘control’ the Africans, a separate residential area was set aside for non-
Muslim Africans with full-time, salaried employment. Most Swahilis, with their 
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hodgepodge of occupations, were not allowed to live there. The stratification 
became even stricter when Asians [and Arabs] successfully pushed the poorer 
Swahilis who had moved in later out of the Asian commune (Matongoni) into an 
adjacent area called Kabondo (Dickerman 1984: 134).1 The Swahili group had to 
pay higher taxes than others and they were harder hit by the educational 
measures taken in 1927 in which the Catholic Church took over almost all the 
educational responsibilities and the language of Catholic instruction changed to 
Kirundi in primary schools and French in higher education.2 The missions ‘re-
ceived official sanction – and funds – to spread their influence by working with 
the young elite, who would in turn bring their followers into the Christian fold’ 
(Ibid.: 132). They educated the chefs and the auxiliary executives like male 
nurses, agronomic assistants and veterinaries who would assist the colonial ad-
ministration (Karangwa 1995: 138). Muslims who did not agree to convert to 
Christianity were denied access to training and the skills demanded by the 
European administration and companies. This was also true for artisanal in-
struction.3 As a consequence, ‘professions which could be learned without formal 
instruction became increasingly prevalent among the Muslim community’ (Dic-
kerman 1984: 126). 
A growing geographical separation between Catholic and Muslim Africans 
underscored the increasing economic and educational isolation of the latter, and 
by the end of the 1920s ‘the divisions within Bujumbura’s population and the 
communes allocated to them were firmly drawn: Europeans, Asians, Swahilis, 
and other Africans, each group with its own neighbourhood, each with appro-
priate occupations’ (Ibid.: 135). 
In the mid 1930s, two new communes came into existence. One was Buyenzi, 
the ‘village des Swahilis’ that was designed for the Swahilis who were trans-
ferred from Kabondo, Mbugani or Matongoni. The people living here were likely 
to be born, marry and die locally. The other commune, closer to the centre of 
town, was Belge where the inhabitants were Christians or traditionalists (Ibid.: 
192).4 They were often men who had come to Bujumbura as young adults in the 
search for work, who returned home to marry but did not necessarily ever bring 
their wives and children to Bujumbura. They were usually able to speak French 
and had steady employment in a good job that they had been able to get by virtue 
                                                 
1  The justification for this racial separation given by the Asians and the colonial administration was 
public health. 
2  The Protestant missions continued to use Swahili as the language of instruction and in their services. 
The pastors’ mobility in the Great Lakes Region, where Swahili was still the most common language, 
encouraged them to keep Swahili as their working language. 
3  It is said that the Catholics, whose schools were often located outside Bujumbura, frequently did not 
accept anyone living in Bujumbura. See Dickerman (1984: 133). 
4  Although not commonly practised, Swahilis were allowed to live in Belge in order to practise their 
commercial activities as shop owners.  
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of being educated at a mission school. This was in contrast with those living in 
Buyenzi who were often poorly trained, changed jobs regularly and were no 
longer the administration’s ‘right hand’. The Belgian administration’s new stra-
tification policy had as an effect that ‘Islam no longer exercised the attraction to 
immigrants it once had. Newcomers to Bujumbura now found a large, reasonably 
stable community of Christians and unconverted Africans among whom they 
might live’ (Ibid.: 193). Consequently, by 1948 Muslims were no longer the ma-
jority even though there had been three times as many Muslims as non-Muslims 
in Bujumbura in the 1930s. ‘Swahilis had been supplanted as the focal point of 
Bujumbura’s African community.’ (Ibid.: 194). As a reaction to this, the Swahilis 
increasingly formed a real community in which they regrouped individual na-
tionalities and different ethnicities: Congolese, Ugandans, Rwandans, Rundi, 
people from Tanganyika and Arab-Swahilis. Four elements created a sense of 
unity among them: Occupation, religion, language and residence. Swahili be-
came not only a means of communication but also a means of identification 
towards other people who did not speak the language. Islam brought them a 
cultural framework and a social stratification that cut them off from the rest of 
society (Karangwa 1995: 162). 
Even without professions in the colonial administration, the Swahilis in Bu-
jumbura lived quite well, better than the Rwandans and the Rundi. This intensi-
fied the name-calling between the two groups. The Swahilis were successful in 
their work in commerce but this success was often ascribed to be as a result of 
illegal commerce and theft, and not due to their sharp business sense and their 
open minds. A negative image of the Swahilis started to emerge and spread 
through the population, with the term ‘Swahili’ in the end becoming a synonym 
for a thug, liar, thief and a generally dishonest person. And when the Swahilis, 
who distinguished themselves by dressing in the kanzu and the veil, were seen as 
being cheats and liars in the eyes of their compatriots, their language also became 
the language of thugs, liars, thieves and the uneducated. Muslim youth were said 
not to have had a ‘social education’, like the children in the rural areas. If a 
person spoke Swahili, he was seen as someone from ‘town’ and regarded as 
being bad. They were seen as people without a Rundi social education but with a 
foreign social education (i.e. strangers). People who had grown up in the city had 
learned no manners, it was said, whereas people from the countryside could work 
in Bujumbura but had had more social education.5 As a result, within non-
Swahili surroundings, the use of Swahili provoked mistrust and occasionally dis-
dain (Karangwa 1995: 165). From 1950 onwards, (new) polygamous marriages 
were prohibited, with the result that especially Swahili women became or stayed 
single more frequently. The government did not believe that these women were 
                                                 
5  Interview with G. Nijinbere, a RTNB journalist, 25 September 2007. 
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really single and thought that they were either still in an illegal marriage or were 
working as prostitutes. The high taxes that were levied on single women by the 
Swahili clerks as a result were called kodi ya malaya (tax on prostitutes) 
(Castryck 2006: 146-147). 
Not only the Belgian administration made divisions and distinctions between 
the different groups in Bujumbura; Africans created them too. They started to 
align themselves ethnically at elections, which served to exacerbate ethnic and 
regional rivalries, or formed associations along ethnic lines. Belge became the 
home of ethnic associations, while in Buyenzi, the only formally recognized 
associations were those that drew their membership from the Muslim African 
community as a whole (Dickerman 1984: 252). 
By the end of the 1950s, Bujumbura resembled a vast formation of stratified 
rock, with strata composed of ‘people of differing occupations and national 
origins. There was also order and logic to this melange, with specific groups 
dominating certain activities. This configuration was the product of the changing 
requirements of the colonial political economy and of the recruitment procedures 
by which these needs have been met’ (Ibid.: 259, 260). These strata also reflected 
linguistic attitudes. The new Francophones considered Swahili to be a language 
of the non cultivés and uneducated, and even that of thugs and thieves. The 
Swahili language, as a result, ended up at the bottom of the linguistic pyramid, 
below French and Kirundi.  
Towards independence 
Towards independence, it seemed for a while that the Swahili community had 
experienced some sort of revived. In 1955, women in Buyenzi protested against 
name-calling and the high taxes they had to pay. Their protests evolved in overt 
resistance to paying taxes and they filed a petition in 1956. The protests were 
taken over by the men in the Swahili communes in 1957. These actions by 
Swahili men and women were the first signs of political resistance to the colonial 
administration and, as such, were a symbolic step towards the decolonization of 
Burundi (Castryck 2006: 153). But there was more to come. 
Great enthusiasm in Buyenzi emerged for the leader of UPRONA, Prince 
Louis Rwagasore, the son of Urundi’s mwami (king) Mwambutsa. The Swahilis 
supported his activities and were excited about working for him, knowing that 
the Belgian officials were unhappy about such activities. Rather than being 
systematically and progressively excluded, Swahilis were at the very heart of 
Rwagasore’s cooperative (Dickerman 1984: 255). They were frustrated and 
wanted independence, they wanted an end to the high taxes, chances in Rundi 
society, freedom of commercial activities and to be able to visit the countryside. 
The Swahili were of great help to UPRONA. They connected UPRONA with 
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other Swahili speakers fighting for independence, like those in Tanzania and 
Kenya. In Burundi they helped with propaganda and mobilization upcountry, and 
they organized meetings. Although they were not very well educated, they had 
open minds. ‘Their mobility, which is part of their intermediary position at the 
margins of Burundian life, proved to be not only a carrier of goods and people, 
but also of ideas’ (Castryck 2006: 7). However, the Belgians warned the Rundi 
about the Swahilis and said that if the Swahilis won power, they would suppress 
the Rundi, and the Rundi culture would be lost. A law was passed that stated that 
(most) Swahilis could not be chosen or vote themselves on the ground that they 
were not ‘nationals’. Some though could obtain political rights based on Rundi 
descent but there was another reason why Swahilis were not able to be elected: 
They were not educated, thus not eligible to be a deputy or a minister.6 That was 
exactly why, after independence in 1962, everything reverted to the way it had 
been before for the Swahilis. Most of the Congolese had left because of the 
independence of Congo in 1960, and the Rundi had taken over their positions in 
the administration. The Swahilis, not well enough educated, returned to the 
informal sector. ‘Eventually, the Muslims in Burundi decided [again] to openly 
withdraw from participating in the social and political sphere by setting up their 
own educational system of Qur’an schools’ (Grohma 2005). 
The slow comeback 
The colonial government in Belgian Africa had given advantages to the African 
languages of the natives, although they had also used French. After independence 
though, this completely changed, with French becoming the most important lan-
guage, while Kirundi was given an inferior status (Karangwa 1995: 178). Swahili 
was left without status but was still used in Bujumbura, especially in commercial 
areas. 
In the first years after independence, the Swahilis received little opposition at 
a sociological or political level. After all, it was the Swahilis who helped win 
independence. Even the Catholic Church was defending Swahili by stating that 
Swahili, being a language used by its neighbours, could serve as a second 
African language in Burundi7 although for practical and emotional reasons this 
did not happen. First of all there were not enough teachers available, and second, 
the administration was indifferent towards it. French was the language of power 
and influence, not Swahili. Some still had negative feelings towards Swahili and 
saw it as a language of the uneducated and the illiterate, and thus despised it. For 
others, it brought back memories of oppression and the injustices of Belgian rule. 
                                                 
6  Interview with Prof. E. Mworoha, 19 December 2007. 
7  Proposition by the President of the Rundi Academy, Priest J.B. Ntahokaja, quoted in Karangwa (1995: 
192). 
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The firmness of the Congolese, as officials responsible for order and chores, 
made them dislike Swahili (Karangwa 1995: 192-193). Ten years after indepen-
dence, Swahili was spoken even less in Bujumbura and Kirundi had taken over 
as the main language, since many Congolese had returned to their home country 
and more Rundi had moved into Bujumbura.  
Although Swahili and its speakers were still marginalized, the hard work of 
the Swahilis during independence resulted in the re-introduction of the Swahili 
language on the radio in 1961. This pleased the Swahilis but the language did not 
win the hearts of the Rundi. Nevertheless, over time, things slowly changed for 
the better for Swahili and its speakers. In 1995, Karangwa described Burundi as a 
monolingual country, with the inhabitants of Bujumbura being bilingual, with 
Swahili in second place after Kirundi and ahead of French and English. He 
noticed that ‘[l]e kiswahili n’est pas généralement consideré comme une langue 
d’incultes’ and that ‘l’image positive de cette langue est plutôt répandu entre les 
deux ages, les plus jeunes et les plus vieux étant les plus nombreux à y croire, 
dans les mêmes proportions auprès des deux sexes’ (Ibid.: 289, 290). At the time 
of his research, Burundi was entering a period of civil war marked by ethnic 
violence, with fighting between the Tutsi-dominated army and armed Hutu rebel 
groups. The fighting was causing widespread civilian casualties and although not 
directly influencing the situation of the Swahili speakers in Burundi or appre-
ciation of the language itself, indirectly there were many changes in the country 
due to the war, changes that had a positive effect on how Swahili was seen and 
on its speakers. Let us now discuss some of these factors of change. 
 
The position of Muslims during the civil war 
The people in Buyenzi, primarily Swahili-speaking Muslims, are said not to have 
participated fully in the ethnic rivalries and are lauded for their contributions to 
maintaining peace (Rockfeler 2002). Muslims are said to have opened ‘their 
doors to shelter those who were running for their lives’ during war, with as a 
result a ‘growing number of new Muslims’ (Grohma 2005). As shown by Belt 
(2007), something similar happened during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when 
‘Muslim identity became a new horizon for many who were exhausted of being 
persecuted due to their Hutu or Tutsi origin’ (Ibid.).. This might have had the 
effect that the negative view that people had about Muslims and their language, 
Swahili, changed for the better.  
 
Former refugees 
The recent wars and the subsequent upheavals in Burundi have paradoxically 
increased knowledge and the use of Swahili. This is partly because the refugees 
who fled to neighbouring countries acquired Swahili in the process. The lan-
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guage is widely used in the refugee camps, especially by children, and these 
refugees are now returning and continue to speak Swahili (UNESCO 2006). 
Moreover, the new regime in Burundi is largely made up of former refugees, 
people who joined the rebellion – often outside Burundi – and people who lived 
in a Swahili-speaking country due to the war and are therefore fluent in Swahili. 
They are more disposed towards the promotion of Swahili in Burundi and, as a 
result, many present-day politicians speak Swahili. One of those interviewed 
said: ‘People accept Swahili now because even the new president speaks it. In 
Africa one follows the opinion of the president, so if he thinks Swahili is im-
portant, it is indeed important.’8 
 
Muslims in the new regime 
Many present-day politicians speak Swahili and are also Muslim, like Hussein 
Radjabu (the CNDD-FDD party chairman until February 2007), Dr Yves Sahin-
guvu (first Vice President), Saïdi Kibeya (Minister of Education and Scientific 
Research) and Hafsa Mossi (Minister of Information, Communication, Relations 
with Parliament, and Government Spokesman) and ‘for the first time in Burun-
dian history Islam was treated as an integral part of society instead of a marginal 
or repulsive appendix to it’ (Castryck 2006: 8). But there are also worries about 
the future position of Muslims in Burundi as it seems that the openness towards 
Muslims is already drawing to a close again.9 
 
Regionalization 
Due to political crises in the 1990s, Burundi (and Rwanda) have started to open 
up. They have joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 10 and focused their policies for regional integration increasingly on 
the Swahili-speaking east. Burundi (and Rwanda) chose to apply for entry into 
the East African Community (EAC) in 2007.11 In addition, Mombasa, Dar es 
Salaam and Nairobi have become very important for the country’s imports and 
exports since those from Congo were disappointing. When joining the EAC,  
 
                                                 
8  Interview with A. Ndayisenga, a 26-year-old university student, 25 July 2007. 
9  See: News24 (2008) Burundi jails Radjabu over plot, 04/04/2008, http://www.news24.com/News24/ 
Africa/News/0, 2-11-1447_2299906,00.html (accessed 7 November 2008) or Info Burundi, Jusque 
quand restera Hussein RADJABU en prison, http://www.info-burundi.net/modules.php?name=News 
&file=article&sid=2798 (accessed 7 November 2008)  
10  COMESA is a preferential trading area with twenty member states stretching from Libya to Zim-
babwe and has as its objective the promotion of regional economic integration through trade and in-
vestment.  
11  The EAC is the regional intergovernmental organization of the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, the Uni-
ted Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda and aims at widening 
and deepening cooperation among partner states in political, economic and social fields for their mu-
tual benefit.  
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Burundi accepted its treaties as they were, with English as the working language 
and Swahili as the lingua franca.  
 
Swahili education 
As a result of its EAC membership, it was decided in 2005 that Swahili would be 
re-introduced into Burundi. There were three main reasons for this. The first was 
geo-political. All of Burundi’s neighbours use Swahili, and with the introduction 
of Swahili in schools, Burundi wanted to become more integrated in the region, 
especially economically. Secondly, Swahili was recognized by the African Union 
(AU) as a language that would provide a link between several states. Thirdly, 
Swahili education in schools was a condition for joining the EAC. In recent 
years, African countries have become increasingly aware of the importance of 
linguistic diversity, with the result that language policies being developed nowa-
days are mostly aimed at multilingualism. This offered Swahili new chances. 
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Swahili on radio and television 
Since joining the EAC, Swahili can be heard more frequently on radio and 
television. It has been given more importance by the Burundi government and 
journalists urge politicians to speak Swahili when being interviewed. Although 
different radio stations give different value to Swahili in their programming, all 
realize that it is a language that should not be ignored. With their broadcasts in 
Swahili, people with no knowledge of Swahili can become familiar with the lan-
guage, and people who already speak Swahili can be more involved in society. 
 
The importance of Bongo Flava 
Swahili in Burundi has become popular through music too. When spending a day 
in Bujumbura, one can hardly avoid hearing Swahili in Bongo Flava: East Afri-
can hip hop.12 ‘The Swahili lyrics and phrases tackle the usual East African hip-
hop subjects like poverty, ambition, success, money, HIV and AIDS, education 
and experiences we can all relate to such as love, education, beauty or loneliness’ 
(Kitakufe 2006). Bongo Flava is everywhere in the city centre, in bars, in discos 
and on minibuses. Bongo Flava artists from Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya per-
form regularly in Bujumbura and their songs are played on the radio as well. 
Young people hear the songs every day, learn the lyrics by heart and discuss their 
meaning. In this way, they learn Swahili without having to make a concerted 
effort to do so. Bongo Flava has, in fact, been an important reason for many 
young people becoming interested in the language. 
 
Swahili and religion 
Swahili is increasingly part of Burundi’s churches, especially the Protestant 
churches. Protestant pastors from the US and the UK who initially worked in the 
Swahili-speaking former British colonies are now travelling to Burundi and other 
countries more frequently, taking Swahili songs with them from Tanzania and 
Kenya, and also a positive attitude to Swahili. Protestant churches attract many 
young people who are less averse to Swahili than their parents and who love the 
Swahili religious songs they find there. The Catholic churches mainly use 
Kirundi and French in their services and hardly any of them offer daily Swahili 
services although they can provide Swahili translators if necessary.13 
Swahili is always used in mosques. Sermons are in Arabic and translated into 
Swahili, and the Qur’an is in Arabic but with a Swahili translation. A Kirundi 
translation of the Qur’an is said to be in the process of being written.  
                                                 
12  See also on AOL Music: What is Bongo Flava? http://video.aol.com/video-detail/what-is-bongo-flava/ 
372535766 (accessed 20 October 2008). 
13  One exception is said to be Minevam, a Catholic church in the centre of town that offers Swahili ser-
vices with translations in Kirundi. 
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Conclusion 
The position of Swahili and Swahili speakers in Bujumbura has changed several 
times. The linguistic features and social arrangements were interrelated over a 
century ago but were influenced by political factors. Both were important in Bu-
jumbura in the period before and during German rule but the situation changed 
under Belgian rule. More people, including Rundi, arrived in Bujumbura and 
Swahili speakers were increasingly discriminated against by the Belgian admini-
stration. As a result, the positive image of Swahili was damaged to the point that 
Swahilis were seen as a marginal people and their language became marginalized 
in Bujumbura. A brief revival by Swahilis during the struggle for independence 
did not result in significant changes in their position or that of the language and it 
was only during and after the civil war that their situation changed for the better.  
Looking at the history of Bujumbura and at the interplay between linguistic 
features and social arrangements, it would appear that language and social status 
are indeed interrelated. Political decisions have sometimes contributed positively 
and sometimes negatively to these changes but have always been a factor in the 
appreciation of the Swahili language and its speakers. With this in mind, it will 
be interesting to see if future developments in Bujumbura will keep on following 
the found interplay of language and society as we have described in this paper.  
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Peer groups and human  
anchorage: Girl migrants  
making it work in  
N’Djamena, Chad 
 
Jonna Both 
 
 
 
 
 
Issa Serge Coelo’s short film about a taxi driver in N’Djamena, the capital of 
Chad, shows the military repression, the fear of robbery and the poverty and 
insecurity that people in this city endure in their daily lives.1 One does not expect 
girls, living independently in small peer groups, to find a proper way of coping in 
such a volatile environment. For at least three decades, N’Djamena has been an 
unstable and insecure environment but young girls and boys from southern 
Chadian villages nowadays actively seek access to the city in search for jobs and 
new experiences. This chapter deals with young girl migrants – aged 10 to 19 – 
from southern Chad, finding their ways in N’Djamena, and looks specifically at 
the importance of peer groups to understand how they cope in this urban setting.  
Introduction 
On the corner of a block in Chagoua2 and built against the wall of a big 
compound, two very small rooms made of mud faced each other. A small wall 
partly closed the ‘compound’ off from the street. These two rooms were home to 
twelve girls who together paid FCFA 14,000 a month to live there. The doors did 
not close well from the inside and at night the door handles were tied with string 
to keep them shut. During the interview with the group of girls living there, I was 
bothered by the wall I was leaning against in the middle of this small compound, 
                                                 
1   Issa Serge Coelo, Un taxi pour Aouzou. Movimento Production, 1994. 
2  A quarter of N’Djamena. 
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while trying to stay in the little space of shade on a mat we had brought along.3 
Then I realized the walls had been plastered, probably after the rainy season, with 
sand from the street, which explained the black plastic pieces4 and other waste 
visible in them. We formed a big group; eleven of the girls that lived in these two 
rooms, a baby, a research assistant and a girl from the neighbourhood. One of the 
girls had stayed on her mat inside one of the rooms as her finger was badly 
infected and she was in a lot of pain. The other girls, varying in age from twelve 
to seventeen, were dressed in colourful T shirts and third-hand skirts. They were 
spending their Sunday together – their only day off – and did not often go out, 
tending to stay home in the evening unless they went out with ‘brothers’ from 
their home village. By helping each other find jobs as domestic workers, mostly 
in the northern, Muslim parts of town, they had managed to save some money for 
their rent and for the goods they wanted to buy to take back to their village.  
The group’s living conditions are typical of a lot of other young rural migrants 
in N’Djamena: the tiny rooms they share with so many, the way their rooms open 
onto the streets and can barely be closed off, the proximity of the chef de race,5 
the single mother in their midst and the girl’s untreated infection. Although the 
proximity of girls from the same village and with whom they feel at ease cannot 
remove their harsh urban living conditions, their closeness helps the girls survive 
in N’Djamena and is essential for coping in the city. 
To explain the importance and dynamics of these peer groups, the following 
issues will be presented in this chapter: The local context, a short historiography 
to embed the topic of migrant peer groups in the literature, an interpretation of 
the important functioning of female peer groups in the face of migration and new, 
uncertain urban landscapes, the characteristics of groups, the importance of 
emotional support, solidarity and safety one finds from being a member of a peer 
group and, finally, the role of brothers and boyfriends in the urban landscape. 
Living in N’Djamena 
N’Djamena is an urban region in which se debrouiller (managing to cope) has 
become normal practice.6 Its recent history, the constant threat of violence and 
                                                 
3  An attempt to visit another group of girls at their home was not realized. They proposed meeting some-
where else because they did not have any shade at home and no mat. For us, this would not have mat-
tered but the girls felt it was unacceptable to receive visitors in such circumstances. 
4  The remains of black plastic bags are found everywhere on the streets of N’Djamena. They swirl 
around the city with the Harmattan as the Saharan sand and winds blow them through the air. A girl in 
the research used this léddar as a metaphor to describe men. ‘Men are like léddar, the wind will come 
and take them.’ V. got married two years ago. She is now about fifteen, has a baby and is working as a 
domestic servant. Her husband had already been ‘taken by the wind’ to another girl (Walia, 2 Decem-
ber 2007). 
5  See Both (2008). 
6  See, for example, Waage (2006). 
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rebel attacks, the poverty of its people, an imposing political elite, job (in)se-
curity and regular flooding in the rainy season make the city an insecure environ-
ment. Political tensions are influencing daily life and specific factors over time 
have contributed to tensions between southerners (mostly Christians or animists) 
and a diversity of northern (mostly Muslim) kingdoms and political-military 
fractions, between southern farmers and northern/central pastoralists and between 
Muslim traders and local people in the south (Magrin 2001). There was fighting 
in N’Djamena between 1979 and 1982 when southerners in the capital were 
pushed back towards the south of Chad. Today there is still occasional fighting in 
the city centre or on the outskirts of N’Djamena when rebels from the northeast 
attempt to take power, as they did for example in April 2006 and February 2008. 
Political power and with it (oil) money and the means of repression in the form 
of the army and the police are controlled by a specific part of the population. 
Such power distribution renders others defenseless in everyday life in the face of 
‘the law’. In other words, the political and economic climate in Chad plays an 
important role in the period described in this research. Traders and market 
women in N’Djamena face the daily threat of displacement and dispossession in 
a city where heavily armed military forces, both Chadian and French, are a 
visible presence on the streets. But fortunately this is also a city in which people 
create alliances and have not given up trying to make things work. 
Under Habré,7 there was no democracy. Nobody came here (to N’Djamena). Now 
there is democracy and inflation. Everything is expensive but we have to cope (...). 
(Gua, 19 years old)8 
The girls in this research project link their mobility to the ‘democracy’ created 
under President Déby, the current president. For the last ten to fifteen years, it 
has been relatively safe to travel to N’Djamena from the south of the country as 
security has improved.9 However, according to Gua, the kind of democracy that 
President Déby has created in Chad means that the resources of the state are 
primarily in the hands of his close affiliates, his kin and those he maintains 
reciprocal relations with, such as traders, and who have the means to build large 
houses and employ more than one southern youngster in their household. Girls 
from the age of eleven onwards are now joining the exodus from southern rural 
areas, according to the media and NGOs. Their arrival en masse to work in 
                                                 
7  Chad’s former president, now facing trial in Senegal.  
8  All the names of informants have been changed for reasons of privacy. 
9  Although there is mounting evidence of conflicts between (state-armed) cattle herders and farmers in 
the south over the last fifteen years (Both 2008; Magrin 2003), local militias (codos) and the national 
army are no longer fighting each other in the rural areas. 
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N’Djamena is, unlike elsewhere,10 a relatively recent type of mobility. The girls 
demonstrate their independence by choosing migration as a new generational 
freedom but at the same time the impoverishment in the south is making their 
farming parents realize that they do not have the means to provide for their 
children and it is therefore difficult to convince their daughters to stay in the 
villages. 
Coming from the south of Chad 
A large group of girls and a lot of boys in N’Djamena, estimated to number 
between 900 and 1000, come from the village of Beduigrui in the Department of 
Mandoul in southern Chad. The local circumstances in Mandoul, as in other 
southern regions, are complicated: Farmers need to sleep in their fields to protect 
their crops at night from the growing numbers of (commercial) cattle herders in 
the region and weapons are increasingly being used to resolve these kinds of 
conflicts between farmers and herders. Southerners feel abandoned by the local 
administration, which is no longer staffed by local people but by those from the 
northeastern (ruling) part of the country. They feel unable to defend their rights 
in local conflicts with alleged state-armed and state-supported pastoralists. The 
groups approach each other with a political memory of slave raiding, and a his-
torically imposed colonial divide between southern animists and northern Mus-
lims plays an important role in the region. In addition, most of the soil in this 
cotton-growing area is exhausted and the land does not generate the money it 
used to in the past. Nevertheless, the girls in N’Djamena did not often refer 
directly to the problems faced by their villages but explained their move to the 
capital as a chance to earn money to purchase their own utensils and clothes. The 
element of adventure was considered an important factor too. They had saved up 
for the journey by engaging in petty trade in billi billi (local millet-beer) or fried 
beans at the local market, had chosen their day of departure (usually a market 
day) and left on a minibus without informing their parents.11 Their routes to the 
capital, where they would become domestic workers, correspond with the mi-
gration routes that most of their fathers and brothers also once explored. 
The girls’ regrouping in the city is often mentioned in the media (“sharing 
overcrowded places, boys and girls sharing rooms, that’s how they get pregnant 
or get AIDS”) and they are very visible on the streets. Living on the outskirts of 
the city, they walk to and from work in the centre or the north of town in small 
                                                 
10  There are many studies of similar migration patterns for other areas, ranging from Europe (Moch 1993) 
to the rest of the world (Oudedraogo 1995; Bastia 2005; Moya 2007), that analyze dynamics such as 
historical phenomena. 
11  Parents were sometimes aware that their daughters were planning to leave but were often not informed 
of the exact day or time. 
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groups, carrying each other’s babies to work and walking hand in hand. Out-
siders comment on the way they walk and dress, describing their style as 
villageois (rustic) in a city where a lot of people are attempting to adopt middle-
class standards. Most of the youth cross specific urban boundaries between the 
northern (Muslim) parts of town and their own southern quarters, borders that 
their parents’ generation are much less likely to cross. Their mobility coincides 
with a very insecure urban landscape and a political environment that makes their 
coping strategies interesting to investigate. 
 
 
 
Picture 6.1 Next generation of migrants 
 [© Jonna Both] 
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A historiography of group formation: Girls and migration  
Though comparable small-scale women’s networks have proved essential for sur-
vival in migrant settings for women worldwide, those of young girls have rarely 
been addressed in the literature. The social networks of adolescents were until 
recently seen as marginal to the survival of youth because they were thought 
unlikely to possess the social or economic capital that is inherent in adult net-
works. To explain the social relevance of the understudied networks of female 
adolescent peers in N’Djamena, it is necessary to understand the larger body of 
literature on female migration. 
There is a certain amount of literature on the specific interplay between gender 
and migration. Studies generally cover a large geographical and historical space 
and focus on domestic workers and prostitutes, presenting an image of vulnerable 
female migrants (Moch & Fuchs 1993; Moch 2003; Lawson 1998; Schrover 
2003; Brennan 2004; Moya 2007, Nyanuti Ondimu 2007). The way in which the 
migration of women was perceived in the past related to ideas about women’s 
vulnerability or stemmed from moral concerns (Moloney 2006; Soderlund 2005; 
Pittin 1984). These issues predominate in current studies on child migration as 
well. In particular, girl migrants seem to be easily connected to prostitution and 
(sexual) exploitation in contemporary migration discourses. Much of this is based 
on ideas about women and children being inherently vulnerable and easy victims, 
especially in connection with globalization and large-scale corruption in some 
countries (Agbu 2003). As a result of these fears, information on the migration of 
girls rarely extends beyond information about trafficking in certain areas, a 
discourse that is strongly shaped by NGOs. Regular migration patterns and forms 
of female self-organization have not received much attention. 
Like many researchers working on the topic of girl migrants, Bouju (2005) 
tends to take a great deal of agency away from the girls and portrays them only as 
the victims of normless, lawless and patriarchal societies, in his case in Mali. He 
concentrates solely on a group of female migrants who experienced pregnancy as 
a result of sexual abuse. The focus of other researchers is only on the violence 
experienced by domestics in the workplace (Human Rights Watch 2005; Nyanuti 
Ondimu 2007; Blagbrough 2008). It is striking how they do not always deal with 
these facts critically or look beyond the paradigm of exclusion and violence to 
explain the social position of these girls. 
What is problematic is that the above-mentioned researchers leave little room 
for diversity and agency regarding young female migrants, while in the field one 
is likely to encounter a diversity of experiences in which some girls are better 
able to address their urban working and living circumstances than others. The 
research described in this chapter, on the contrary, deals with how young girls 
living together in the city function as a group in a variety of ways. In N’Djamena 
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these small groups mediate and facilitate well-being for the girls, a topic not 
often dealt with in research on domestic workers in Africa because most of it 
concentrates on live-in domestics. Their position is likely to be quite different 
from that of many of the girls in the present research. Live-in domestic workers 
are frequently equated with exploitation, violence, invisibility and falling beyond 
the scope of the law (Human Rights Watch 2005; Blagbrough 2008). Jaquemin 
(2004) did however distinguish three groups of domestic workers with different 
social positions and living conditions but did not elaborate on the difference this 
makes for the girls involved. The girls followed in this chapter, who are living 
and working in small groups in N’Djamena independently of classificatory par-
ents or adults, appear to form a relatively new group in the literature. 
The importance of peer networks in the face of uncertainty 
Very few studies consider the importance of finding peers in town as the main 
focus of their attention, or only do so when studying gangs or street boys. How-
ever, there is reason to believe that this process is critical for girls too. Although 
Moch & Fuchs (1993), Schrover (2003) and Ross (1983) emphasize the proxi-
mity of solidarity as being important for the survival of (poor) female migrants, 
the types of grouping found in N’Djamena are not comparable. But according to 
Ross (1983) and Moch & Fuchs (1993), the networks of poor women are 
especially valuable in the absence of state assistance or any sort of social-security 
benefits. This particular observation is of importance in this study. 
The recent tendency in Africa to explain urban coping mechanisms has been to 
stress the creativity of the urban poor and, more specifically, urban youth. This 
literature focuses almost exclusively on male youth in the urban setting. Simone 
(2004) stresses the redundancy of social networks needed by youth to survive in 
volatile African cities but his analysis is not applicable to the way the girls in this 
research found their space for manoeuvre, and seems biased towards male youth. 
Female groups are more inwardly directed in N’Djamena and rarely make use of 
loose ties to improve their own position. How urban survival mechanisms (in 
Africa) might work differently for girls is thus still to be studied. Rwebangira & 
Liljeström (1998) and Moyer (2006) have been pioneers in the field by des-
cribing in more depth how girls and young women in town look for human 
anchorage and need to create a space of belonging. Together these two studies 
offer valuable insights that have inspired this research to consider the contem-
porary positions of girls in African societies and the way they try to make things 
work. Relationships and networks matter and adolescent peer groups need con-
tact with other such groups to protect them from risks.  
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Grouping in N’Djamena 
This chapter started with the example of girls from Bedigrui living together in 
impoverished circumstances. All of the girls present stated it was they them-
selves who had wanted to move from Bedigrui to N’Djamena and that they had 
saved for their journey by engaging in petty trade at the local markets in the 
south. Some had only recently arrived and were likely to spend a year or more in 
N’Djamena before going back to their village of origin. Others in the group came 
longer ago, had saved what they came for and would be leaving within a few 
months and newcomers would take their place in the group over time. Though it 
was hard to establish a direct relationship between the girls in town and their 
initiation groups, there are certainly links. For example, moving away from one’s 
village in small, same-age groups is something the community is already familiar 
with because of the process of male and female initiation rites in villages. This 
does not mean that migration in these small groups is a subsequent step but the 
idea of being away temporarily from one’s village as age cohorts is not com-
pletely new (Leonard 2000a, 2000b) even though urban migration by girls still 
generates a lot of moral concerns in the villages concerned. 
Moving into small peer groups living independently in the city was seen as 
something relatively new in N’Djamena in 199312 and two important expla-
nations were put forward in the local media. The first presented this as the 
consequence of girls choosing to move out of the households of classificatory 
parents in town where they were sent by poor rural parents and were often 
exploited as domestic workers and not adequately remunerated. As such, going to 
live with peers was seen as an empowering act, a consequence of maltreatment or 
exploitative kin relationships. Secondly however, this pattern of girls living on 
their own was associated with work in prostitution. The new development of 
grouping emerged just before the time when southern girls working in northern 
households was identified as a major economic niche, which explains why prosti-
tution was seen as the only way for girls to survive independently of their kin 
before then. Nowadays it is widely known that girls find domestic work, es-
pecially in Muslim parts of town.13 The group-formation process seems to have 
followed on from foster-care constructions and then started to gain importance 
through the practice of suivance (chain migration) from southern villages. 
While the need for a group in town to generate a type of independence from 
(exploitative) family and for practical reasons (for example, sharing rent) was 
legitimate, once it was established as a ‘system’ it became something to be aimed 
                                                 
12  See Notre Temps (1993). 
13  The girls themselves come from animist or Christian backgrounds. Coming from a different back-
ground seriously affects their position in the city and their room for manoeuvre but is not extensively 
touched upon in this article. For more information, see Both (2008). 
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at on departure, a mechanism on its own. To leave one’s village to go on an ad-
venture is nowadays undeniably linked to those coming back to the village with 
consumer goods and exciting stories. The girls do not necessarily leave the vil-
lage together14 but are sure to meet up with each other in town. 
At a meeting in the southern village of Bewala with girls and mothers, a young 
girl told us that she had been to N’Djamena. When asked if she had found age-
mates in the city (those with whom she was initiated), she said they were all 
living in N’Djamena but that they did not all live together. Only one of the girls 
from her initiation group had not been to the city and she was one of the chief’s 
daughters. In fact, the chief had asked my research assistant and me if we could 
talk to his daughter, who had been threatening to leave one day soon, to dis-
courage her from going. When we met the girl herself in a group of women, she 
laughed and said she had never been to N’Djamena but that she would go soon 
and come back and shock us all, meaning she would impress us by coming back 
with beautiful clothes. A half-sister of hers then joined the group. She had been 
to N’Djamena and indicated she would not want to go again. We asked her why, 
on the basis of her experience, she had not advised her sister not to go. She 
claimed to have done so but that it did not prevent her sister from wanting to go. 
She herself had returned due to intimidation: 
I don’t like the city. I prefer to stay here and go to school. I don’t see the importance 
of staying there (in N’Djamena). There are men there who want you and you don’t 
want them but they don’t leave you alone, they are even capable of killing you. Here 
if you don’t want it (to be with a boy), they leave you alone.  
The girl preparing to leave was still exited about leaving and bragged about 
the way she would look when she came back. Her ambitions would only be 
realizable though because of the presence of her peers in N’Djamena. The new 
generation of girls is longing for beautiful clothes that the older generations of 
women do not recognize from their youth. The wish to be publicly admired is 
something Leonard (2000a, 2000b) described as new for the same region and 
related it to the relatively new regional practice of female circumcision. A one-
to-one relationship between the group of promotionelles (girls with whom one 
has been through the initiation ritual) and the groups formed in town was hard to 
establish. Many girls said: ‘All the others are in N’Djamena’ but they did not 
necessarily live with them. Nevertheless the coming-out of girls after initiation 
and their return after a stay in N’Djamena seemed not to be so very different. A 
girl’s return from N’Djamena is celebrated because she will bring (small) gifts 
and her parents are happy to see her return. Dressing up, receiving attention and 
                                                 
14  Although on a market day in Bekolo in December 2008, nine girls from one village left for N’Djamena 
together. 
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standing out because of one’s clothing, ‘exotic’ language15 and behaviour seem 
to be important for adolescent girls in the villages, something that both occasions 
– the return after initiation and that after a stay in N’Djamena – have in common. 
Temporary separation from parents and the family is an element that both 
experiences have in common. This is a comparison that only counts for some of 
the girls in the research however. For example, some young married women who 
leave the village of Dono-Manga make the decision to go and work in N’Dja-
mena as a result of being the youngest woman in a polygamous household (Both 
2008). And for them, finding a group in N’Djamena might not be as relevant as it 
might be in the case of migration from Bedigrui and its surrounding villages. 
The experience of being in a liminal phase for a while is another aspect of the 
initiation period that seems to be of relevance when it comes to understanding the 
social position of girls in small groups in N’Djamena. In the process of living in 
the city: Especially at the beginning, an experience of liminality may be central 
for newcomers, reducing the expectations one has of the environment and ex-
plaining how one can gradually learn to deal with city life and one’s likely 
achievements. Inherent in the process of liminality is the social phenomenon of 
developing solidarity and equality, which also explains some of the group dyna-
mics observed in N’Djamena. For example, none of the groups of girls studied 
displayed any clear forms of hierarchy. 
Characteristics of small groups 
Although there is no direct connection between the groups of young girls parti-
cipating in initiation and those that find themselves together in town looking for 
domestic work, there is some overlap. In a group of five, four of the girls had 
undergone initiation together, while the other had experienced it a year earlier. It 
is also common to find half-sisters in small groups or at least girls that are 
related, although they do not necessarily arrive or leave together. A lot of girls 
come alone like the girls from Péni did. 
Victorie, Denise and Irene all have the same father but different mothers. 
Victorie and Denise are fifteen and sixteen and came to N’Djamena together two 
years ago. Irene is fifteen and came a year later. Mami’s mother is a younger 
sister of Denise’s mother and Mami, who is fourteen, has been in N’Djamena for 
fifteen months, having come on one of the famous mango lorries from the south. 
The father of Clarisse, who is thirteen, is a cousin of Irene’s father. Clarisse came 
to live with the other girls two months ago. Knowing that they would easily find 
each other in town had been important. 
                                                 
15  Having learned Chadian Arabic in N’Djamena is seen as an asset on returning to one’s village as it 
distinguishes those who have been to N’Djamena from those who have not. It is used as a secret 
language and excludes inexperienced youth. 
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Victorie: We already knew in the village that the Sara lived somewhere in Chagoua 
(a quarter of N’Djamena) so we went and found them. The first night we slept at the 
home of ‘sisters’ who had left before us. It was them who helped us find work. 
For those moving in and out of these kinds of groups, the girls offer an im-
portant safety net as well as places of ‘comfort’. Without peers in town, the girls 
would probably not have considered this type of migration. When asked if they 
would have come to N’Djamena if other girls from their village had not been 
there, they explained:  
How would we come? It is because we have friends here that we came. (Victorie) 
They are sure that they will find girlfriends there. (Staff of the Cooperation Suisse in 
Bedigrui) 
They might travel alone, only to find le group national over there. (Mothers in Be-
wala, Bedigrui) 
Regangner les camarades (relocating friends) is central for many in moving to 
town and is nothing new in rural-urban or other types of migration. The issue of 
copying the migration behaviour of others is discussed by Thorsen (2007), Hahn 
(2007) and many others. How these peer groups then work in the city has not 
been extensively investigated but helping each other find jobs is crucial to sur-
vival in the city. 
What is your work?, I ask 14-year-old S. 
S: I work in housekeeping for FCFA 15,000 a month. 
Me: Are you paid on time? 
S: That is always a problem. They ask you to wait. But we eat together. They are 
OK. This is my third job. 
Me: Can you tell me about your previous jobs? 
S: I didn’t like my first job and at my second employers they accused me of stealing 
something, so I quit. 
Me: What happened? 
S: I went to my big sister and we went to see my employer together. They dropped 
the accusations but did not pay me for that month. It took me 10 days to find a new 
job. A friend helped me to find it. 
Peers help each other find jobs and this makes it easier to move from one job 
to another if one is not treated well. Knowing that peers can help is reassuring.16 
Many of the girls we spoke to knew how to define where their boundaries lay. 
They would quit a job if they were insulted to the extent that they could not bear 
it anymore, had not been paid for a few months, were not given money for a 
minibus if it was too far to walk to work, were accused of theft or received bad 
(old) food at work. They knew they could changer jobs without problems be-
                                                 
16  Moch (1993: 42) recognized the need for peers to help poor women migrants in Paris find their first 
job. After that they seemed to move on to other jobs on their own as they had become ‘familiar with 
the means to find work’. 
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cause they could rely on others and their own growing experience to find a new 
one. It is in this respect that ‘brothers’ also came into the picture. 
Me: You say that you quit a job if you are treated badly but how about if they pay 
you FCFA 25,00017 but treat you badly? 
A: You have to quit. Also if they give you old or mouldy food, you cannot stay. 
Me: Is that the same for you younger girls? 
V: It is the same. If you are treated well, you stay, if you are treated badly, you 
leave. 
Me: Isn’t it extremely difficult to be without a job? Would you not prefer to keep a 
job even if you are not treated well?  
V: If you do not have a job or if you are ill then perhaps your brothers will be able to 
help you (and give you food) if you have to stay at home.  
The groups discussed so far have specific characteristics: They are made up of 
same-age girls and are fluid in their composition, with members coming and 
going independently of others or with only one of the others. Some will have 
stayed for two years, saved all they came for and be almost ready to go back. 
Others have just arrived. The groups are often based on the same village back-
ground and are almost always constructed around half-sisters. Yet girls frequent-
ly travel alone and only reconnect in town. Speaking the same languages is an-
other reason why they group together in the multilingual setting of N’Djamena. 
Living together, helping each other find jobs and taking care of each other’s 
babies are important group characteristics. At times of illness, the others contri-
bute money to help buy medicine (although they sometimes cannot raise suffi-
cient cash). The rent is paid jointly and saving money in a tontine means that 
they all receive a larger amount of money at a certain time that enables them to 
buy clothes and utensils to return home with one day. 
Concentrations of affection 
The groups offer something else that is more difficult to measure in terms of 
input and output, namely affection, friendship, loyalty and solidarity. Walking 
behind these girls in town, one could often catch them holding hands and their 
small gestures of touching and closeness seem very natural. It is this kind of 
closeness and trust among peers that live-in domestics are normally deprived of, 
something that might make them emotionally more vulnerable. Girls carrying 
each other’s babies or playing and cuddling a baby to sleep are common scenes 
in the villages the girls come from, and having similar physical closeness in a 
harsh migrant setting in the city seemed important as a coping strategy. 
                                                 
17  Research assistant Guedengao suggested this question. FCFA 8,000 to FCFA 10,000 was the average 
monthly income for most girls. 
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Their touching and teasing during a group meeting in Walia, on the outskirts 
of N’Djamena, was commented on by a few of the adult women present. We 
talked about the differences between their positions as older domestic workers 
and those of the young ones, with the older women indicating that the biggest 
difference was that the latter had fewer worries. The young girls, according to 
them, worked and went home and slept, whereas the older women felt more 
troubled and worried in their daily lives. In response to this comment, two girls 
(who had been tickling each other and leaning against each other) giggled, which 
led one of the older women to say: ‘Look at them; they play like children’, em-
phasizing the difference between the generations. 
It is difficult to explain the influence or importance of this closeness in exact 
terms but there are indications that the trust and physical contact are of im-
portance to the well-being of such adolescent girls in an urban setting. This is 
both generational and culturally influenced. Not only the obvious functional 
aspect of being part of a group but also the affection and friendship it brings are 
vital in helping to understand why girls can laugh, make jokes and tease each 
other under such difficult circumstances. 
Limits to peer-group protection 
While the extent to which these peer groups can serve as a safety net should be 
carefully formulated, it would appear they generate a type of agency for young 
girls. Nevertheless, there are situations in which individuals are unable to expe-
rience the protection of being part of such a group. The girls this chapter started 
by describing how they had twice been robbed at night while they were in their 
rooms. Speaking about safety they said:  
During the day it is OK. The night is the problem. People come like that. Two times 
we have been attacked. They carried a big knife. They took everything because we 
girls were afraid.  
The chef de race (a community leader) who lives just around the corner con-
firmed the robbery:  
They took the clothes and cooking pots the girls had already bought. I do not sleep 
well at night. When I hear something, I go out with my torch. There is no (street) 
light. The first time someone came and warned me. We went there right away but 
the thief had already taken their things.  
Chagoua, where these girls live, is known for its thugs (colombiens). Some of 
the girls had never been robbed even though their houses were similarly located, 
while others had left this quarter of town because of the threat of theft. A lot of 
the girls deliberately do not go out at night or go only occasionally with brothers 
from the same village. Some mentioned being free to go out without adult super-
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vision but this was not seen as a benefit of being in N’Djamena. Though adults in 
town and parents in the villages accuse their youngsters of leading frivolous lives 
in N’Djamena, a recurring theme when speaking to these girls was that they felt 
less free in N’Djamena than in their villages. One fifteen-year-old girl from Dono 
Manga in Walia said: 
F: In the village we have a system; when there is a full moon, we beat the drums and 
we go out to dance. Here we are afraid. We don’t go out. 
Me: Why don’t you go out here? 
F: In the village you work in the fields, you grow some peanuts and then in the 
evening you go dancing. But here when you are so tired from work and you have to 
walk home, how will you dance? And we don’t have a space here. 
Me: But why do you say you are afraid? 
F: We don’t have a space. 
Me: But just outside the gate there is a big open space isn’t there? Can’t you dance 
there? 
F: But that is not our space, it is the property of the state. We are afraid to dance 
there.  
 
 
 
Picture 6.2 Mixed group of women and girls in Walia 
 [© Jonna Both] 
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Being in a group does not automatically protect these girls from external 
threats and the environment they live in. In their small groups, the girls can face 
up to threatening situations, but being alone generates increased feelings of in-
security. This was obvious when walking long routes home from work in the 
evenings. None of the girls liked to walk home alone and if they had to, it was 
because they worked in a different area from their friends or because they had to 
work late. These girls would move significantly faster and were less approach-
able, also for me as a researcher, as they displayed a more closed attitude. While 
going home from work in a small group meant laughter, being able to reflect on 
things together and jokes with other people along the road, girls who walked 
alone seemed more serious. This however did not mean that a girl walking alone 
would not be able to mobilize others to her aid if something happened, as sooner 
or later she would encounter girlfriends or frères de village along the road.  
Specific streets in town were considered especially unsafe by a lot of the girls, 
one being the old bridge to Walia and others included roads in the most northerly 
parts of town or small streets after dark in the peripheral quarters they lived in. 
The risks they envisaged were mostly related to the presence of columbiens and 
soldiers. The girls claimed that they did not carry anything with them for 
protection as they knew that any man would be stronger and could use a knife 
against them. 
Being and moving in a group does not mean that one’s safety is guaranteed 
and a sense of freedom is experienced. To a certain extent, the small groups of 
girls were inwardly directed for reasons of protection. Walking home together 
and not going out at night enhanced their safety. Interestingly, Simone (2004) 
paints a picture of highly active, outgoing, network-seeking youngsters in Afri-
can cities who are securing their livelihoods, and stresses creativity as the way of 
survival for young people in Africa. There might be a very specific gender aspect 
to this. The girls in this research seemed much more likely to rely on their small 
group of same-age acquaintances for their survival. In some cases, ‘parents’ (a 
chef the race for example) or boys from the same villages are mobilized to offer 
assistance or security. 
 
Frères de village 
Where do the girls’ male counterparts figure in this picture? Do they form a part 
of these close networks or are they part of the uncertainty girls face in the city? 
Are the boys from the same villages the reason the girls go to N’Djamena in the 
first place? Some girls did indeed mention having followed a boyfriend or a 
husband, afraid that he would marry someone else in town if they were not 
around. Migration by boys was common before girls started to leave too. The 
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following is taken from a mixed group discussion with adolescents from Dono 
Manga: 
Me: Someone told me that girls come to N’Djamena because all the young men are 
here and not in the villages? 
Dono (24-year-old male): This is to some extent true but that is not all: We (boys and 
girls) grew up together, we have danced together. We are all the same generation. 
Now when someone leaves for N’Djamena, it is difficult. You miss that person. That 
is why people follow each other. 
Although they are surrounded by many different people, the adolescents re-
main focused on those from the same region when it comes to friendships, flirt-
ing and relationships. Two girls indicated that they had followed boys to 
N’Djamena but in both cases they had ended up with a baby and no husband. 
Sometimes the proximity of frères de village enhanced the girls’ safety. When 
they felt they needed the assistance of a ‘brother’ or someone more educated than 
themselves, they knew how to mobilize someone. ‘Brothers’ fulfil a variety of 
roles for groups of adolescent girls. For example, they may be required for safety 
reasons if a girl wants to go out in the evening but at the same time they can be 
seen as part of the insecure environment itself as these boys have proven 
themselves to be less than trustworthy in the past. Harassment by boyfriends or 
husbands is not uncommon. But it is impossible to look at these girls’ social 
networks without seeing brothers in the larger picture. It is in this circle and 
beyond that there is space reserved for ‘classificatory’ parents. Community chiefs 
who represent the villages the girls come from in N’Djamena play a different but 
significant role in the larger circle around the girls (Both 2008). The inner circle, 
however, is reserved for female peers only. 
Conclusion 
The functioning and characteristics of small peer groups are relevant but also 
relative to the dynamics of safety and survival of migrant girls in N’Djamena. 
These peer groups form small landscapes of trust and solidarity in the city’s 
larger insecure landscape. They often form the locus of belonging (Moyer 2006) 
and human anchorage (Rwebangira & Liljeström 1998) in the city for girls not 
living with parents. Though the value of having peers around in the process of 
migration has been covered in the literature (cf. Moch & Fuchs 1993; Schrover 
2003), no references are found to the context described in this chapter, namely 
that of young, single girls living together so closely with age-mates. Although it 
did not form the focus of this study, this way of grouping was a less obvious 
dynamic of the young male migrants in town who seemed to live more frequently 
in pairs or alone. This gender-specific type of human anchorage for female 
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migrants in N’Djamena is different to that seen amongst girls or young women 
who stay with uncles in the city or who work as live-in domestics. 
A type of physical closeness and trust appears very important for individual 
well-being in town, something girls living in groups seem to find easily and 
naturally, and which live-in domestics miss out on. Thus while young female 
domestic workers may seem to be exploited and constrained in situations they are 
unable to oversee or cope with, they can also be active decision-makers, with the 
small networks of girls they are able to fall back on making this possible. 
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Recycling gifts: Ritual 
and money in present-day  
tonw in Bancoumana1 
 
Esther Kühn 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding popular economic conceptions of money as a ‘neutral instrument 
of exchange’, as something that can be individually owned and is ideal for saving, 
women from Bancoumana live in a society where money is fluid and whimsical 
and therefore impossible to save. The RoSCAs run by their associations provide 
an opportunity for compulsory saving and a socially acceptable reason to with-
stand claims made by family and friends. Through RoSCAs, members build up 
rights to a large fund which they use for life rituals, consumer items and debt re-
payments. Members can organize these rituals in cooperation with their associ-
ation, which has resulted in an up scaling of ritual. At these events, gifts are given 
in full reciprocity to establish, strengthen and express social relationships. Money 
is thus kept in constant motion in a realm different from that of lending. It is 
shown that the use of money does not necessarily indicate economic activity in the 
orthodox sense of the word. 
Kadjatu Camara’s denkundi 
It is 7:30 a.m. on Sunday morning, 2 April 2006, as I enter the compound of Niagale 
Coulibaly who is secretary of the Jigiseme2 women’s association (ton) in Bancou-
mana. At that time there is nothing to be seen but empty benches around a mat. 
However, in the following half hour about 40 women gather here. Everybody takes a 
seat and starts chatting. At 8:00 Ami Sinaba, a member of the board, finds her place 
on the mat and Niagale Coulibaly takes out a large writing pad. That afternoon, 
Kadjatu Camara, one of the 97 members, will host a denkundi (name-giving cere-
                                                 
1  This revised article was presented earlier at the European Students Africa Conference 2007 in Basel, 
Switzerland under the title ‘Recycling Gifts: Ritual and Money in Women’s Associations in a Malian 
Town’. I thank many conference participants and Jan Jansen and Sabine Luning for their comments. 
2  Literally, ‘help, point of support’. 
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mony,3 pl. denkundiw). The members have come together to assemble a gift that will 
be given by the group. As usual, everybody is obliged to give FCFA 500,4 two bars 
of soap or two yards of cloth (one pagne). Many members have given their present to 
the secretary beforehand, to a friend who can be present at this morning’s meeting or 
to Kadjatu Camara herself who brings in the presents that she will receive again in 
the afternoon. After an hour, the secretary has crossed off all but two names on the 
membership list. The list includes the names of the 60 members who form a group 
that has agreed to give a pagne and FCFA 500 at each other’s ceremonies, thus pro-
viding the mother with enough cloth to make 20 complete dresses with a top, a skirt 
and a headscarf (a complet in French). Then everybody goes home to continue the 
day’s work. At midday, I visit Kadjatu’s compound. She, the female members of her 
household and some friends, who she has promised three pagnes in return for their 
help, are cooking the festive meal riz au gras. 
 That afternoon, two months after the birth of Kadjatu’s baby boy, Nuhan Sinaba, 
he is welcomed into the community by his parents’ friends and family, the members 
of Jigiseme and three other associations that together form the ‘Association des 
femmes de Bancoumana’. The event will draw about 150 women, but no men,5 from 
all over the village. Visitors are drawn by the banging on calabashes that one can 
hear from afar. At Kadjatu Camara’s compound, a UNHCR canvas has been hung 
over a mat where she will sit with some close friends and other (classificatory) 
mothers of her child (denbaw). Women are sitting around the mat on benches and 
chairs watching the musicians, others have gotten up to dance to the music. Every-
body is waiting for the festivities to begin. At 16:00 all attendees have taken their 
seats and a pair of griottes6 starts the ceremony with a speech, offering the large 
Jigiseme gift to the mother while praising her, her family and her association. This is 
followed by applause and a song from the public. While a blue baby bath and the 
twenty brand-new pieces of cloth from Jigiseme are set aside, the money is given to 
two other women on the mat; they will collect the gifts of money for Kadjatu this 
afternoon. This kicks off a stream of gifts that will take about two hours to present. 
                                                 
3  Denkundi literally means ‘shaving the head of a child’. At this particular ceremony, which takes place 
in the morning of the eighth day of a baby’s life, the head of the newborn is shaved while a griot or 
imam announces his or her name. The child gets an identity, a path to be accepted in the community. 
This announcement is an event that is attended mostly by men (women are around to cook and shave 
the baby’s head) and is followed by a gathering involving music, cards and eating. In the afternoon, 
women have their own event at which men are normally not allowed to be present. Women give 
presents to the mother of the child for her baby and thereby welcome the baby into the community. If 
the shaving of the head and the announcement of the baby’s name is done for every baby, the men’s 
and women’s gatherings are not compulsory and are only organized if a family has sufficient re-
sources. It is therefore a seasonal event. In this paper, when speaking of a denkundi I will be referring 
to the women’s gathering. Due to the planning that is required for an event of this size, they are often 
held long after the baby’s head has been shaved. 
4  Approximately € 0.75. For comparative purposes: in 2006 a bar of soap cost FCFA 250, a kilo of sugar 
cost FCFA 400 and a kilo of rice cost FCFA 250. 
5  In other places, like Bamako, men are allowed to be present but usually do not attend. In Bancoumana 
the griottes immediately stop talking when a man enters the compound. 
6  Jelimusow: female traditional bards who sing praise songs and speak in public. The men from their 
families, jelikew, recount history, speak at public events and act as middlemen at marriages or during 
conflicts. 
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Griottes speak in changing pairs of speaker and naamu sayer7 to present presents, 
announce the donor and the gift given and pass on the well wishes of the donor. The 
presents include money, soap and pagnes (including cloth, sheets, baby clothes etc.). 
These are laid in tubs that stand between the griottes and Kadjatu Camara. At the 
beginning, a lot of attention is paid to every gift but as there are about 300 gifts to be 
presented, the speeches near the end of the ceremony are much more rushed. Still, 
the name of the donor and the amount given are always stressed. If a griotte forgets a 
name, she will ask for it as these have to be written down in a long list by a woman 
who writes frantically at all denkundiw organized in cooperation with the ‘Asso-
ciation des femmes de Bancoumana’. At some point, I decide to give my present. 
My friend and research assistant, Maryam Keita, asks my ‘aunt’ Kadjatu Doumbia to 
present the gift of FCFA 500 (an average-sized gift). She presents it with some of 
her famous jokes and praise, some for me but mostly for my host parents. A little 
later the gift-giving process comes to an end with a concluding speech by one of the 
griottes. Sherbets are distributed among the guests, and I get the opportunity to take 
pictures of Kadjatu Camara and the piles of presents in front of her. Her friends and 
relatives bring out huge bowls of rice with meat and buckets of hand-washing-water 
and place them between the guests who have formed little groups. At around 18:15 
the women leave in groups, the griottes who have performed and old guests are 
given a little token of appreciation in the form of some money (up to FCFA 1000) or 
a pagne. During the whole afternoon I haven’t seen little Nuhan Sinaba at all. 
Studying associations in Bancoumana  
In the beginning of 2006, I spent three months in the Malian town of Bancouma-
na on fieldwork.8 This was followed by a five months fieldwork project in 2007-
2008.9 Bancoumana is a growing community of about 10,000 people, 60 km 
south of the capital Bamako. As a result of immigration from the region and its 
location at a crossroads, the town is experiencing reasonable economic growth in 
an economy that is mainly based on agriculture, fisheries and trade. The popu-
lation consists mostly of Maninka, Bambara and Fulbe families who tend to live 
on large compounds with extended, patrilocal families but because of recent im-
migration there are many exceptions to this regional pattern. My aim was to 
research the ways in which women save for leaner times or big expenses, like 
their daughter’s trousseau. For three months, I stayed with the Diabate family 
while doing fieldwork on women’s associations and their financial activities. 
Research methods included participant observation, especially of associations’ 
                                                 
7  Griottes speak in short sentences which are confirmed by a naamu sayer who responds to every 
sentence with naamu (indeed), abarika (thanks) or amina (indeed, confirmation of a blessing). In this 
way, a rhythm is maintained in the dialogue between speaker and naamu sayer. These roles are con-
stantly turned and continuously taken over by others. 
8  Doing research for an MA in Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University (Kühn 
2007b). 
9  This research was part of the MPhil in African Studies at the African Studies Centre and Leiden Uni-
versity (Kühn 2008). 
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weekly meetings and feasts, and interviews with 20 women on their activities, 
memberships and the feasts they had organized.  
This paper looks into ways in which women channel money that they have 
access to, through these associations, into activities that are meaningful for them. 
I start with a conceptual and historical analysis of the association (ton) and the 
ways it currently rotates money through RoSCAs. This is followed by an attempt 
to embed this in more general ideas of exchange and kinship that play a large role 
in Mande. Then I will look at several ways in which people use the basic struc-
ture of the organization, both to organize celebrations and to accumulate money, 
two seemingly different activities which in reality have the same effect in that 
they make ‘good relatives’ out of ‘strangers’. I will touch on local perceptions of 
money, which turn out to be of vital importance to the way women organize their 
associations and rituals, leading us to a fundamental question: Is it all about 
money or is it not at all? 
 
 
 
Picture 7.1 Maryam Keita – research assistant in 2006 – and Esther Kühn at the 
Bancoumana market.  
  [Picture taken by Eline van Nes, 28 February 2008] 
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Women’s associations (tonw) 
The ton is a well-known type of organization in the geographical region of the 
Haute Vallée du Niger10 and the wider cultural region of Mande.11 ‘The concept 
of ton is used by Mande people (Bamana, Maninka, etc.) primarily to indicate a 
group of individuals that are bound by the same rules, without necessarily having 
kin relationships among them or who are bound to each other by an oath’ 
(Haïdara 1992: 117-118).12 Ton is a generic term for ‘association, community, 
group, cooperative’ or ‘the rules of an association’ (Bailleul 2000: 465). So, a ton 
is a group of people who are bound by the rules of the ton. In this way, the rules 
make the group, and therefore the rules and the group are virtually the same 
thing. Haïdara states that the concept of ton also encompasses ‘ideas of service, 
public service and obligation’ (Haïdara 1992: 118). For this reason, the word is 
often used for new groups, like political parties or even ‘the nation’. 
In the classic French anthropological publications on the Haute Vallée and 
Bamako, tonw play a large role. In the 1960s, youngsters – both male and female 
– in rural areas gathered in tonw to do work in fields owned by the villagers. 
Members used the money, or other contributions collected, to organize parties 
(Leynaud 1966). The ton was a system through which young people entertained 
each other and were educated, with adults leading the organization. Young immi-
grants in Bamako also had their tonw through which they organized parties and 
dancing demonstrations in their new neighbourhoods (Meillassoux 1968). During 
the 1960s, Meillassoux noticed that women in Bamako organized so-called 
pariw, associations through which they saved money ‘with a more modest goal 
[than the journey to Mecca that men saved for, EK]’ (Ibid.: 86). Unfortunately 
Meillassoux did not continue his analysis of women’s associations in Bamako, 
possibly due to the male bias that reigned supreme at the time.  
In Bancoumana I encountered more than 20 savings associations organized by 
adult women.13 I estimate that approximately 1000 women are members of these 
tonw, of which the majority meets weekly. Each of these associations has be-
tween 23 and 100 members, which is extraordinarily large in comparison to 
                                                 
10  The region just south of Bamako in the direction of Guinée. 
11  ‘The Manden (sometimes Manding) is a space, in some way perhaps a time, and for many, an idea. 
The space is roughly defined by the headwaters of the Niger and its affluent and lies in western Mali 
and eastern Guinea; it is occupied by the Malinke [Maninka – JJ], for whom it is a symbolic heartland 
from which the more widespread branches of their people have left at various time to take on different 
names (Mandinka, Dyula, Konyaka, and others)’ (Belcher 1999, in Jansen 2004: v).  
12  My translation, as are all the translations in this chapter. 
13  I am certain there must have been other groups that I did not find. These will generally have been 
smaller, less tightly organized groups than the ones that are described in this chapter. By comparison, 
in Bamako which had a population of about 900,000 inhabitants in 1996, there were more than 10,000 
groups with a RoSCA savings system (named ONGs, tonw of pariw) with on average only ten mem-
bers (Colleye 1996: 156). 
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groups elsewhere (cf. Ardener 1995). Members organize events like denkundiw 
and a component of the wedding ritual, celebrate Islamic feasts, have parties and 
run so-called RoSCAs (see below) or work to earn money for rituals (like the 
‘Association des Cultivateurs’). This new shape of association has quickly 
developed into an important type of organization and made a big impact on the 
wider community of Bancoumana. 
The RoSCA in theory and Malian reality 
Most women’s associations in Bancoumana encompassed, at the time of my 
fieldwork, a type of ‘Rotating Savings and Credit Association’ (RoSCA), which 
in the French literature is referred to as tontine.14 Here I use the term RoSCA 
only for the mechanism that rotates money, not for the association as a whole 
since these groups of women do much more than RoSCA alone implies, some-
thing that is often forgotten or treated as of minor importance because of a focus 
on the savings system. RoSCAs are organized all over the world, especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Turkey and their diasporas. Ardener (1964: 201) de-
fined the RoSCA15 as ‘an association formed upon a core of participants who 
make regular contributions to a fund which is given in whole or in part to each 
contributor in rotation’. This definition is still used in most of the literature on 
this topic. A RoSCA can work as follows: Ten women gather every week to each 
put FCFA 1000 in a fund which will be given to one of them. At the next 
meeting another member receives the FCFA 10,000 from the fund. This conti-
nues until after ten meetings every member has put in FCFA 10,000 spread over 
ten weeks and received the full FCFA 10,000 once.  
Research published on RoSCAs can be divided into several groups; the first 
perspective is an economic one which is mainly interested in describing RoSCAs 
as a set of financial transactions with the aim of increasing the business success 
of individual members. Very popular in this genre are Cameroonian RoSCAs 
(esusu) run by Bamileke businessmen in the cities. Esusu involve a complicated 
system with an auction that determines the order in which members take the 
fund, with the remaining money being lent out to members and non-members 
until the end of the RoSCA cycle (see Tchuindjo 2000; Van Dievoet & Verboven 
1993). The second perspective focuses on ‘development’ and explains the exist-
ence of RoSCAs from a developmental and teleological perspective. This per-
spective attempts to incorporate RoSCAs in development activities such as 
strengthening the formal banking sector or empowering women (see Kimuyu 
1999; Liman Tinguiri 1992). Here, RoSCAs are increasingly seen as a locally 
                                                 
14  The word tontine comes from the name of the Napolitan/French banker Lorenzo Tonti (1635-1690), a 
ton on the other hand is a Bambara/Maninka word whose background is described above.  
15  Then still called Rotating Credit Association, in reference to an influential article by Geertz (1962). 
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grounded and cheap alternative to microcredit (e.g. Oxfam America). This is 
discussed in more detail later. The third perspective is the most important for 
present purposes and involves a less instrumental view of RoSCAs, focusing on 
the social aspect of its system of saving; its groups, meetings, etc. It explains the 
popularity of RoSCAs in wider terms, such as the importance of belonging to a 
group (for advice, social support, gossip) and the need/want to force oneself to 
save (e.g. Mekounde 1997; Essombe-Edimo 1993). 
Ardener (1964: 201) stated that although the RoSCA might seem like a fair 
savings mechanism, this is not the case since the person receiving the fund first 
gets credit from all the members, refunding this only at the last meeting of the 
cycle. The last to receive the fund is a creditor to all the others until the last 
meeting, and the other eight move from creditor to debtor. This may be true 
through the eyes of formal banking systems based on the assumption of inflation 
and interest, and many writers seem to have made such an analysis using prob-
lematic concepts like saving, credit and debt. For most RoSCA members world-
wide though, this analysis does not apply (Hospes 1995: 127), and it is certainly 
not relevant to members of associations in Bancoumana. The ROSCA is used to 
establish and strengthen social ties other than those with family or existing 
friends and to build up the right to a large sum. In Mande, people need access to 
a big sum of money every now and then and through the RoSCA, everyone but 
the last member that receives the fund gets this sum earlier than they would have 
without the RoSCA, even in the theoretical case that they could have saved it up 
themselves without others successfully laying claim to it (cf. Fidler & Webster 
1996: 17). The final result is positive for all both practically and theoretically. 
Women receive the fund because they have a right to it, wherever in the cycle 
they receive it (cf. Ardener 1995: 6). Every time someone responds to her name 
being called by the secretary and handing over her contribution, she builds up a 
right to the fund whether she has received it already or not. In Bancoumana, and 
in many other places, the order in which women receive the fund is determined 
by drawing numbers, i.e. by chance. The RoSCAs in Bancoumana work like the 
standard one described above, every member takes out as much as they put in 
and this is usually the same amount for all members. This system implies that a 
great deal of trust has to be invested in fellow members. In the two large asso-
ciations with 100 members this may mean that the last person in the cycle will 
have to wait for almost two years before taking the fund. During these years one 
member will have brought in FCFA 1,250 or FCFA 2,500 (€ 1.87 or € 3.75 
depending on the association) a week, which brings her an enormous amount of 
money in a country where 80% of the population lives on less than US$ 1 a day. 
There are other, generally smaller, associations with lower contributions (starting 
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from FCFA 250, 500 and several with 1,000 a week) where the fund will be 
smaller and members receive it more frequently. 
Turning strangers into friends 
Women in Bancoumana frequently told me that they were a member of an asso-
ciation so as not to ‘eat’ their money. ‘Eating money’ is a well-known expression 
in many parts of Africa (cf. Shipton 1989: 71) and deals with an effect that is 
likely to be well-known to any reader: If you have money in your wallet it will be 
spent sooner than if the same amount was in a savings account. ‘Eating’ also 
points to a situation in which money has disappeared and been used by the 
community that eats together (Jansen 2005: 86). Peer pressure from an asso-
ciation forces members to save and build up a right to a large amount of money. 
This is an important reason for many women to join one or several of these 
associations because at times they too are in need of a large sum, often to 
organize a ritual like a denkundi or to provide their daughter with a trousseau so 
she can get married.  
Money in Mande is, in contrast to popular western expectations, very fluid; it 
can slip through your fingers like water. It is considered to be impossible (and 
undesirable) to keep money in one’s possession for a long time because of the 
moral obligation to share, since ‘in Mali the creation and maintenance of social 
networks is the basic goal (and not the means) of economic action’ (Jansen 2005: 
86). Without sharing, one becomes isolated in a society, a great fear since the 
very notion of a person lies in his/her social relationships (Brand 1996: 145). 
People lay claim to each others’ money, making the notion of ownership a com-
plicated one. These claims are laid because almost everybody is chronically short 
of money. There is always somebody in one’s family, or circle of close friends, 
who needs money urgently enough that one can’t deny giving it if one has it, for 
example to pay for a doctor’s bill or for food. 
Money rotating through a RoSCA is spoken of in a discourse of gifts (ton wari 
di, the money to be given to the association). In the end, these ‘gifts’ result in a 
web of social obligations. The ‘gifts’ are the rules that make the ton, which 
explains why women could decide to use such a classic concept for a new system 
dealing with money.16 At this level of gifts, deposits can be seen as a string of 
regular obligatory gifts to other members of the association. One substantial gift 
from the association is given back through total and obligatory reciprocity. The 
result is that these gifts are recycled in a way; they are used to create new gifts 
that will strengthen other social relationships. The postponed reciprocity of 
                                                 
16  It is interesting to note that women in Bamako’s higher social classes refer to their associations as 
ONGs, the French for NGOs, alluding to a whole different realm than that of their rural counterparts, 
while performing the same activities (Zoë van Mansveld, personal communication). 
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RoSCAs does not lead to the power differences and expectations that can arise 
between ‘creditors’ and ‘debtors’ in the case of friends or family who ‘lend’ each 
other money when the ‘debtor’ is in urgent need; in the case of RoSCAs or tonw 
the order and direction of these relations have been determined by a lottery as 
have the moments when the ‘debts’ are to be repaid (cf. Mauss 1990: 74 [1925]). 
Money has an important role in the creation of relationships inside and outside 
associations.17 Besides RoSCA’s, other ways of shaping relationships with the 
use of money are the maintenance of debt and the contrasting possibility of 
claiming someone’s money if they have it, in gifts of money and the custom of 
depositing money with others (to avoid the risk of theft). From this perspective, 
the RoSCA and ‘family and friends’ are two realms of social obligations that 
women can decide to put their money in. Once one is a member of an association 
with a RoSCA, this will gnerally take precedence because of the obligation to 
save. Members borrow money from their friends and relatives in order to save in 
the other realm. Exchange with family and friends has all but disappeared, es-
pecially if a woman experiences a windfall and has more money than necessary 
for the weekly contribution. This will then be shared, creating new possibilities 
for her to claim money for her contribution some other time. It is, however, 
interesting to see that once she receives the fund this sum is less likely to be 
subject to claims. The money that a woman has saved up for months or years 
becomes more a part of her personal possessions than that earned through trade. 
Although the system of the RoSCA gives women a bigger say over their 
earnings, the most important reason to be a member of an association is the 
friendship, social activities and mutual support it can provide. Niagale Coulibaly, 
secretary of one of the largest associations; Jigiseme, emphasizes that the asso-
ciations have created social relations between members to be more like those 
between family members: 
This year there are more denkundiw than last year because then the association 
[Associations des femmes de Bancoumana18] didn’t yet exist. This association hasn’t 
been around for a long time, it was only really developed this year. Before, there 
were separate associations (…) We have a women’s meeting regularly.19 Unlike be-
fore, the women of the village are more like a family now. The money that we save 
through the association is actually of minor importance. It is especially important 
that we are friends: Mother, father, sister. We talk together. (Bancoumana, 23 May 
2006) 
                                                 
17  One is obliged to give all kinds of products in Mande, for example meals have to be offered to every 
passer-by. 
18  The cooperation of four large associations, with as its prime activity the joint organization of name-
giving and wedding ceremonies. 
19  Once every two weeks, on Sunday afternoons. 
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These positive kinship relationships are of great importance in Mande. Indivi-
duality, egocentrism and strife are indicated by the term fadenya (children of the 
same father20), badenya (children of the same mother) refers to harmony, soli-
darity and team spirit between family members. Strifeis an undesirable situation, 
especially for women, which can be solved by building up badenya relationships. 
Although money has often been said to lead to freedom and thereby to indivi-
dualism (cf. Kahn 1997, Zelizer 2000), women build up badenya relations 
through their associations, which are by definition groups of non-related indivi-
duals.21 Members of an association treat each other as badenw, children of the 
same mother, with an interest in cooperation and social harmony. This does not 
mean that there is never any conflict, as this is a goal that in practice can never be 
attained. The goal of badenya can be read from the names that have been given to 
the groups: Jigiseme (help, point of support), Badenya, Dannaya (trust), Ben ka 
di (pleasant meeting), etc. Through the RoSCA and its postponed reciprocity 
members create trust. A group is shaped out of people that would otherwise not 
have had badenya relationships with each other, using money as a tool. These 
relationships are confirmed by organizing wedding and name-giving ceremonies, 
activities that before were visited mainly by relatives and friends. It becomes 
clear that Ardener’s assumption about the RoSCA; that members extend credit to 
individuals and simultaneously save for themselves – with unequal results for 
members that receive the fund at different moments in the cycle – does not apply 
here. By giving money through the tonw, with the certainty that one will oneself 
receive the fund at some point, relationships of institutionalized trust are created. 
Party! 
These positive social relationships are confirmed through the organization of 
rituals, that in themselves are considered to be part of the realm of the family,22 
i.e. a component of the wedding (bolomafara) and name-giving ceremonies 
(denkundiw). Both of these ceremonies revolve around the giving of gifts in reci-
procal relationships between individuals. A bolomafara is that part of the com-
plex wedding ritual in which the bride receives gifts from the women of her 
village of origin, the village where her parents live. As in almost all other parts of 
                                                 
20  The terms fadenya and badenya originate from the structural tensions that exist in polygamous families 
where mothers are involved in competition over their husband’s resources and attention for their 
children. While badenya is referred to very often in practice, fadenya is an unwanted situation that 
demands a search for badenya at another level (e.g. all children of the same father are ‘children’ of the 
same grandmother). 
21  Although relatives can be members of the same association, these relations should not matter inside 
this group (cf. Van den Brink & Chavas 1991: 27-28). 
22  Women in Bancoumana who are not a member of a ton still organize these rituals for family, friends 
and neighbours.  
 Ritual and money in present-day tonw in Bancoumana 117 
 
the ritual she is not present, her classificatory mothers receive presents for her. 
Bolomafaraw in Bancoumana are rarely given with the large cooperating asso-
ciations because the family of the bride will have to feed all 150 to 300 guests, 
having to pay for this themselves because the guests’ gifts are for the bride. 
Strikingly, the only such ceremony organized by an association that I witnessed 
was with one of the smaller associations, the rich ‘Association des femmes des 
fonctionnaires’, even though the organizing mother was also a member of the 
‘Association des femmes de Bancoumana’. She and her family had chosen not to 
invite the 300 women of the large association but instead the 28 rich wives of 
civil servants, a choice that might have aided the husband’s social network as 
well. Other bolomafaraw are usually organized with friends and family, only 
because of the huge costs involved in the total wedding ritual.  
 
 
 
Picture 7.2 One of the piles of cloth given to 
Kadjatu Camara at the denkundi 
for her son Nuhan Sinaba, 2 April 
2006 
 [© Esther Kühn] 
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The name-giving ceremony is very different in this respect. From the outside it 
looks exactly the same as the bolomafara but it is more often organized with the 
‘Association des femmes de Bancoumana’ because here the mother can keep 
most of the presents. As usual, griottes and older people are thanked for their 
contribution (praises and blessings) with a small gift but most of the money 
received can be used to pay for the rice, ingredients and rents that were acquired 
on credit. More guests will lead to greater expenses here as well but in contrast to 
the bolomafara to more gifts too.23 
At the large-scale ceremonies organized with the ‘Association des femmes de 
Bancoumana’ all donors and their gifts are written down, always by the same 
woman. The list is not, as has become the custom in Bamako, for the mother to 
be able to see who has given her what, if she can read it, but instead it is meant 
for the presidents of the four cooperating associations (cf. Muurling 2003: 112). 
Their members are obliged to give a gift at all ceremonies of the ‘Association des 
femmes de Bancoumana’ and the list allows them to check whether this has 
happened. Members do not have to show up in person but if they have not made 
sure a gift is presented in their name and they have not given anything through 
the president of their association, they will be ‘accused’ in public at the next 
meeting. This is also the case for the members of Jigiseme who had already given 
towards the joint gift in the morning. The one time I saw this happen it led to 
huge debate and showed how the rules that make the association (ton) encompass 
both regular contributions to the RoSCA and presence (and presents) at events 
where gifts are to be given. For the members of Jigiseme this also includes their 
contributions to the joint gift that was assembled in the morning, and for which 
the administration is remarkably similar to that of the RoSCA. The positive effect 
of these obliged gifts is that the organizing mother can be certain of a minimum 
number of gifts, giving her the opportunity to get the food, ingredients, rents, etc. 
on credit. In paying for all this food, she is indirectly being aided by women who 
have given her a gift but have not shown up, and therefore will not eat her food.24 
Even though, according to many, the existence of associations helps women to 
organize denkundiw, I witnessed only five during my three-month stay.25 Unlike 
weddings, denkundiw are not organized for every child but it is supposed to be 
‘better for the child’ and the organizing family gains prestige since it shows it 
can host that many guests. From the low number of denkundiw it is clear that 
                                                 
23  Often money which is a perfectly acceptable gift, and can be used to pay for the event. 
24  I estimate this to be about half the membership of the association (150 out of 300). 
25  Because the organization of a denkundi remains costly for the organizing woman and/or her family it is 
often not celebrated. During my three months of fieldwork there were only three that were organized 
by the ‘Association des femmes de Bancoumana’, one by the ‘Association des femmes de fonction-
naires’ and one without an association. 
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many families still cannot afford to do so, even in the knowledge that they will 
receive numerous gifts. 
While all types of presents are placed in front of the mother, the money is 
handed over to two women sitting on the centre mat with her. In response to my 
question as to why the mother does not receive this money (which is not placed 
in front of her because it may get lost) Kadjatu Camara said:  
The mother sits. She is watching if everybody gives her what she has given her (at a 
previous gift giving-ceremony). That is also the case for women who haven’t orga-
nized denkundiw because they have received gifts at weddings. Everybody organizes 
weddings so everybody has to give something. (Bancoumana, 1 April 2006) 
Where associations induce reciprocal gift relationships in their RoSCAs, these 
inter-individual gift relationships are based on reciprocity too. At denkundiw and 
bolomafaraw one needs to give at least as much as one has received from that 
specific person. Gifts are far from free here, and are supposed to stand for the 
importance that the donor attaches to her relationship with the mother. This 
mother can, when it is her turn to give ‘back’, hardly give less as this would be 
an insult. Where, for example, in the Netherlands the personal relationship is 
expressed in a gift and it would be considered rude to give somebody exactly the 
same gift as s/he gave you, the situation is different in Bancoumana. Here it is 
positive to give a gift of the same size but the type of gift does not really matter: 
‘at a denkundi one can give tissi [from the French ‘tissue’, a thin type of cloth], 
pagnes, sheets or money. Myself, I give money or pagnes because these presents 
are easy to find. Last Sunday I gave money,’ said Niagale Coulibaly (Bancou-
mana, 23 March 2006). At a denkundi, all of a woman’s female social contacts 
gather and give something according to the strength of their relationship. These 
events are the perfect occasion for the mother to find out how strong her social 
network is; how well she is doing in life. 
Different types of associations 
The women’s associations in Bancoumana can be subdivided into two groups.26 
The first consists of the four large associations with between 50 and 100 mem-
bers each from all over the village who make weekly contributions of FCFA 
1250 to FCFA 2500. These four associations cooperate in the ‘Association des 
femmes de Bancoumana’ to organize rituals together like the one described 
above. The second group is made up of smaller associations that have between 
                                                 
26  There are some exceptions to these groups, like the ‘Association des femmes de Bancoumana’, the 
‘Association des femmes des fonctionnaires’ with a monthly contribution (probably because their hus-
bands receive a monthly salary and put it in a RoSCA through their wives) and the ‘Association des 
cultivateurs’ where the members work a field together to earn money for the members to organize 
denkundiw and bolomafaraw. 
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20 and 30 members from the same neighbourhood, contributing between FCFA 
250 and FCFA 1,000 weekly at lower profile meetings. In all the associations the 
meetings are social events; in small associations these are gatherings of women 
who know each other well and have enjoyable and relaxed meetings that interrupt 
their hard daily routine. For meetings of the large associations,27 the women dress 
up and the emphasis here seems to be more on networking. In all of the groups, 
the woman receiving the fund at that meeting is supposed to provide tea for the 
whole gathering. Only when numbers are drawn for the next cycle all members 
should be present. At other meetings about a-third to a half of the group has a 
friend take their money to the meeting or gives it to the secretary beforehand. 
It is slightly easier for smaller groups to provide additional help for members 
in need. The ‘Association des femmes de chauffeurs de Bancoumana’28 used to 
collect an additional FCFA 250 per member if one of them was in desperate need 
of money, for example to pay a medical bill. However, this sometimes led to 
conflict if members felt someone asked for this too quickly, possibly out of fear 
of being left out, or if it was demanded by a member who did not come to the 
meetings very often and had not contributed when others were in need. As an 
association with members from only three neighbouring families, the association 
is a vehicle for women to act as ‘the neighbourhood’. Thus, at the meeting on 
Wednesday afternoon 8 March 2006, money (about FCFA 500) was collected 
after the RoSCA procedure to give to a woman whose husband had passed away 
that week. After the meeting women who had some time left went to her place to 
give their blessing and the money from the association. Large associations rarely 
make these kinds of gestures because they are too large to decide who will re-
ceive a visit and who will not. They may have a fund of money that they can lend 
to members or other associations in need. When this happens, it is mostly for the 
organization of rituals. 
The large associations are stricter than the smaller ones. Default is not ac-
cepted, and it can be seen from their books that this has not happened at all last 
year. The books are kept by a member who functions as group secretary, being 
assisted by two advisors who take in and count the money. All groups have 
presidents whose task is to represent the group, for example when cooperating 
with other associations. Smaller associations also write down their members’ 
contributions in a notebook but here default happens a bit more frequently, about 
once or twice a round. Since members know each other personally there is a little 
more room for flexibility. The ‘Association des femmes de chauffeurs’, with 27 
members contributing FCFA 1000 a week, had a problem because none of its 
                                                 
27  And the ‘Association des femmes des fonctionnaires’. 
28  With members who were not necessarily a driver’s wife. Instead most of the members came from three 
neighbouring families. 
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members could read or write so they used to ask a child to read out the names 
during the midday break. The last meeting of a cycle, when numbers were drawn 
to determine the order of takings in the next cycle, ended in chaos. The school 
girl made too many numbers for the 27 members before leaving for class and the 
association was surprised when people drew numbers 43 or 58, read out by me 
and checked by a woman who could read numbers. It was subsequently decided 
to repeat the procedure a week later.  
 
 
 
Picture 7.3 Group photo of the Association des Femmes de Fonctionnaires,  
5 April 2006 
 [© Esther Kühn] 
 
Being a ton(w) member 
With the different types of associations and their advantages and disadvantages, 
prospective members can strategize. By deciding to become a member of a 
specific association, several considerations can play a role and women can spread 
their social relationships or strengthen existing ones. The number of possibilities 
that a potential member can choose from is increased by the possibility of sharing 
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a membership.29 Fanta Diakite, for example, shared her membership of Faiyda 
with three others. This means the four women contribute FCFA 2,500 every 
Sunday afternoon, and once in the cycle of about 100 weeks they receive the 
fund, which they subsequently distribute amongst themselves. Thus women with 
limited resources can become a member of the ‘Association des femmes de 
Bancoumana’ and be invited to their meetings and parties. It is also possible to 
make several contributions at each meeting and subsequently receive the fund 
several times in a cycle.30 Nobody seemed to be a member of two large asso-
ciations but it was normal for women to be a member of several small asso-
ciations or one large and one or more small ones. Niagale Coulibaly, the secre-
tary of a large association, for example, earned money from the sale of medicines 
at the weekly market and, as many others did, by embroidering and selling sheets 
and curtains. She used this money for three memberships of FCFA 1,250 a week 
of the large association and made a monthly contribution of FCFA 5,000 to an 
unnamed association and paid their weekly contribution of FCFA 50, to save for 
the Tabaski feast. Many women are a member of a small and a large association, 
of the former to shape badenya relations with women from the neighbourhood 
that they might otherwise have more conflict with, and of the latter to gain access 
to a large network and receive an extraordinary amount of money once every two 
years.31 
During my fieldwork, I met a woman who was a member of four associations 
with five RoSCAs in total. Ouleye Kante, one of the three wives of a civil servant 
of the Office d’Agriculture, was involved in trade herself for most of the day. 
She sold sandwiches with fried onions at offices and workshops, sauce ingre-
dients at the daily market and traded in perfumes. She contributed money to the 
RoSCAs of the large association, Dannaya, and to two small associations, whose 
membership was mostly wives of civil servants; Sigiya and an unnamed asso-
ciation (the same as Niagale Coulibaly) where she contributes to both the weekly 
and monthly RoSCA but does not save for the Tabaski feast. In addition, she is a 
member of the ‘Associations des femmes de fonctionnaires’ where she and her 
co-wives contribute using their husband’s money. 
 
 
                                                 
29  This makes it difficult to establish the exact number of members in an association since groups of wo-
men are listed under only one of their names in the membership records. 
30  This happens in large associations with long cycles and no opportunities for richer women to resort to 
another type of association with larger contributions. 
31  Sometimes many members of a small association are members of the same larger group but this is far 
from compulsory and there are many exceptions. 
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Are all coins the same? 
The sharing of riches is both an obligation and a way of enhancing one’s status in 
Mande. Money can only be usefully productive if it is set in motion. Only then 
can it be a catalyst for the creation and maintenance of social networks, the 
ultimate and basic goal since it is one’s social networks that make one a person 
(Brand 1996: 145).32 The obligation to share applies especially to money (wari) 
since in itself money produces nothing in the long term.  
For daily expenses, Mande people have become more and more dependent on 
money (Jansen 2006: 54), as have people everywhere. There is no exit option 
from the money-based economy. Storing it for an unknown future, however, as a 
known but unattainable wealth for others, is perceived as a downright insult. 
While in the West, money is praised for its durability and the possibility to keep 
it for future use, in Mande one should show one’s riches to announce redistri-
bution.33 Money, and most other goods for that matter, cannot be individually 
owned. Muurling describes how the well-known griotte Sangungwé Kouyaté is 
visited by lots of people in the days after a performance at a wedding or name-
giving ceremony in Bamako. Visits are made by close family but also by others 
who have come to ask for money. Shortly after the performance, all the money 
that was given to thank the famous singer for her praise songs has been given 
away. ‘Saving is not possible,’ she said ‘because many people in Bamako and the 
surroundings depend on her income’ (Muurling 2005: 184). Money that you 
‘have’ will disappear either because it is given to others or ‘eaten’ (dum) by 
yourself in an attempt to use it before somebody else asks for it. Money is not as 
durable as we may sometimes believe. On the contrary, it is easily divisible and 
without individual properties, making it inviting for distribution.  
The savings associations that women have organized in Bancoumana, and 
elsewhere, provide their members with both group pressure to pay the weekly 
contribution and with a good excuse to refuse the claims of others. During the 
RoSCA cycle, members build up a right to the fund but at the same time they do 
not have any access to their money, thereby shielding it from demands from 
relatives and friends who are asked instead to lend members money so that they 
can make their contributions to the association. This idea of compulsory saving is 
an important reason for people to become a member of an association with a 
RoSCA. 
                                                 
32  At their denkundiw women can see how well they are doing in life from the number and size of gifts. 
33  The timeframe of redistribution may differ depending on the medium the wealth is stored in. The 
golden jewellery that many Malian women owned till the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s could be 
seen as personal property, more so than money: gold jewellery, received at birth or marriage, did not 
have to be redistributed until after its owner’s death. On the contrary, gold that one has dug is seen as 
being a windfall and needs to be redistributed as soon as possible to create more durable social 
relationships (cf. Werthmann 2005). 
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Muurling explains the redistribution of gifts by showing giving to be a way of 
receiving blessings that will enhance one’s chances in life (Muurling 2005: 185). 
Roth (2005: 129) explains the moral obligation to give differently, stating that: 
‘money in Mali represents a far less substantial and durable form in which to 
store wealth than social relationships’. Money can express and reproduce social 
relationships, through giving. This counts both for gifts to griottes, as well as for 
money put into RoSCAs. Through a RoSCA, members keep their money in 
motion for a limited time and create positive social bonds (badenya) between 
‘strangers’, by making them temporary creditors and debtors. RoSCAs tie people 
to the association and the individual members. At the same time, money has 
become an important vehicle for vital economic exchange; to be able to organize 
rituals that provide women and their families with much-wanted prestige but also 
to buy consumer-items. Thereby associations with RoSCAs have been able to 
attract a lot of women in a short time. 
These associations are not necessarily any less personal than those that do not 
deal with money as directly as they do. The expectation that this may be the case 
(e.g. Rowlands 1995: 118-119)34 has been inspired by the assumption that money 
would be a ‘neutral instrument of exchange’. In Western economic thought, 
money is said to forge superfluous a relationship between buyer and seller. The 
debate that we are left with is on the moral value of the ultimate effect. Is it 
positive and liberating or negative and restricting if we do not need social re-
lations with others anymore to survive (cf. Kahn 1997; Zelizer 2000; Klamer & 
van Dalen 2000: 91)? This conceptual division between money and social rela-
tionships is a problematic one both in Mande and in the West. In Mande, a 
prerequisite for a successful transaction is the establishment, not the denial, of a 
social relationship between buyer and seller. They greet each other and enquire 
after each other’s well-being and that of their families with standard questions 
and answers, thereby establishing a short-lived social relationship before pro-
ceeding to the transaction. Many small traders try to establish a longer-term 
social relationship with the owners of stores in order to be able to successfully 
demand products on credit later. In Mande, it is therefore almost impossible to 
own a store in a place where one has families or friends (Jansen 2005: 86). 
The associations with their RoSCAs provide opportunities to accumulate mo-
ney in such a way that women can claim it once they take the fund. They have 
often earned the money through trade, ‘the buying of goods to sell more expen-
sively’. Money ‘earned’ in this way is perceived as a windfall and is therefore 
susceptible to ‘falling’ (tomber). One day, my host sister Fama Diabate, who 
                                                 
34  Who suggests calling only those associations that are geared at economic advantages for businessmen, 
by the name of RoSCA. In his article on RoSCAs in Cameroon, he avoids all other associations, pre-
cisely those that are of interest here. 
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acted as my interpreter, and I were on our way to interview a woman and we 
found a FCFA 10,000 (€ 15) banknote on the main road. We took it with us and 
handed it over to my host father who kept it for a week waiting for someone to 
ask for it. When that did not happen, he gave me the same banknote and told me 
to use this particular note as soon as possible to buy candy for the farewell party 
that we had planned. I was then to give FCFA 5,000 of the change to Fama. 
Money that one finds – in this case very literally – disappears very quickly; it 
cannot produce future material wealth because it will ‘fall’.35 It can be used in-
stead to produce a different type of (useful) wealth, that lies in social relation-
ships. It was, therefore, a good idea to use the money that was found for a 
farewell party or a RoSCA. Social relationships are the most valuable as are the 
gifts one gets through these activities; the RoSCA fund or gifts at a party are 
durable in themselves, in addition to the relationships create. They have not been 
procured by chance but through a slow and socially accepted method of accumu-
lation. A RoSCA association is thus an appropriate system for saving for large 
expenses; parties and consumer items. The fund is hardly ever used to invest in 
small businesses, to improve consumption in the longer term (as many develop-
ment and microcredit organizations would like people to believe). The most 
important expense for women is the trousseau that their daughters need to get 
married. FCFA 25,000 of the standard bride price is, in principle, meant to cover 
these costs but this is far from enough and often cannot be procured by the 
prospective husband. RoSCAs are a common way of saving for this purpose.  
Are RoSCAs microfinance? 
One of the main differences between RoSCA savings associations in Bancouma-
na and microfinance, are the purposes to which RoSCA funds are put. Micro-
credit, which is very popular in donor circles, is often mentioned in the same 
breath as RoSCAs because of its similar technical properties. They describe the 
RoSCA as an existing savings system that, if members wanted to, could be 
changed into an indigenous microfinance institute (Guérin 2006: 558), as a cul-
turally appropriate and cheap alternative for microcredit with the same positive 
results (Oxfam America), or as a type of indigenous microfinance in itself (de 
Swaan & van der Linden 2006).36 Although both RoSCAs and microcredit are 
part of the financial landscape (Bouman & Hospes 1994), RoSCAs are not pre-
existing locally organized microcredit organizations; money rotates through 
                                                 
35  It is a well-known phenomenon in Africa that money that is found or (too) easily acquired has to be 
distributed freely to make it productive for the – more or less – honest finder (cf. Shipton 1989: 71). 
36  The title of this book, based on anthropological studies into groups with RoSCAs, is, curiously enough, 
titled; ‘Mutualist Microfinance: Informal Savings Funds from the Global Periphery to the Core?’ (my 
emphasis). 
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RoSCAs to strengthen social ties and people are members for this reason. In 
addition, the money that members receive from a RoSCA fund is rarely invested 
in the way development organizations would imagine, namely to start or improve 
an activity with which one could make more money in the future to improve 
one’s situation and that of one’s family. Therefore, a number of development 
thinkers are of the opinion that the RoSCA as a savings system for consumption 
products should be replaced by microcredit because this would be safer and 
encourages investment (see Robinson 2001: 240-241).  
In practice, it turns out that clients do not always use and interpret formal 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the sense of an economic investment op-
portunity either. Thus, Bhil farmers in India did not care whether the financing 
facilities of their new savings and credit groups were efficient: ‘Regardless of the 
success or otherwise of the groups as farmer-managed microfinance institutions, 
they were perceived as the most important change because they stood for access 
to a range of other project benefits, whether wages, seeds or credit’ (Mosse 2005: 
214). Lakwo shows how women in rural Uganda have embraced microcredit to 
start new businesses. However, the effect is not that they have escaped poverty 
through increased assets, as donors would like ‘investors’ to believe (Robinson 
2001: 20) but they have gained more bargaining power in their households and 
communities, i.e. empowerment (Lakwo 2006: 187). Empowerment is certainly 
an aspect of development. It is not, however, the type of development that is 
promoted by MFIs looking for donors in rich countries (cf. Kühn 2007a), instead 
it is only applied in certain aspects of MFI activities. In Latin-America it is be-
coming increasingly common to extend microcredit for the purchase of consumer 
items as long as it can be refunded, thereby moving from direct investment for 
development to consumptive credit (Bakx 2007). At the same time the women’s 
groups that are instituted by MFIs, commercial banks and NGOs as a source of 
social pressure and support for clients who need to refund their loans rarely 
remain merely a business-oriented group and start to look like associations with 
RoSCAs.  
Microfinance can be compared to the practice and ideas behind associations 
with RoSCAs but the underlying utopian neo-l0iberal idea of microfinance, 
subscribed to by all authors who see RoSCAs as a type of microfinance, is how-
ever far from the ideas that underlie the RoSCA in a women’s association in 
Bancoumana, Mali.  
Conclusion 
This chapter began by asking whether the event described in the introduction was 
about money. It was about money to some extent, however, not about money as a 
‘neutral instrument of exchange’, a notion that has been discarded as an ana-
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lytical explanation by a multitude of empirically based publications, but instead 
about money as a whimsical thing that carries value, although how much value it 
stands for and the ways in which it can be used depend on the situation. In 
Bancoumana, money is ‘a far less substantial and durable form in which to store 
wealth than social relationships’ (Roth 2005: 129). To create stable wealth, pres-
tigious social networks are created through gifts of money and other goods. 
Within the realm of women’s associations (tonw), this can be seen both in 
RoSCAs and the rituals organized in cooperation with the association. These 
groups try their very best to avoid default and provide their members with a 
credible sphere in which to use money to establish and strengthen social relations 
with the near certainty that this money will be returned. This oppurtunity of trust 
is of major importance since people have become increasingly dependent on 
money for their vital daily expenses (Jansen 2006: 54) that include the main life-
rituals. Money is not merely a ‘neutral instrument of exchange’ or used in eco-
nomic actions like saving, spending or investing. Instead it is used to establish 
lasting social relationships.  
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This chapter proposes that rather than a universal (social) desire for communi-
cation, it is a rational, individualistic need for access to opportunities (and the 
chance to meet established needs) that drives the motivation for mobile-phone 
uptake and use in Africa. Seeming global similarities in the underlying motives for 
the adoption and use of mobile telephony camouflages regional variations. This, 
in turn, glosses over the extent to which a region’s historical processes influence 
its people's adoption and use of mobile telephony. This article looks at how the 
desire for access to opportunities has driven the uptake and usage of mobile tele-
phony in the Anglophone Cameroonian town of Buea, and how Anglophone Ca-
meroon’s history, much like the context in which the phone was introduced, has 
been instrumental in shaping people’s motivations for adoption and use. The pri-
mary data used here derives from five months of research in Buea amongst uni-
versity students, professionals, the blind and members of family households. 
General survey data and observations in the town, as well as an analysis of some 
of the literature, are also included. 
Introduction  
Take a combination of university students, blind people, professionals and some 
members of family households, toss them into a researcher’s cooking pot, stir 
them well; add some seasoning from general surveys – with the salt of observa-
tion here and the pepper of ad hoc interviews there – and you will get (or are 
likely to get) the most improbable concoction of units of analysis for a research 
project on mobile telephony imaginable, except, of course, if the aim of the re-
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search is to find out if there are any consistencies in how and why people from 
such diverse groups within a society adopt and use the mobile phone.  
How and why people in Buea have adopted and used the mobile phone was 
one of the questions that drove the five-month research that inspired this article. 
However, this question was an extension of the main focus of the research, which 
was to examine the ways in which mobile telephony was influencing and being 
shaped by daily life in Buea. The question on motivation for uptake and use was 
therefore only relevant to the extent that, as Bar, Pisani & Weber (2007: 1) have 
argued, ‘(...) to fully grasp the social, economic and political impact of mobile 
telephony, we need to understand appropriation: The process through which 
mobile phone users go beyond mere adoption to make the technology their own 
and to embed it within their social, economic, and political practices’. By no 
stretch of the imagination was I expecting that this spin-off question would 
produce answers that would task the very premise upon which my research 
rested. Where I had thought that mobile telephony was strictly a social tech-
nology, the answers I got suggested that the innovation is an individualistic 
technology.1 And while I had conjectured that the only issue to look into when 
asking questions about how people from different social groups use the mobile 
phone was what their various communication patterns indicated about their group 
micro cultures, I discovered that the act of communicating only represents a 
means to an end. Conversely, where I had concluded that the manner in which 
people use the mobile phone is born of a universality of motivation (Katz & 
Aakhus 2002), I found that people’s usage patterns expose the extent to which 
local social and historical factors configure motivation for use. To explain moti-
vation for uptake and use in a society, therefore, an examination of the history of 
that region was a prerequisite. 
Back to Buea: Much as I had succeeded in identifying ways in which people 
in the town were using the mobile phone and for what purposes, it would take 
knowledge of (Anglophone) Cameroon’s recent history for me to begin to 
understand the deeper social and cultural considerations driving motivation for 
the various uses of the phone in the town.2 This article now begins with an 
examination of those historical facts.  
The first section of the article is thus a discussion of those aspects of (Anglo-
phone) Cameroon’s history that have been instrumental in creating the needs and 
desires responsible for shaping motivation for mobile-phone uptake and use in 
the town. An analysis follows of the extent to which the needs and wishes born 
                                                 
1  ‘Individualism’ here denotes people’s prime attention to their individual needs and wellbeing rather to 
a communal, social drive to stay in contact. While communication and contact are not to be negated, 
they are not the primary focus. 
2  Mobile telephony fills three different roles in Buea: A functional role, the role of a communicator and 
a communication technology. 
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of those historical processes and prevailing conditions have shaped people’s 
rationale for uptake and use. As alluded to above, the findings will be based on 
research done among four groups of people in Buea: University students, blind 
persons, an assortment of professionals and members of family-households. The 
analysis constitutes two elements: An examination of data gathered through 
observations, informal discussions and interviews; and findings culled from the 
study’s four participating groups. But first, we turn to history. 
So what has history got to do with it? 
When answers to questions that seem grounded in the present are traced to the 
near or distant past, history becomes relevant. In Buea, a rather unexpected detail 
about mobile telephony came to my attention. I discovered that regardless of how 
participants from the different groups in the study handled or behaved with the 
mobile phone, their end goal for its use was analogous – namely, to reduce 
insecurity, ameliorate uncertainty and expand opportunities. I observed too that 
those conditions of insecurity and uncertainty mentioned above were not the sum 
total of that which shaped people’s sense of urgency in their pursuit of well-being 
via the mobile phone. It was, in addition to that, the process that had led people 
to those states of insecurity and uncertainty. In other words, the historical pro-
cesses that had lead to the conditions driving uptake were as key to understand-
ing motivation for uptake as were those concerns of insecurity, uncertainty and 
lack. Therefore, knowledge of how history propelled Anglophone Cameroonians 
to the context in which the mobile phone arrived was essential to fully under-
standing the motivation for uptake and use of the technology in Buea. History 
was therefore relevant. This chapter begins its inroads into the historical parti-
culars informing the conditions that the mobile telephone met on its arrived in 
Anglophone Cameroon. It takes, therefore, as its point of departure the time in 
Cameroon’s history when the effects of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) were beginning to take root in the daily lives of Came-
roonians. This was the time when mobile telephony arrived. 
History has everything to do with it  
As in other African countries, mobile telephony arrived in Cameroon at a time of 
socio-economic instability and a time when the SAPs were compounding to 
Africa’s woes. In the case of Cameroon, the problem was exacerbated by the 
unpreparedness of Cameroonians, or, more appropriately perhaps, by the fact that 
Cameroonians had not primed or equipped themselves for the economic melt-
down that begun in 1986 and to which SAPs proceeded to add more coal. Prior to 
this period, Cameroonians had been living in relative economic stability. As Jua 
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(2003) points out, before the crisis, the transition from school to employment – 
that is, from school to independence and thereby a stable life – was an uninter-
rupted socio-political choreography. In this routinized state of social, political 
and economic repose, political indifference governed and, arguably, bred com-
placency in people (Ibid.). Then again, there was some justification for this com-
placency. Between 1970 and 1982, the gross national product (GNP) rose from 
300 billion CFA to 2,000 billion CFA (Akoko 2007). It grew by 4.8% annually 
in real terms between 1960 and 1978, and at a record rate of 8.2% per year 
between 1978 and 1986. Until 1978, the contribution of agriculture to GNP and 
exports was 30% and 74% respectively (Ntangsi 1991). This was a direct result 
of President Ahidjo’s Green Revolution, which encouraged agricultural develop-
ment (Ngoh 1987; Mbuagbaw et al. 1987). Cameroon’s credit worthiness grew 
amongst Western nations and they, and France in particular, invested heavily in 
the country (Jua 1991; Krieger & Takougang 1998; Akoko 2007). The job 
market expanded and the civil service ballooned as the government, which was 
the country’s main employer, took on large numbers of people. Because both 
Francophones and Anglophones, though unequally, benefited from the economic 
climate and the employment rate, Buea’s civil-service population swelled. Issues 
of unemployment or the social integration of youth were not particularly sig-
nificant as the transition from school to work was fluid for thousands of 
Cameroonians (Jua 2003). Then in about 1986 things began to change, and by 
1994 the situation for even the employed had become testing. While this took 
many Cameroonians by surprise, the downturn did not start in 1986. There had 
been indications of future problems as early as the late 1970s but these echoes of 
impending trouble remained blanketed under the government’s reluctance to 
acknowledge the problem or inculcate outside help.3 Between 1978 and 1986 
agriculture’s share declined to 22% of GDP and 51% of exports (Ntangsi 1991) 
and during the 1986/87 fiscal year, Cameroon recorded a drop of 27.8% in its 
export revenue due to external (a fall in the price of oil and agricultural products) 
and internal reasons. Amongst the internal causes were the ‘blow-out of public 
expenditures and a crisis of public finance, a high-cost domestic economy, a 
stagnant and non-competitive industry in both international and domestic 
markets’(Eba’a Atyi 1998) and the poor management and misuse of national 
resources by a casual bureaucratic public administration (Jua 1991; Mbuagbaw & 
Akoko 2004; Nkwi 2006; Akoko 2007). In all these developments, nothing 
apparently crossed the radar of the unsuspecting Cameroonian masses who, as a 
result, did not see the crisis coming. Yet coming it was. 
                                                 
3  I am still to find literature that suggests preparedness among the Cameroonian masses for the economic 
meltdown and its consequences. 
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Having failed to independently manage the emerging crisis, the Cameroonian 
government eventually signed a stand-by agreement with the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) in September 1988 and a structural adjustment loan in June 
1989. However this would prove a bitter pill for Cameroonians because, as Jua 
(2003: 1) noted, ‘Intrinsic to the (SAP) program was a commitment to reducing 
the budget deficit and downsizing the state. Practically, this meant the freezing of 
employment opportunities in an economy in which the state was the main em-
ployer. Generally, the SAP has been a macroeconomic catastrophe, engendering 
high unemployment and limited growth.’ Jua (2003: 2) would also observe that 
‘It also (…) marginalized youths or reduced their chances for a sustainable 
livelihood’. Yet more trouble was pending for Cameroonians. In 1993/4 the 
French government devalued the CFA, sparking unrest across countries in the 
CFA zone as salaries halved (or dropped even more in some cases), while com-
modities remained at the same price. Describing the situation as a salary tsunami 
(in the February 2008 instalment of the monthly debates on topical issues orga-
nized by the Fredrich Ebert Foundation Press Club in Yaoundé), a mathematics 
teacher, Jean Kandem, declared that ‘a public service worker on indice 1140 was 
on a gross monthly salary of FCFA 420,425 but by November of the same year 
the sum was cut to FCFA 154,287 representing a slash of FCFA 266,138 giving a 
percentage of 63.3’. In the same debate, economist Dr Francis Menjo Baye 
claimed that government ambiguity in economic policies and the ‘speculative 
attitudes of economic agents’ only left the inflationary tendencies in motion (The 
Post Online 25/2/2008).  
For Anglophone Cameroonians who had traditionally had a secondary (lower) 
status in a Francophone-dominated political system, this was an untenable situ-
ation. Jua & Konings (2004: 6) put it as follows: 
In February 2003 it was announced that there were only 57 Anglophone youths 
among the more than five thousand new recruits joining the police academies. The 
next month records show that there were only 12 Anglophones among the 172 new 
recruits into the Customs Department. And, even more significantly, these Anglo-
phones were only given junior staff positions while all the senior staff positions went 
to Francophones. 
Anglophone Cameroonians therefore lost all trust in their government’s ability 
to protect and provide, and developed a resulting sense of uncertainty and fear 
for the future. People were no longer sure if or when salaries would be slashed, 
when inflation might hit or when the president might announce a special decree. 
Writing on the conditions that became the norm in Cameroon from the mid-
1980s onwards, Akoko (2007) notes that:  
The crisis (gave) rise to compounding poverty, misery and unemployment, (ferment-
ing) fear, doubt, and uncertainty right down to increase in social insecurity. Armed 
banditry (became) common place, with bandits operating in open daylight and often 
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with impunity. More and more young people and whole families even (began) 
dreaming of or migrating to the West to seek greener pastures. 
Seemingly trapped in a state of perpetual uncertainty, Anglophone Cameroon-
ians had become distrustful. Mobile telephony would, thus, make its inroad into 
an environment undermined by tension, insecurity, distrust, fear and a new 
proclivity among harried Anglophone Cameroonians to use whatever appeared in 
their line of vision to reduce and negotiate their sense of vulnerability.4 With its 
ability to allow instant access to relevant information, instant access to people 
and instantaneous real-time results, the mobile phone came to Buea with the 
remarkable potential of becoming anything and everything in the hands of people 
constrained, restricted and in need of financial, psychological and emotional 
freedom. It was thus destined to be a powerful weapon in the battle that Ang-
lophone Cameroonians were waging against uncertainty and lack.  
I found three roles that mobile telephony was occupying in the lives of people 
in Buea: A functional role, an expressive role, and the role of a communication 
technology.  
In its functional capacity, the phone showed itself to be several different 
household gadgets at the same time: A flashlight in dark streets or during power 
outages, an alarm clock, a watch, a calculator, a portable money-exchange bu-
reau, and a multimedia resource.  
In its expressive role, I observed it to serve not as a technology through which 
feelings, thoughts, ideas, hopes or aspirations could be conveyed, but as the ex-
pression itself, i.e. a means by which unsaid messages could be dispatched – say, 
for example, a person taking a call from a particular caller and then deliberately 
switching off the phone without answering, thereby expressing a form of coded 
sentiment to the caller. Another way in which the phone translated into ‘the 
expression itself’ was in its ability to communicate to observers the state of 
people’s interpersonal relationships through the way they handled, answered, 
stowed away or behaved with the device with regards to each other or one an-
other.  
It was in the phone’s role as a communication medium, however, that I traced 
the deep connection between usage pattern, needs and local historical processes.  
 
 
                                                 
4  The definition of vulnerability here is based on Omar Cardona’s conceptualization of the word. He 
states that ‘Vulnerability represents the physical, economic, political or social susceptibility or pre-
disposition of a community to damage in the case of a destabilizing phenomenon of natural or 
anthropogenic origin’ (Cardona 2004).) 
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The mobile phone as a communication device:  
Deeper reasons for uptake and use. 
As a communication device, mobile-phone usage in Buea showed itself to be like 
everywhere else in the world: Person/s to person/s, and through calls (synchro-
nous voice-to-voice contact), texts (asynchronous person-to-person contact or 
written messages from one mobile-phone screen to the other) or beeping (calling 
and hanging up before the call could be answered). 
Ordinarily, calling is the most expensive of these three mobile-phone commu-
nication methods in Buea as elsewhere, followed by text messaging and lastly by 
beeping. One would therefore expect that in an environment of economic hard-
ship, people would make calls selectively and rely more on texts and beeping. 
This is not what I observed in Buea. I noticed that rather than use the cheaper text 
method to contact people abroad, no fewer than 90% of study respondents 
instead made calls to overseas contacts. To my question about why this was so I 
was told that texts were the preserve of local contacts (specifically close relations 
such as friends and family), while calls were reserved for all other types of con-
tacts, especially contacts abroad. The problem with my confusion about this 
seemingly upside-down logic was that I was still operating from the school of 
thought where communication and contact were seen as the driving forces behind 
the uptake and use of mobile telephony. Not until the correlation between desire 
for access to opportunities (or access to the opportunity to meet established 
needs) and uptake and usage patterns dawned on me did it make sense that 
modes of mobile-phone communication were being determined in Buea not by 
the availability of a person’s phone credit but by the expected result of the 
contact. I gathered from respondents that, on a scale from one to ten in impor-
tance, calls abroad were often in the range of nine. The reason being that the 
grounds for communication varied from urgent family requirements to maintain-
ing vital connections as in the link-up activities in Jamaica (Miller & Horst 
2006), or soliciting direct help in kind or cash for other mutually beneficial pur-
poses. I was told that such long-distance exchanges had to be devoid of mistakes, 
misquotes or miscommunication of any kind. Text messages, with their predis-
position to mistakes undetected in real time, were therefore a precarious means of 
contacting people abroad. The immediacy of calls tended to make it less likely 
that mistakes would go undetected.  
Where the value of text correspondence seemed most obvious was in its 
ability to allow for mutual psychological assistance. An overwhelming number of 
participants said they generally sent text messages to encourage one another, 
swap vital information, micro-coordinate, and exchange Bible passages. Implicit 
in these explanations was the intimation that text messaging was a binding de-
vice, a breeding ground of solidarity amongst people locked in the same condi-
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tions. Ultimately therefore, mobile-phone calls and texts were not about commu-
nicating for the sake of making contact but about reaching a desired end – be it 
financial help from abroad or release from stress from within. 
 
 
 
Picture 8.1 Building (left) of one of MTN’s offices in 
Buea. Note the call box beside it.  
 [© Barbara Tah Gwanmesia] 
 
 
Another observation I made about the use of mobile telephony in its role as a 
medium of communication was not how it was being used but who it was being 
used to contact. I noticed that young people tended to call friends and families 
most, while older persons, such as the professionals in the study, called family 
and then business and work acquaintances. I would rapidly understand why. 
Several young people in Buea told me that their friends were a lifeline of 
hope, providing opportunities and jobs for them, a font of assistance when things 
got tough and a source of promises that could not be expected from the govern-
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ment or, for some, from family members. For students and young people still 
hoping to find a career, therefore, getting up in the morning and calling or texting 
key contacts or staying on the phone for long hours (for instance during the 
provider MTN’s night-time promotional offer) discussing new information and 
possibilities was not a luxury (or seen as such).  
As for the professionals in the study, monitoring the well-being of family 
members – as much out of love as out of duty – helped release stress. I first 
observed this connection between family and stress release in uptake patterns. I 
found that the persistent anxiety concerning the health and circumstances of 
loved ones in the ‘geography of crisis’ (Mbembe & Roitman 1995), which the 
socio-economic and socio-political dynamics of Cameroon had produced, had 
resulted in parents and established persons buying phones for their loved ones. 
Almost all the students I spoke to said their phones had been bought for them by 
parents, sisters, aunts, brothers and/or cousins who were keen on keeping tabs on 
their health, movements or living conditions. Many of the professionals I spoke 
to, specifically the teachers, said they had given phones to their children and 
other relations or had been given phones themselves by, say, their husbands or 
others, for security reasons, for peace of mind or to facilitate micro-coordination. 
This purchasing of mobile telephony for others is referred to, in the literature, as 
‘gifting’, but in Buea I observed that the act transcended gifting. It represented 
the givers’ peace of mind as much as anything else. Here again, the mobile 
phone’s worth proved to reside not in its function as a technology through which 
people communicated but in the opportunity it gave people to deal with stress, 
fear and the uncertainties engendered by Cameroon’s own specific circum-
stances. 
However much these observations reflect data gathered in Buea, they do not 
illustrate the connecting thread linking one participating group’s motivation for 
uptake and use of mobile telephony to the others, and vice versa. For it is this 
link that suggests or shows a commonality of motivation for use within the town 
– without which there can be no talk of a generality of usage pattern or reason for 
use of the mobile phone in the town based on the region’s unique circumstances 
and people’s individual needs and aspirations (or rather the needs and aspirations 
generated by those circumstances). Such a conclusion would only negate asser-
tions in this chapter about the influence of mobile telephony on society in Buea. 
The following section picks up on this theme of a harmony of motivation 
amongst the four groups in the study (the blind, students, professionals and 
members of family households), beginning with the findings amongst students.  
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The symbolism of mobile telephony 
My research amongst students began with assumptions. False assumptions. Chief 
amongst these was the assumption that, to students, the mobile phone was above 
and beyond all else a status symbol. This was a belief born of my own precon-
ceptions about youth behaviour and what appeared from observation and dis-
cussions to be students’ attitudes towards mobile telephony. Early in the study I 
had taken time to exclusively observe students. For an hour a day and at different 
times of the day and on different days of the week for two weeks, I sat on the 
grass at the UB junction (the entrance to the University of Buea) – out of the sun 
and away from the stream of call-box operators, hawkers and traders - and 
watched the students (or the young people who I assumed were students at the 
University of Buea). I watched girls giggle, boys give the bump and young 
people stop and then take calls. I observed young men and women walk along 
with their phones to their ears, or sit in solitary spots engaging their phones. 
Every so often, two or more young people would guffaw at something that 
seemed to appear on the screen of one of their mobile phones. These phone 
carryings-on were, of course, not an unremitting flow of activities. They were 
intermittent. Sometimes, barring the continuous visits of young people (phone in 
hand) to the different call boxes, I would have to wait for minutes before ob-
serving one or more phone-related activities.  
Nothing much about these activities or the way students handled or acted with 
their phones spelt drama, but my preconceptions about students’ relationships 
with their phones still held. Even though thirty of the thirty-four students in the 
study said the phone had no other value to them than its ability to help them get 
class and other information, expand their social network, give them access to 
spiritual counselling, emergency aid, and instant access to relevant others or act 
as safety net, my view scarcely shifted. The sophisticated looks of some of the 
phones and what seemed like students’ tendency to admire each other’s phones 
hardly discouraged this perspective. Neither did complaints by a minority of 
student participants in the study about the predisposition of other students to 
parade their phones, talk obnoxiously loudly on the devices or let their phones 
ring in inappropriate places change my way of thinking. In this mode of thinking, 
I could not see the true symbolism of the phone to the students. I could not, or 
did not, see that the phone’s real symbolism for them lay deep in the recesses of 
the socio-economic/socio-political state of Cameroon and its impact on their 
aspirations and hopes. I would eventually discover this, in part, as a result of 
three sets of views I discerned among students in the study.  
The first view, held by about 30% of the students, suggested that mobile 
telephony is a technology that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer since 
rich people use their sophisticated phones to get to more information and oppor-
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tunities, while poor people, devoid of such advanced phones, have no such access 
to opportunity-creating possibilities. Not owning a top-of-the-range phone, in 
this view, was considered a disadvantage, and not owning one at all meant re-
signing oneself to the economic stagnation facing the Cameroonian masses. A 
second view of the phone, held by another 30% of the students, was that the 
phone had brought a levelling of the playing field with its potential to offer poor 
people what had before been the exclusive preserve of the wealthy: Useful 
contacts, results-creating information and commercial offers. According to this 
view, possessing a phone could give poor people the means to access information 
remotely, make valuable contacts at any given time, and organize themselves for 
life-impacting opportunities. As in the first belief system, advocates of this view 
felt that not owning a mobile phone was tantamount to relegating oneself to the 
mediocrity that ownership generally terminated. In the third and final view, 
advocates proposed that simply owning a phone qualified a person for world 
citizenship. The view was that although the phone does not immediately make 
such world citizenship possible, it does offer the owner a route to active parti-
cipation in the global village. As with the first two views, in this standpoint too, 
not owning a phone suggested a person’s entombment in the hopelessness of a 
stagnant socio-political environment.  
In all three views, I traced two themes: (i) not owning a phone relegates a 
person to mediocrity due to a lack of access to information, and (ii) owning a 
phone offers a window of hope. The symbolic value of the phone, according to 
these views, rests in its representation of (or promise for) the future, and in what 
it suggests about the owner’s personal prospects. As appeared to be the case with 
the students’ sentiments about the Internet, the phone to them was a light in the 
darkness of hopelessness and lack of promise. The correlation I later found 
between the students’ relationship with the Internet and their relationship with 
the phone only served to testify to the students’ apparent belief in the phone as 
hope. During my months in Buea, I observed that the majority of visitors to 
Internet cafes were youths (mostly students), and that these young people tended 
to visit sites on higher education, with chat facilities, distant friends, games and 
football matches, celebrity images and other exotic images. I noticed that they 
visited social communities, Craig lists, match-making sites, porn sites, sites with 
tourist information and others promising opportunities for travel abroad.  
On closer reflection, I realized that all of these sites had one thing in common: 
They consistently offered promises or images that blotted out the reality of the 
present. They displayed mental, psychological and emotional highways to other 
realities, to better possibilities, and to hope. Nyamnjoh (2005), Jua (2003) and 
Akoko (2007) have all argued that the Internet is a magnate for young Ang-
lophone Cameroonians who, in that vast universe, are finding and asserting their 
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voice. The Internet, thus, is a place where one can beat the odds, and find and 
create possibilities. In a Cameroon where there is little hope of finding employ-
ment after university, nothing, I realized, compared to the implications of the 
images presented on Internet sites. The mobile phone, I now saw, with its porta-
bility, design and facilities, and with its access to worlds beyond the present, 
presented the same glimpse of possibilities and hope that images on the Internet 
gave. Students’ attachment to the Internet and their extensive use of the mobile 
phone therefore confirmed their need to look beyond the boundaries of their 
present and to look to the future.  
 
 
 
 Picture 8.2 Door to someone’s business place 
representing the juxtaposition between 
mobile telephony and religion: the number 
written in chalk and the religious 
expression in the form of a sticker. It is a 
theme that took me unawares in Buea, and 
proved to be a key framework of analysis. 
 [© Barbara Tah Gwanmesia] 
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The professionals 
Amongst the professionals, I found attitudes towards the phone that at first 
seemed so divorced and completely out of sync with the attitude of students that 
the notion of a corresponding motive for usage seemed improbable. Teachers, for 
instance, tended to treat the phone as a necessary evil, a thing of decadence, lies, 
crime and financial drain, yet indispensable for coordinating responsibilities, 
managing their home affairs, and opening up avenues for career enhancement, 
residual income, and micro-coordination. For the nurses and the other pro-
fessionals in the group, the phone tended to be seen as a career vaccine – a 
technology that was valuable for its ability to boost job and business opportu-
nities, enhance their social and family lives, and help organize daily affairs. 
Neither the nurses nor the teachers nor the mix of other professionals in the study 
saw the phone, therefore, as anything other than a useful gizmo necessary to 
make prevailing circumstances more manageable. The functionality of their 
relationship with the phone ostensibly showed them as realists – men and women 
who used the phone to make the best of life as it was, rather than as it ought to 
be. The students’ symbolic use of the phone, on the other hand, seemingly made 
them idealists, people whose attention was directed outwards. So, ostensibly, 
students used the phone to look outwards while professionals used it to look 
inwards – at the here and now. The dichotomy that this suggested between the 
two could not seem more real; yet what apparently was real was the fact that the 
aforementioned differences and dissimilarities between the two usage patterns 
were what made their respective motivation for uptake and use so alike and so 
very connected. 
It would take appreciation of the circumstances of each group against the 
backdrop of their mutual history and collective living conditions to clarify this 
fact for me. I saw, for instance, that regardless of their separate group micro-
circumstances, both the professionals and the students lived in an environment 
defined by a historical precedence that, for the majority of Anglophone Came-
roonians, had been destabilizing. Berner & Trulsson (2000: 277-309) noted that 
some sociologists argue that ‘the reduction of uncertainty is one of the major 
preoccupations of social life; the fight against continually produced disorder is 
imperative’. For the professionals and students in the study therefore, the over-
riding preoccupation has been their struggle to reduce uncertainty and negate all 
sense of vulnerability. Given their socio-cultural and socio-economic back-
grounds, this battle has been different for each group, yet the goal has remained 
the same. For example, on the one hand, the professionals have jobs in an en-
vironment where jobs are scarce, while for the students it is a possibility that 
seems farther and farther away given existing realities. What each then has 
 Negotiating insecurity through mobile telephony in Buea 143 
 
wanted the phone to do for them has been different, but the goal similar. History 
clarifies this point.  
As the history of Cameroon indicates, unemployment – especially amongst 
Anglophone Cameroonians – was the most immediate consequence of the eco-
nomic meltdown in the 1980s. By 2001, unemployment amongst Cameroon’s 
youth had grown to 49.9% (The Post Online Cameroon 14/2/2006), while a 2008 
report showed Cameroon’s national unemployment rate to have risen to 20% 
prior to 2007.5 In such conditions, having a (permanent) job meant possessing a 
gem. For the professionals, that gem was already at hand, so all they required of 
the mobile phone was for it to enhance whatever opportunity was there to aug-
ment the salaries they were earning and as such cushion the many eventualities 
that had become the feature of Cameroon’s ‘geography of crisis’, and, if possible, 
maintain the status quo in which they were salaried men and women. Making the 
here and now better as it was, was their concern. For the students however, the 
here and now was their problem. In the economic environment in which they 
were living (where at least 49% expected to be unemployed after graduating), 
there was little prospect of a job or a career after school. And so, like the Internet, 
which had thrown open a window onto a world of opportunities and possibilities 
with scholarships, jobs, new ideas and new playing fields, the phone was 
representative of a promise: To flee the mediocrity of the present and to network 
and find valuable coaching into the paradise of hope. Akoko (2007: 12) has 
contended that ‘with the added advantage of the internet and cellular phones, 
Cameroonians in the Diaspora daily liaise with relatives and friends at home, 
coaching them how to avoid the ever-sophisticated immigration hurdles mounted 
by Western governments’. 
It is clear, therefore, that though the ways in which the students and pro-
fessionals use the phone show marked differences, the motivation driving the 
different patterns of usage is the same. Just like the professionals, the students 
want to better their lives but, unlike the professionals, their peace of mind does 
not hinge on the status quo. Looking outwards through the phone is what 
promises to help them reach their goal. And this ‘looking outwards’ scarcely 
makes the students’ motivation for uptake and use any different from that of the 
professionals who are ‘looking inwards’. It only indicates that the manner in 
which the phone is translated to reduce uncertainties or lower any sense of 
vulnerability is different for the two, while the intention of use is the same. The 
two groups have little or no trust in the system’s ability to better their cir-
cumstances. Just as the one group has felt trapped within existing conditions, so 
has the other; and just as the one has been in hot pursuit of that which would 
reduce feelings of helplessness, mistrust and historically sewn anxiety, so has the 
                                                 
5  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/487ca1fa420.html. 
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other. Each group has sought to use the phone to make things happen for them, 
and has done so along routes reflective of their position in society. The same 
conclusion could not be avoided concerning the blind persons in the study, in 
spite of the improbability of any correlation between the blind and the two 
above-mentioned groups. 
The blind 
After studying the life stories of six blind people and interacting with thirty-one 
trainees in a rehabilitation centre for the blind, one thing became clear: For the 
majority of blind people, if not all, life amongst sighted people is informed by 
misunderstandings, prejudice, imposed dependence, disrespect and a lack of 
freedom. In his article ‘Sighted Don’t Want Blind’, Robert Feinstein writes:  
Sighted people condescend to us. They treat us like children or as if we are mentally 
impaired. They talk louder to us because they think we are deaf as well as sightless 
(…) Socially, blind are stuck in a corner. As a blind guy once put it, ‘Where you sit 
is where you stay! Sighted don’t want blind to mingle – you’re too awkward, you 
might ruin the party (…).’ (Feinstein 2003) 
Michael Simpson, the President of Blind Citizens Australia, adds: 
I genuinely believe that Blind Citizens Australia is making a difference and chang-
ing what it means to be blind, but sometimes I despair at the task before us. We 
continue to receive too many calls from people who have been discriminated against 
because of blindness, too many calls from people who can't find employment suited 
to them as a blind person, and too many calls from blind people who are concerned 
about the lack of specialist services. What is particularly frustrating is when organi-
sations which are publicly funded and have a charter to provide services to blind 
people treat us with disregard and abuse. (Blind Citizens News, February 1999) 
From these two comments, we get the sense that one of the most overriding 
concerns of the blind person is the ability to live a life of dignity, freedom and 
independence. In fact, this proposition becomes fact when the works of such 
prominent blind people as mountaineer Erik Weihenmayer, novelists Sally 
Hobart Alexander and Frances Lief Neer, along with the writings of contributors 
to various publications for the blind and occasionally the sighted across the world 
are compared. From these works, we see that what the blind person seeks most is 
independence, equity, respect, equality, empowerment and, above all, freedom – 
the freedom to be, to act and to go about his/her own business just like the next 
person.  
The lives of the blind participants in the study revealed that the blind of Buea 
are as restricted by the same sighted prejudices and ignorance that hound blind 
persons in other parts of the world; but that unlike the blind in rich countries,  
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 Picture 8.3 Blind, or visually impaired boy. If he can see any-
thing, it is just spots in darkness. With his phone he 
takes pictures and sends and receives text messages.  
 [© Barbara Tah Gwanmesia] 
 
 
blind people in Buea do not have access to the types of technological and insti-
tutional assistance that make independence and freedom easier for richer blind 
people to fathom. I found that the life of the average blind person in Cameroon is 
circumscribed by the same local conditions that have been stifling the aspirations 
of the students and professionals in this study.  
While Robert Feinstein can write that ‘we (the blind) are a thorn in their flesh 
(of the sighted), an irritation that they cannot rid themselves of because new 
legislation gives us minimal protection’ (Feinstein 2003) and Blind Citizens 
Australia’s President, Michael Simpson, confidently declared that ‘what is parti-
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cularly frustrating is when organisations which are publicly funded and have a 
charter to provide services to blind people treat us with disregard and abuse’ 
(Blind Citizens News, 02/1999). The blind people I met in Buea would be hard 
pressed to find any grounds on which to stand regarding dependence on a pub-
licly funded organization to advocate for or protect their rights. They, unlike their 
counterparts in the West, have to do all they can to better their own situation 
without relying on the state. Like the students and professionals in the study, they 
have an enduring desire to reduce their collective stress and uncertainties, and 
must fight to achieve this on their own. As a result, I came to glean three pre-
mises upon which the blind in the study use the mobile phone.  
Ordinarily, the blind use the phone to text (yes, text!), beep and call. They use 
it to take photographs (indeed!) and to entertain themselves through listening to 
ring tones or to the radio, or through playing with or on it. They also use the 
phone to send and receive money, organize their home and work lives and busi-
ness affairs remotely, as well as to keep in contact with family and relevant 
others. Additionally, they use it to search remotely for jobs, promote various acti-
vities and participate in diverse engagements. The operative word here, however, 
is ‘ordinarily’ because what I discovered to be the reality was that these usage 
patterns were no more than the front-office façade of what was actually taking 
place between the phone and the blind. I found that the phone had become three 
things to the blind people in the study, namely (i) an opportunity for pro-activity, 
(ii) a level playing field, and (iii) a window onto the world beyond. Let us 
consider these points in more detail. 
Rather than sitting back and waiting for the sighted to take initiatives, the 
blind were taking the upper hand and making calls to whomever, whenever and 
for whatever reason they chose. Fourteen-year-old Felicite, one of the visually-
impaired girls at the Bulu Blind Centre where I carried out much of my research 
amongst the blind set the tone for this conclusion. The Felicite I thought I knew 
was a timid and seemingly withdrawn girl, in any event she was withdrawn as far 
as I, a sighted stranger, was concerned. Yet Felicite not only mustered the cour-
age to call me by phone once, but multiple times, to say she wanted to talk to me. 
For Felicite to have picked up the phone and taken to calling a seeming stranger 
simply to express a certain sentiment, was pro-activity incarnate.  
On two occasions, blind people told me that ‘the sighted judge by sight’ and 
‘the sighted see but do not perceive’. If that were the case, then where the sighted 
could not judge a person by the sound of that person’s voice, the blind generally 
could. Or if a blind person could not attain such a feat, s/he would be in a 
position to deal with the sighted person on the same wavelength, i.e. by sound 
rather than by sight. Additionally, with the advantage of sight taken away, a 
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sighted employer, in the case of a job interview, would be hard pressed to judge a 
person’s physical status via a phone conversation.  
I came to realize that the phone had given blind people access to the world. No 
longer was it necessary for a blind person to leave the safety of his/her home for 
every engagement that involved distance. The blind person could now simply sit 
at home and be a world citizen, participating in phone conferences with other 
people without the danger of ever getting lost. Even when lost, as I discovered, 
the phone is now a trusted companion: where a lost blind person would pre-
viously have needed to request help from strangers, s/he now has the option of 
calling a friend or loved one for help. Borrowing from the sentiment of one of the 
blind participants in the study, the phone is now a sort of life line for many of 
those with the good fortune to own one. For them, its use as a means of com-
municating has become secondary to its ability to offer independence, freedom 
and a means to negotiate the stresses and uncertainties of life in Cameroon’s 
‘geography of crisis’.  
Family households 
Regarding the diverse family households in the study, I was able to draw five 
conclusions, though for this article it is the last two that are of immediate ana-
lytical relevance. The first conclusion I drew was that mobile telephony high-
lights the state of the relationship between household members by feeding into 
the existing patterns of interaction in the household. Secondly, by highlighting 
the state of a household, mobile telephony exacerbates any prevailing conditions 
in that home. Thirdly, by highlighting and exacerbating the conditions of a 
household, mobile telephony reveals what members of a household most need to 
fix amongst themselves or, rather, what is precious enough to be maintained. 
Fourthly, the way people use the phone in the home in relation to each other 
reveals attempts by household members to either distance themselves from others 
or become closer. And lastly, individuals use the phone within homes according 
to their personal aspirations and needs – be these geared towards the good of the 
entire household or the individual’s private agenda. 
As noted above, only the last two reflections are of relevance for this chapter. 
As for the fourth point, I noticed that in homes where rancour, tension and 
frustration prevailed, people’s relationships with and their handling of the phone 
were shrouded in secrecy. In addition, they tended to exhibit a marked resistance 
to sharing phone credit or phone-related devices. In homes where love and 
camaraderie reigned, the opposite held true. Turning to point five above, I found 
that individual aspirations tended to determine patterns of mobile phone use 
within households, resulting in diverse patterns of phone use within a single 
household. In some households, for instance, younger persons would spend time 
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calling or interacting with friends and other outside acquaintances by phone, 
while household heads, especially female household heads, would limit phone 
credit to managing domestic affairs, business or work-related matters and check-
ing on the well-being or activities of family members. These divorced phone 
usage patterns clearly exposed and reflected the concerns and aspirations of each 
user. Thus, just as for the students, the professionals and the blind in the study, 
the motivations for using mobile phones in family households exposed not only 
the desire to communicate, but also the relentless impulse to fulfil needs 
engendered by circumstance – be they perceived or real. 
Conclusion 
It becomes clear from the above that the motivation for mobile-phone uptake and 
use is not driven merely by a desire for communication or contact, but also by the 
wish to gain access to opportunities and meet needs. That data from members of 
such diverse groups as students, professionals, the blind, and household members 
would not only confirm general observations made in Buea about needs and up-
take patterns but link the motivation for mobile-phone uptake and use by these 
groups to their collective difficulties and historical deficiencies gives licence to 
the argument that rational, needs-based calculations motivate uptake and use of 
mobile telephony, and that this has been the case in Buea. For the students in this 
study, we see how their stifling living conditions, both perceived and real, geared 
their symbolic use of the phone towards edging away from the here and now. For 
the professionals, the need to lower existing uncertainties, to cushion the dearth 
of opportunities and bring order and organization to their lives has guarded their 
use of the mobile phone. For the blind, the desire for freedom and independence 
has driven motivation, while in family households, members’ individual needs 
have influenced uptake and usage patterns. In all these cases, communication 
itself becomes the motivating factor only when it is an end that is unequivocally 
filling a need.  
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Challenges for ethnographic  
research in fragile situations: 
Research among youth in  
post-war Burundi 
 
Lidewyde H. Berckmoes 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-war Burundi provides a research context that requires both the researcher 
and the researched to constantly assess and balance security and the research 
objective. This chapter discusses the methodological challenges in conducting 
ethnographic research, their implications for security and the data obtained; and 
the way this researcher approached the challenges. It reflects on the choice of 
research site, the social spaces available for research, openness, trust and in-
consistencies in interviews. It is argued that an important way of dealing with the 
methodological challenges posed by post-war contexts is to pay specific attention 
to the situatedness of data, exploring both ‘information’ and ‘context’ in a dia-
lectical manner. 
Introduction 
Discussions about war in Africa tend to prompt images of angry young men with 
machetes, brutal attacks on women and girls, and endless streams of refugees. 
These images have been circulating for decades in news broadcasts, newspaper 
reports and documentaries about Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the DRC. They 
depict what in academic and policy circles are known as the ‘new wars’, which 
can be differentiated from the ‘old wars’ in that they constitute interzonal events 
rather than conflicts between states (Richards 2005). These wars are often 
characterized as involving irregular militias of youth in primitive violence with 
no clear ideological basis. They are seen in the first place as expressions of an-
cient hatred, in which ethnicity and culture have become ‘ineradicable things-in-
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themselves’ (Richards 2005: 8; Vigh 2006). The 1993-2005 civil war in Burundi, 
which forms the backdrop for this chapter, has also been depicted in this way. 
Yet the representation of civil war as primitive violence provides an over-
simplified image of what actually happens. It restricts our understanding of the 
complex causes and different manifestations of civil war. Richards (2005: 12) 
argues in this respect that by analyzing war as ‘a disorderly bad’ it is unjustly 
taken out of its social context. Instead, war needs to be seen as a social possi-
bility, something made through social action and something that can be moder-
ated by social action. This allows one to look at people as agents acting during 
times of war and peace. It enables an exploration of not only questions about why 
or what war is but also how war comes about. Space is thus created to explore 
questions about peace-building processes and how to strengthen them, which 
seems especially relevant in Burundi where ‘peace’ continues to be very fragile. 
To research the practices of war and peace, an ethnographic approach is par-
ticularly useful (Ibid). ‘Ethnographic research allows one to slip beneath the 
obvious or speculative. It enables us to go behind the thin, shiny surfaces of 
politicized discourse and analyse everyday political praxis instead’ (Vigh 2006: 
22). I adopted an ethnographic approach in my research on Burundian youth but 
during fieldwork, which began in the summer of 2007, I was confronted with 
several methodological challenges. This chapter focuses on these challenges: 
Their implications for security and the data obtained; and the way I dealt with the 
challenges.  
The Burundian ‘terrain’ 
Burundi’s background, its turbulent history and its continued instability are 
important to an understanding of the methodological challenges I encountered 
during fieldwork. Burundi is a small landlocked country in the Great Lakes 
Region and for decades it has endured cycles of violence, refugee movements 
and waves of returnees. Since a new president was democratically elected in 
2005, Burundi has been officially recognized as a democracy at peace, but 
political struggles, economic challenges and the impact of war on the social 
fabric are posing recurrent threats to this peace. Updates on the political situation,  
security and development show fluctuating prospects from optimistic to negative 
and back again. Vigh (2006: 12), who conducted research in post-war Guinea-
Bissau, uses the concept ‘terrain’ to refer to such instability, arguing that ‘terrain’ 
takes on the quality of the different elements underlying the predicament of 
living in an unstable context ‘where one has to constantly assess and reinterpret 
the character, dangers and possibilities of the shifting social matter – having 
certainty only of the frailty of socio-political orders’. 
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Box 9.1     War and post-war in Burundi 
 
It will take too long to tell you [the history of this country] now, but if 
you know that everyone has a different version, you already know a 
lot. (Interviewee, Bujumbura, June 2007) 
  
The conflict in Burundi ran predominantly along ethnic lines – although different lines of 
division played an important role as well (Kadende-Kaiser & Kaiser 1997).1 Ethnic stratifi-
cation in Burundi, as in neighbouring Rwanda, can be traced back to pre-colonial times but 
hardened during German and Belgian colonial rule (Lemarchand in Waters 2003; Christensen 
1985). Rigid opposition was encouraged in this period, with the Tutsi minority being elevated 
to a higher level at the expense of the Hutu majority. Tension between the different groups 
rose after independence when ethnic violence flared up time and again, resulting in the in-
famous massacres of 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988. In its initial three republics, the Burundian 
government was dominated by Tutsi from the southern province of Bururi until democratic 
elections were held in June 1993. The first elected (Hutu) president was assassinated just a 
hundred days later in October 1993 and his assassination is often considered to mark the be-
ginning of the most recent civil war, which ravaged the country for the following decade.  
The first major step in peace negotiations resulted from international pressure. Overseen by 
South Africa, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000. 
‘This Agreement and its protocols marked the beginning of the transition out of war towards 
the development of new institutions designed to support and maintain peace, integrate the 
army, adopt a new constitution, organise elections, and kick-start development’ (Uvin 2007: 
39). However, its signing did not lead to a halt in the fighting and it was only after the largest 
rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, and the Burundian army signed a protocol on political, defence 
and security power sharing that fighting calmed down. Another rebel group, the FNL, did not 
lay down its weapons until April 2009 when it was transformed into a political party. 
Poor economic conditions, competing land claims by returning refugees and people who 
remained in Burundi during the war, human-rights abuses and a failing justice system continue 
to threaten hopes for a sustainable peace. The country’s social fabric and relations between 
people at all levels of society have been devastated by the war, exacerbating not only ethnic 
divisions but damaging personal relations between community members, neighbours and 
families (Tol et al. 2007). Establishing lasting peace still requires a lot of work. 
 
 
Instability has unavoidable consequences for ethnographic research as re-
search always carries with it the need to negotiate fieldwork practice. Yet this 
need is exacerbated in war and post-war contexts like in Burundi. Instability 
impacts on the reality studied as well as on the researcher’s own position. Both 
the researched and the researcher constantly need to assess and find a balance 
between the objective of the research and security. Furthermore, the constantly 
                                                 
1  In addition to the ethnic dimension, at least two other issues have been important in shaping the 
balance of power in post-colonial Burundi: regionalism, which refers tot the geopolitics that divide the 
country into three key regions where military control, the intelligentsia and an underprivileged ‘rest’ 
characterize the regions, and a ‘politicized military’. The military has dominated politics since the coup 
in 1966, resulting in a strong segregation between civilians and the military (Daley 2007; Kadende-
Kaiser & Kaiser 1997). 
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changing socio-political context and the uncertain living circumstances of the 
researched make information hard to ‘read’. Methodologically, this affects the 
informants who are approachable, matters of continuity, issues of trust and the 
reliability of data. Based on my experiences in Burundi, this chapter discusses 
these issues by looking into the choice of research site, the social spaces available 
for research, openness, trust and inconsistencies in interviews. First let us turn to 
the choice of the fieldwork research site. 
The fieldwork site: Centre Jeunes Kamenge 
After a day of project supervision in the rural province of Cibitoke, we returned to 
Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi. We made a short detour to one of the northern 
city quarters to drop off a girl we had taken along from Cibitoke; one of the clients 
of my host organization. It was my first time in these northern quarters – impover-
ished and overly crowded. The driver lurched from left to right not only to avoid the 
usual holes in the road which haven’t had any maintenance since before the war but 
also to avoid all the busses to and from town, bicycles carrying packs of bananas, 
market women and girls, idle boys, young men white from grinding maize, men on 
their way to the bars and, many goats – all manoeuvring for a place on the road. In 
the quarters, new houses were being built everywhere. Everything was in motion. 
Some buildings along the road, however, were desperately still, with bullet holes or 
blackened remnants as a reminder of more hostile times. The project coordinator 
pointed to the left and said to me: ‘Here, you see the flags? That’s where the Ka-
menge Youth Centre is. That’s where you should go to find out about the young peo-
ple in Bujumbura.’  
[Diary, 8 June 2007] 
Central in my research were the narratives on war and peace by male and 
female youth in Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura. The main research question 
focused on the perceptions of youth regarding the meaning of war and peace. 
Most of the empirical data gathering took place in Bujumbura’s northern quar-
ters; Kamenge and Cibitoke. The northern areas are amongst the poorest quarters 
of the capital. During the war, the area served as a primary battleground for rebel 
groups fighting the army and this resulted in almost all residents becoming 
refugees or IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) for a period of time. Relocating 
was important for security and, with continuing insecurity and poverty, this has 
remained a viable strategy to access new opportunities. During my research 
period, young people ‘moved’ or talked about moving to live with other family 
members who could take better care of them, going to boarding school or even 
fighting with rebel groups in the DRC (see Box 9.2) or in other parts of the 
country. 
A background of relocation, as a strategy for security and livelihood oppor-
tunities, suggested that the most interesting approach to understanding the ideas  
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Box 9.2     Interview with Ali, Bujumbura, July 2007 
 
‘They (youth) want to live in a way, I think it cannot be explained (…) it is because of the crisis the 
youth have known. They take the trouble to see how – they may even go to different countries, for 
example to the Democratic Republic of Congo – to attack others, to earn money (…) it is because of the 
jealousy they have. He has three of four nice pairs of shoes, he has three pairs of jeans, he lives at home. 
Maybe they have means? So he also will try to take the trouble and see how he can arrive at the level of 
the other (…) maybe even buy guns to kill people.’ 
 
 
and strategies of youth would be to let them and their networks, rather than 
locations as such, define the ethnographic research site. To understand young 
people’s views and different strategies or tactics, it was useful to follow several 
youth through time and space rather than to do research in one particular period 
and in one location only. As opinions and strategies should be understood as 
being embedded in particular situations, following youth would help gain a better 
understanding of this situatedness (Cf. Vigh 2006).  
Nevertheless, the limited time span for the research and security difficulties in 
particular did not permit this approach. Some of the reasons related to security 
that made youth move made me, as a researcher, stay – or at least limited my 
physical mobility. Several provinces were considered too dangerous for field-
work by both local people and (inter)national development organizations, while 
the mode of travel of most of the youth – local transport or walking – was highly 
discouraged for me too. Following youth to boarding schools or to their aunts’ or 
uncles’ homes in the collines (hills) in rural areas, let alone to rebel groups, was 
simply too risky. 
The large youth centre at the Kamenge-Cibitoke crossroads served as an 
alternative fieldwork site and became my base. The Centre Jeunes Kamenge 
(CJK) had been operating for fifteen years and was set up just before the last war 
to encourage better mutual understanding between youth of different (ethnic) 
groups. The CJK had succeeded in establishing a relatively safe and stable 
position in the area even throughout the war. It was an attractive site for a 
researcher because personnel working at the centre were a valuable source of 
information regarding the situation before and during the 1993-2005 war. In 
addition, the CJK was a place where I could meet many different youth and try to 
grasp some of the initiatives introduced to ensure lasting peace in the country. 
The youth centre, apart from constituting a clear geographical place, signified 
a particular social space too. Firstly, it was open to the general public. Secondly, 
by focussing on peace and reconciliation, the centre aimed to be ‘neutral’, at least 
there was no tolerance of overt displays of politically based or ethnic conflict. 
Both Hutu and Tutsi youth used to come there, sympathisers of the Palipehutu-
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FNL (until April 2009 a rebel group), CNDD-FDD and Uprona, who adhered to 
Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam.2 It was also a place/space for leisure 
(soccer, basketball, music, friends), study (there was a library) and debate and 
discussion. In addition, the CJK was to some extent seen as something from and 
connected to the ‘outside’: It was led by an Italian priest, received foreign fund-
ing, worked with themes like democratization and provided links to the global 
youth culture (which was visible in the foreign volunteers coming from Europe 
every summer).  
The social space implied some limitations for the data however, as the centre 
willingly or unwillingly excluded certain youth and discourses. For example, I 
was warned occasionally that only youth who had some willingness to leave past 
conflicts behind and to interact with youth from other ethnic groups were likely 
to frequent the centre. Girls generally had less spare time to spend meeting 
friends, reading books or playing sports. They were often discouraged from 
leaving the house, especially for leisure purposes. Although some girls did go to 
the youth centre, talking to them more than once or twice was difficult.  
Thirdly, youth working as bicycle taxi drivers or those selling oranges were 
too busy to hang out at the CJK. In addition, the poorest amongst them who had 
no decent clothing (or the possibility to borrow from friends or family) were 
unlikely to visit the youth centre. In a similar vein, discourses on acceptance and 
reconciliation were more likely to be heard than those arguing for renewed con-
flict and opposition. It was difficult to check whether this was because the more 
violent discourses were less prevalent amongst youth or because they were sim-
ply not approved of in the context of the CJK. While research at the centre 
opened up the possibility of doing research on a variety of topics with a range of 
youth, statements on Bujumbura youth in a more general (representative) way re-
mained problematic.  
Consequently, to gain insight into the views and strategies of a broader group 
of youth, it was important to take the youth centre as a starting point from which 
to explore other social spaces. The same security concerns that led me to do 
research at the youth centre were, however, still valid.  
Social spaces and access 
As mentioned above, a first security concern was related to geographical limita-
tions. These were informed, amongst others, by the designation of safe versus 
unsafe areas depending on where rebels were known to be active or to reside. It 
was sometimes very difficult for me to assess where the border was between safe 
                                                 
2  This is not to say that these categories were not significant but they were not stressed as opposites in 
this public and ‘neutral’ place. 
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and unsafe and I had to rely on information from international staff working at 
NGOs or UN agencies and local people. This was contradictory at times, leading 
to confusion and potentially dangerous situations, as the following anecdote 
illustrates: 
To explore the northern quarters and meet youth that did not visit the youth 
centre, I decided to walk around the neighbourhood with youth I trusted. They 
showed me the market, schools and where they lived, and they introduced me to 
their friends. On one of these trips while chatting and walking along, I realized 
all of a sudden that we were quite a long way from the youth centre. The hustle 
and bustle of crowded markets and traffic on the damaged tarred roads had been 
replaced by the gentle sounds of children playing on the side of the sandy path 
and the soft thud of our footsteps. I asked my 20-year-old guide where we were. 
‘Almost in Bujumbura Rurale’. (This was the capital’s neighbouring province 
that had received the ‘unsafe’ stamp by government and international NGOs.) I 
started feeling very uncomfortable when I saw some young men in rebel uni-
forms at the side of the road. Fortunately, they merely eyed me with some curi-
osity and continued their discussion about obviously more important matters. My 
guide seemed to feel at ease and was having a good time but it was not until we 
arrived back in more crowded parts by bicycle taxi (the fastest way of getting 
back) that I could relax a bit. 
I had assumed that I could rely on my local guide to assess where it was safe 
for me to move around. Although, fortunately, nothing happened, I had not felt 
safe. My young guide lived in these quarters and had told me he wanted to show 
me ‘his area’. It became clear, a bit too late, that he had taken advantage of my 
wish to see how and where people lived to be able to explore the places where he 
had previously not been able to go. Although he lived in the northern quarters, 
the area had been ethnically segregated during the war and for a long time going 
into areas ‘of the other ethnic group’ was very dangerous. It was almost as if I 
had functioned as his safeguard, instead of him being mine. 
On a positive note, the experience provided me with insight into the current 
role of, and attitudes towards, the rebel group in the area. The ease with which 
my guide passed by the young ‘rebels’ and the normalcy with which they stood 
at the side of the road demonstrated how the rebel group was part and parcel of 
the northern quarters. They were no strangers who only came out at night, al-
though testimonies and newspaper articles depicted this side of the story too.  
Another concern regarding accessing different spaces was related to my ability 
to move around and conduct research alone. I was regularly warned by people 
from my host organization and various youth never go out alone, not even in the 
city centre. These warnings referred to the city’s high crime rate. Muggings and – 
as I was told but never discovered at first hand – the ‘groping of women’ oc-
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curred regularly. I took certain precautions and always went with my research 
assistant. She would come to the city regularly at weekends to go shopping as 
there was more choice and the products were of better quality there than in the 
suburban markets. She also taught me how to move in a way so that people 
would be less inclined to bother me. The drawback of this though was that I did 
not really have time to look around and make good observations but I com-
pensated for this by going to the city centre more frequently. The following ab-
stract from my diary illustrates this: 
Joslyne resolutely and adroitly edged her way through, while I could hardly keep up 
the pace. She was going to show me around the market: First the fruit, piled up in 
neat staples in front of squatting women and girls; then the section with women’s 
clothing where big mama’s tried on huge white bras over their colourful dresses. We 
hurried on, trying not to trip over the invalid young man and the begging elderly 
ladies with children on their laps squatted in the pathways. I completely lost my 
sense of direction. Past the men’s clothing, skipping the meat section, and off to the 
colourful African fabrics. We rushed on to the comestible section. Joslyne wanted to 
buy spaghetti and NIDO milk powder for her sister who just had a baby. We went 
straight to the booth of a young man she knew from secondary school. She bought 
the spaghetti, but the young man had run out of NIDO – ‘I don’t want the one im-
ported from Kenya, the one from the Netherlands is better’ – and we had to go some-
where else (…) She moved through the food stands, all selling more or less the 
same, looking for the right kind of NIDO for an acceptable price. This was hard 
because Joslyne did not really take the time to look or inquire, afraid to reveal any 
uncertainty. We moved around as if we had to catch a bus. When we found the 
NIDO, she was clearly relieved that we could go. 
We concluded the afternoon in a café next to the market, where I could catch my 
breath too. Joslyne explained me why we had rushed through the market: ‘If you 
seem not to know where you are going, people will bother you’. 
[Diary, 30 June 2007] 
A third concern was that places and spaces for research were restricted during 
the hours of darkness as this was the most dangerous time of the day. When I was 
staying at a hostel, I could continue to collect data after darkness fell because 
some young people were living at the hostel, some were working there and the 
owner’s children were there too. Going to the northern quarters and visiting the 
places where most youth hung out at night was not considered safe. Regrettably 
therefore, when informants invited me to go salsa dancing on Friday night at a 
local pub in their quarter, I had to decline the invitation. There was also a time 
dimension that profoundly impacted on the social spaces in which I could do 
research.  
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Picture 9.1 Football match in the northern quarters of Bujumbura, Burundi 
 [© Lidewyde Berckmoes] 
 
 
 Degrees of trust and levels of anxiety were affected by the political situation.3 
This resulted in a level of suspicion that may have influenced the reliability of 
some of the answers received and it affected my access to people’s private 
spaces. Wagner (1996: 25) also described this problem in Burundi: People were 
discouraged from being her host and she was not invited to private ceremonies or 
cultural events as people were afraid that her presence would attract official 
attention. During my research too, some youth clearly felt more confident about 
meeting me in public places like the youth centre. Yet I believe this had less to 
do with a fear for ‘official attention’ than with a general fear of introducing 
strangers into their personal spaces. Political and personal reasons informed this 
fear. This difficulty in access posed an important obstacle in my research and 
made it much more difficult to situate youth within their families and commu-
nities.  
Restricted access to different spaces limited the possibilities for participant 
observation as a method for data collection. I therefore asked several young 
people to keep a diary for a week so I could gain insight into their thoughts and 
actions in the spaces where I could not follow them. Unfortunately, only two 
                                                 
3  Cf. Wagner (1996) who conducted research in Burundi between 1985 and 1987. 
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boys seemed to understand what I wanted, as the other youth simply wrote an 
‘essay about their life’, which was informative too but in a different way. 
Reticence and inconsistency 
Interviews and informal conversations proved to be important research tools but 
they were not without difficulties either. The general political sensitivity in Bu-
rundi allowed for only limited openness on many topics, at least in public. Group 
discussions proved unproductive when discussing personal views on war as these 
discussions were often linked to ethnic and political opinions, grief and griev-
ances. For this reason, I primarily used individual interviews that were char-
acterized by non-directed questions and covered a wide range of topics. The 
focus in these was on young people’s daily occupations, their personal histories 
of the war and post-war period, and their ideas about war and peace now and in 
the future.  
Surprisingly, many young people seemed to feel fairly free to discuss politics 
and ethnicity during individual conversations and interviews but were more 
evasive on topics like their (often precarious) family situations. I would then not 
probe any further. Though ethnographic research rarely involves significant or 
damaging consequences as a result of the actual process of research (Ham-
mersley & Atkinson 1995: 268), I felt it was necessary, particularly in this 
sensitive setting, to consider carefully any likely effects on the young people 
involved. I was especially cautious about causing emotional distress, as there 
were few structures in place to deal with this.4 Another motivation for not 
probing was that I took the unwillingness of youth to discuss certain (private) 
topics as a sign that they did not deem it safe enough. After some weeks, I saw 
this to indeed be true. Nanette, a girl I was interviewing without my inter-
preter/research assistant, explained that she would not have been able to discuss 
her home circumstances and difficulties with me had my interpreter been around. 
She was afraid to show any vulnerability in the presence of fellow countrymen 
because it might lead people to take advantage of her. Hiding her problems was 
her way of protecting herself. Another reason for not talking about certain mat-
ters was related to attitude, and Nanette explained why her friend was not in-
terested in talking to me:  
But you see, she for example, she is a good friend. But she, she has problems. But 
she does not like to talk about them with you. She ‘stays alone’ [without asking help 
from others]. She does not want anybody to know her problem. She does not want 
anybody to know. She talks with a lot of people, but not about her problems. She is 
cool. (June 2007)  
                                                 
4  Fortunately, HealthNet TPO Burundi was my host organization – a psychosocial healthcare organi-
zation – and I could always fall back on their expertise.  
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When we continued our conversation on why people were not sharing their 
problems with others, she explained that it was often just deemed useless to share 
problems due to a lack of solutions: 
Me: ‘A lot of people do not seem to like to talk about their problems, do they?’ 
Nanette: ‘It is because, you see, if you talk to someone about your problems, there is, 
there is, there is nothing that will help you. Because here we are all, we are poor. 
Everyone. You cannot, you cannot tell someone your problem. If you do tell them 
your problems, you will find that the other one, that she has more problems than you. 
What are you going to say? You can, you cannot, you have to say no, it is better that 
I leave it all. Because if I do tell her, she will have problems like me. There is no-
body who can help you.’ (June 2007) 
A range of issues affect the openness of youth in interviews and conversations. 
Thus, it is crucial when doing research in hazardous places, like Burundi, to try 
and understand not only what is being said but also what is left unsaid and why it 
is being left unsaid. This brings us to a related problem that can be encountered 
when interviewing: Inconsistencies in the stories told. 
I spoke to many of the young people several times. Usually I interviewed the 
youth once officially and the other times I talked to them were when I was just 
hanging out at the youth centre. But rather than getting a clearer picture of these 
youth, remaining in contact with them seemed to work the other way. The more 
often I spoke to them, the more I noticed irregularities in their stories, and the 
more confused I got. Answers even to simple questions, for example ‘what do 
you do?’, seemed to change on an almost weekly basis: From ‘I go to school, I 
am a student’ to ‘I have nothing to do’ or ‘I am a working youth’. 
Instead of viewing these inconsistencies as lies, it was useful to see them as 
ways of voicing hopes and fears and as expressions of tactics of representation. 
With the above example of their occupations, it seemed that the youth would 
often claim to be a student as long as they believed/hoped that they could come 
up with the necessary school fees at the end of the semester. It did not mean, 
however, that they were actually attending school regularly at the time. Freddy, 
for instance, introduced himself to me as a busy student. A mere two weeks later 
he told me he was like other youths who had nothing to do and he was feeling 
lazy, poor and bored. It appeared that he had not found a way to find the school 
fees needed and was frustrated with his lack of possibilities.  
Some other youth seemed to present themselves as a ‘student’ for more 
tactical reasons. For instance, being a student was obviously considered more 
‘honourable’ than being unemployed and perhaps I would be interested in having 
another research assistant. By stressing poverty and unemployment, pity would 
be more easily obtained or the youth could more convincingly demonstrate so-
ciety’s wrongs in their stories about life in Burundi. At other times, perceptions 
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Picture 9.2 Women and girls gathered at the water pump, north of Bujumbura 
 [© Lidewyde Berckmoes] 
 
 
seemed to change because of political or personal sensitivities – first it was as-
sessed who was asking the question and why, and then who could actually hear 
the answer.  
Interpreting data requires a good sense of the context. For instance, even 
though politics was not a taboo subject as such, when discussing the subject it 
was often first determined, though not in so many words, which ethnic group my 
research assistant belonged to. I learned a lot from working with her. Joslyne’s 
presence in different settings and with different youth helped me to unravel the 
relevance of particular characteristics of her identity in various contexts. Looking 
at the interaction between her and other youth during our interviews allowed me 
to gain insight into the importance of social divisions between youth. Joslyne was 
a relatively well-off Burundian Hutu university student from the same neighbour-
hood as the youth we were interviewing. Knowing this about her enabled me to 
compare different situations and ‘play’ with this knowledge during interviews. A 
systematic analysis of how other non-student Hutu girls or Tutsi youth reacted to 
her in relation to various topics (and vice versa) provided me with clues as to 
how answers were negotiated. I compared answers about views and experiences 
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given in her presence and when she was not around, which gave me more insight 
into the sensitivity of particular issues and the ‘situatedness’ of the answers. 
Aside from this, observing Joslyne’s body language in a setting with bragging 
boys or a tough young woman was telling regarding gender relations. When I 
asked her about my observations, she would also reflect on them in order to help 
me. 
‘Situating’ answers does not only help unravel the meaning of certain in-
formation given verbally but also helps to better understand the context. The 
changing answers of Burundian youth were in part related to the instability of the 
Burundian terrain. Views on war and peace, and assessments of the current cir-
cumstances or future possibilities were especially changeable because the situ-
ation could alter very quickly. Life might be fine one day but this could change 
overnight: A violent attack or losing one’s job remained threats and such in-
cidents were reported daily in the media. The sense of increasing security and 
movements towards peace can easily evaporate too. Utas’s 2005 article entitled 
‘Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering’ provides another good example of the way 
situating answers as a methodology helps to gain understanding of both people 
and the context in which people live. ‘Victimcy’ is explored as a form of self-
representation that young women use tactically in wartime to deal with their 
circumstances. Trying, uncertain and disempowering circumstances demand such 
responses from actors in times of war: Presenting oneself as a victim tells us 
something both about the self and the context in which this self is being pre-
sented.  
This implies, first, that in order to interpret data in fragile situations, a per-
ceptual shift from interviewing and/or participant observation to the observation 
of participation and interviewing is needed (Cf. de Jongh & Steyn 1997: 34). 
Asking where and how an answer is given and where and how it changes in 
another context are crucial to understanding what is being said and what has been 
left unsaid. Secondly, through ‘situated information’ one can learn more about 
the context in which this information is formed and given. Interpreting data and 
context can therefore perhaps best be understood as a dialectal process in which 
the researcher has to continuously reflect on the information and the context in 
which the information is articulated and obtained. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has discussed some of the methodological challenges that may be 
encountered when doing ethnographic research in hazardous situations. While the 
ethnographic method is useful in analyzing situations of ‘no war no peace’ 
(Richards 2005), such as in Burundi, there can be obstacles to the successful use 
of this method. In fragile contexts, these obstacles need to be confronted, nego-
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tiated and reflected upon. Paying specific attention to the situatedness of data by 
exploring both ‘information’ and ‘context’ in a dialectical manner is one impor-
tant way of doing this.  
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